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"Man is a born free, 
r , and everywhere you 
find him in chains." 
1 (J&an Jacques Rousseau) 
PREFACE 
Our paper does not assert a right to be a monograph. Therefore, it could 
not broaden more the framework of its subject-matter, being not able to 
apply in their entirety either the methods or the systematization demanded by 
a monograph. 
Our work has been created in the course of the research and educational 
activitity displayed in our institute. In. respect of the latter one, we had started 
— just owing to the more and more general use of manipulation — from the 
principle approved by us that a human or a disciple is not a vessel to be filled 
up but a torch to be inflamed. 
In our paper we are emphasizing some thinkers or more exactly some his-
toric periods that, as primary ones, we deem as characteristic enough to illu-
minate the formation and development of the political and legal doctrines and, 
possibly, to elaborate the theme more fully, as a result of our fur ther investi-
gations. 
Marxist science goes far to acknowledge that in the long process of 
culture and civilization reflecting both continuity and interruptions there have 
been produced values, even in the long past ages. A study of these values 
cannot be avoided if we want to understand Past and Present and f rame Fu-
ture. In that w;e are meeting Goethe according to whom "we need to sum up at 
least three thousand years for understanding the reality of to-day". And we 
are reminded of the same by the sometime British politician, Macdonald who 
told that history was always writ ten for rendering us help to follow abruptly 
the way of progress and not in hundred years. 
Our aim has been, af ter analysing a number of political and legal doctri-
nes, to emphasize what may at present "mean" something different from its 
meaning some decades before or may say something else to our own days than 
supposed, and possibly suggested, by earlier scholars. We have laid stress upon 
regarding Marxism, free from any dogmatism, as a method, applying it, like 
this,. as a guide to action. 
It is frequently mentioned by classical scholars that the question of struc-
ture of the State was first raised by a Greek philosopher, and the question 
was answered brilliantly by several Greek scholars. These answers are impor-
tant, delightful ones but if the matter in hand is the structure of the present 
State it remains questionable what, our "politics" can begin with the problems 
raised and answered by the Greeks. At any rate, we have obtained from the 
"replies" of the Greeks and of others not only some awareness of life but 
experiences, science, exchange of working method, as well and — together 
with these — essentially also some continuance that is philosophically a part of 
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the change, the revolutionary change, too, if regarding the history of the whole 
of Mankind. 
We are aware of the presence of Man: "zoon politikon", "homo politicus", 
"homo oeconomicus", "homo technicus" in raising these questions, formulating 
these suppositions, performing our investigations, collecting evidences, drawing 
the conclusions, understanding or misunderstanding the results. We must take 
that, too, into consideration. And we know Robert Burns's celebrated lines 
that are so characteristic of his age: 
"But human bodies are sic fools, 
For a 'their colleges an' schools, 
That when nae real ills perplex them, 
They mak enow themsel's to vex them; 
An' aye the less they hae to sturt them, 
In like proportion, less will hur t them." (The two Dogs) 
Belief and optimism of the scholar and seeker af ter truth helped and 
obliged us to accomplish our work. It is shown by the Basic Literature, 
providing as we do hope an outlook to the world, how immense the material 




SUBJECT-MATTER AND METHODS OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
THINKING 
Politics and law were born after the disintegration of the tribal system. The 
evolution of both social phenomena was associated with the creation of a power 
mechanism segregated f rom society. And the segregated power mechanism 
emerged from society as the outcome of the intrinsic contradictions of society, 
the birth of private property and the concomitant establishment of classes. 
The segregated mechanism, or, in other words, the State, is the product of 
historical necessity and not of the error or malice of Man. There was need 
for the State to ensure the fur ther evolution of society, its progress, i.e. the 
evolution for which there was no chance within ' the clan organization of 
society. Consequently the State came into being on the stage of history as a 
matter of necessity. 
: Together with the State also the law was born, as a peculiar set of rules 
giving expression to the will of the ruling class, rules whose observance was 
in the last resort guaranteed by the mechanism segregated f rom society, viz. 
the State. 
The State as a segregated organizational system, and the law as a specific 
system of norms or rules produced the relevant political and legal opinions. 
A political opinion is any opinion expressing the relation of the contending 
classes to the State, i.e. the political power. On the other hand, a legal opinion 
is any opinion of society which expresses the methods and forms in which 
the antagonistic classes organize power. Since State and law as institutions 
are jointly present in society, the political and legal views or opinions are 
closely interrelated. 
The technical term "politics" is used in literature, in theory as well as in 
. practice in a variety of senses.. There are doctrines^ and for our part we adhere 
to these in the first place, according to which the term "politics" ' is syn-
onymous with the term "State". In this sense we identify the term "politics" 
with that of "State". Consequently, when the political views of certain thinkers 
are analyzed, primary stress is laid on their views and ideas of the State. 
These views may refer to the origin of the State, the organization of the State 
and the structure of this organization. These views may as well refer to the 
functions of the State, its sovereignty, i ts alienation, the relations of the State 
and society, economy, ideology, the individual, democracy, the relations of the 
political parties and also to the withering away of the State. However, the 
term '.'politics" applies not only to the State, or to its organization and acti-
vities, but to all social organizations and their activities which have as their 
goal the maintenance and the change of the political power (here the term 
"policy" would be more appropriate). The central category of politics and also 
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of policy is power. Apart f rom the fact that there is also a general definition 
of power in current use and that this category, i.e. power may be applied also 
to other social phenomena, by political power we understand power which in 
a definite society, e.g. in a capitalist, yet even socialist society, has a privileged 
opportunity to settle and control the relations of the social classes, social strata, 
or social groups opposing one another, or professing conflicting interests. Hence 
the sovereign power enforced by its agencies constitutes a species of the poli-
tical power. Consequently policy manifesting itself in association with the 
State is nothing else but an activity aimed at the acquisition of political power 
and its organization, and fur ther a conscious activity related to the structure, 
guidance and operation of sovereign power. Political ideas are more or less 
concepts cast into a system, concepts on whose pattern political activities take 
place. One also has to be. aware of a difference between the organization of 
society. and the political organizations of the State, although the political 
element is present in both, yet manifests itself in a different manner. 
Law, too, as a technical term has received a variety of interpretations: in 
both literature and also in the course of historical evolution. In the course of 
history the term "law" was bisected in certain periods: as a. mat ter of fact 
there was talk of natural law and also of positive law. Positive law in all cases 
meant a system of rules created by certain agencies of the State. On the other 
hand, natural law was a system of rules which had its place above the 
statutory system of rules. Here the term "law" denotes a certain system of 
rules of conduct required and enforced by the State, or, actually, by the ruling 
class, i.e. a system called into life and, in the last resort, enforced by the 
State, and which in all cases gives an expression to the interests or the will 
of. the ruling class. Hence when we analyze the views of certain thinkers 
about the law, we shall in the first place study their opinions on the origin!, 
system, division, structure, creation and application of the law, on its effects 
and operation, on its relations to the person, to democracy, to morals, on the 
relations between legality and legal order, on political and legal consciousness, 
and on the withering away? of the law. It is beyond doubt that the doctrines 
exposed by the sanie thinkers in connexion with the principal problems of 
the particular branches of law come under the same heading, and so also e.g. 
the opinions formed of the constitution, ideas associated with property and 
commerce, and even. the doctrines developed of penalty, i.e. the principal 
problems of the administration of justice, etc. -
Also the theoreticians of the bourgeois countries try to analyze the prin-
cipal political views and legal doctrines, turning up in. the course of history, 
within the framework of the various disciplines. These analyses are distin-
guished by.a number of peculiarities. They set out first of all from the concept 
that the. political views and legal doctrines have priority over the underlying 
economic conditions, i.e. that the ideas determine the social, economic arid 
class relations, or, in other words, the ideas are independent of the given 
social and economic conditions. Furthermore, these analyses when reviewing 
the ideas of the great political and legal thinkers, have recourse to the 
sorcalled method of positivist epitomization, i.e. they merely describe the 
various political views and legal doctrines of these thinkers, and refuse to take 
up a position in respect of them. Further it is a characteristic trait of these 
bourgeois analyses that they follow what is called the teleological method, i.e: 
they deal with thinkers of old in a sense doing justice to the interests of: the 
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given ruling classes, i.e. they lay stress on the opinions which conform to the 
interests of the given ruling class. Thus these analyses peter out in an abstract 
treatment of the various; ideas and doctrines, in an emphasis laid on the eter-
nity of certain ideas. This method manifests itself in the circumstance that hew 
ideas are ignored and only the changed conditions are recognized. To these 
conditions they attribute peculiarities.which revive the ideas of old. Bourgeois 
theoreticians fur ther proclaim that only great personalities, the so-called stra-
tum of thé élite, are capable of carrying political ideas, or of grasping and 
applying them, and that only this stratum has the faculty of identifying itself 
with these political values. 
The Marxist approach to the political and legal doctrines rejects the ideas 
of the bourgeois theoreticians here reviewed. Still it considers the study of 
the fruits of earlier human, i.e. political and legal thinking important, for 
the very reason because a study of the history of ideas will display the struggle 
of the old and the new in the sphere of social phenomena, and shows the path 
to a scientific concept of State and law. Marxist scientific activity in the 
analysis of the historically determined class opinions and doctrines of State 
and law sets out from the ways in which these opinions reflect the changes 
taking place in the underlying social and economic structure, i.e. in the course 
of a scientific analysis the Marxist approach emphasizes that the political and 
legal ideas so developed are seemingly independent of any material activity 
or economic base; however, in reality these ideas are created by Man, and he 
creates in an ideological structure the conflicts manifesting themselves in the 
underlying economic structure, or existing in it, or, in other words, the class, 
stratum and group conflicts. This is the starting basis which will promote the 
proper valutation of the various political doctrines and opinions. Naturally, 
also other methods of approach will have to be defined, methods which are 
indispensable for the appraisal of the opinions of certain political and legal 
thinkers. It cannot be argiied e.g. that the political and legal doctrines once 
born are influenced by earlier mental materials. These doctrines are fur ther 
affected also by the personality of those calling into life political and legal 
doctrines, and even by ideas which have emerged in other countries. 
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PART ONE 
PRINCIPAL TRAITS OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL THINKING 
IN THE SLAVE AND FEUDAL SOCIETIES 
1. Confucius; Han Fey; Lao-tze; Kautilya; Hammurabi; Hoseah; Ezekiel. — 
2. Aristotle; Platón. — 3. Cicero. — 4. St. Augustine; St. Thomas Aquinas; Martin 
;• Luther; Thomas Muenzer. — Basic Literature. 
¡ [l.J Doctrines of State and law first developed in the Orient of Old. The 
political and legal doctrines of the ancient Orient displayed the various aspects 
and phases of the evolution of the given social systems. In China, doctrines 
on politics and law developed in particular in the period of the Tchou Dynasty. 
Namely in this period the forces of production began to grow vigorously, the 
introduction of the use of iron tools brought about an extensive fermentation 
in. economic life. This led to the evolution of trade, commodity and financial 
relations. In the last resort these developments brought about the union of 
the many principalities, and eventually were responsible for the fall of the 
Dynasty of the Tchou. In the feudal system built 'up in the period of this 
dynasty; numerous political and legal doctrines were born. In the state 
mechanism segregated from society, the doctrines of Confucius were adopted. 
Confucius (born in 541 B.C.) and his followers proclaimed that the ruling 
class could not maintain its power unless it relied on a civil service, the 
administrative organization, trained in the traditions of the past. They , fur ther 
taught that only civil servants recruited from among the nobility were capable 
of guiding the ignorant masses. They tried to guide and improve the ignorant 
masses by the idealization of the past. In this idealization of the past, the 
family had an important function. This ideology professed the idea of the 
humility and the passive obedience of the people and gave expression to it in 
the following notion: "power is equal to the wind, the people to the grass, and 
if the wind blows, the grass (the people) will have to bow." The ideas of 
Confucious and his followers were, opposed by Kwan-tchong and Han-fey. 
Their doctrines, too, sprang up as the products of the developing commodity 
and money economy. Namely commodity and money economy insisted on the 
protection of private property, and at the same time on a uniform legal system, 
reinforced by an efficient civil service and strong sovereign power. Han-fey 
attacked the adoration of the past, and did not make the values of the system 
dependent on the ethical qualities of the ruler and his officials. He believed 
that principal sources of a good system lay in the political and legal insti-
tutions. However, in this concept the functions of the ruler were thrust to the 
background. Han-fey and his followers set out from the notion that the legal 
provision was the.mainstay of order. On the other hand a legal provision was 
good only in so far as it . expressed various ideals. So e.g. the legal provision 
should give expression and guarantee the prevalence of the ideal of justice, or 
express and guarantee the ideal of penalty and reward. Consequently the 
State could operate even independently of the personal abilities of the ruler 
because the legal rule, through the ideals guaranteed by. it, could cause the 
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State to function appropriately. Hence the doctrines of Han-fey had as their 
end the fur ther growth of the commodity and money relations, and thereby the 
suppression of feudalism. It was by no means purely accidental that this 
doctrine analyzed the legal rules in detail f rom the aspects of their logical 
peculiarities and structure. Thus Han-fey and his followers tackled the prob-
lems of the abstract nature of the normativity of the law. Han-fey was in 
favour of a central power and believed that the huge centralized Chinese 
Empire should be governed in a bureaucratic manner, i.e. with the aid of 
legal norms or provisions, and by a staff of civil servants. 
The theory of Han-fey and his followers was readily embraced by King 
Tcheng. King Tcheng, or otherwise called the First. Yellow Ruler, made efforts 
for a complete unification of the State. He liquidated the feudal principalities 
and organized thirty-six administrative regions in their place. He issued a 
large number, of decrees and in the name of the State insisted on their absolute 
observance. The decrees and the statutory provisions set out from the idea 
that Man has two properties. The first property of Man is the totality of 
invariable properties, while the second is the totality of the acquired pro-
perties. As Han-fey pointed out that an adequate legal system was capable 
of shaping the acquired properties of Man. I.e. the legal system was capable 
of reinforcing in Man the sense of discipline, duty and obedience. He set out 
f rom the thesis that the penalties were the principal guarantees of a proper 
conduct of Man. He also taught that the laws had to be adjusted continually 
to the changing social conditions, i.e. that the laws did not exist f rom time 
immemorial. Besides Han-fey, also Ma-tse struggled against the doctrines of 
Confucius. He rejected the cult of the ancestors, as in his opinion this meant 
an excessive burden on the indigent classes. He thought that human relations 
should be based on love rather than on obscure doctrines. 
Already in this period Lao-tse- disagreed with the doctrines of Han-fey. He 
believed that the interference of the State with the life of society violated the 
underlying idea exposed in the principle of Tao, i.e. the concept of non-action: 
According to his teaching, the legal provisions carried with themselves also 
their violation, and so the legal provisions would produce disillusionment, 
sorrow, disquiet in society; on the other hand, the ruler must not. interfere 
with the affairs of the people. This thesis he expressed in the Book of the 
Path and Virtue as follows: 
"The sharp weapons of the State > . 
Must not be brandished to the people." 
From this logically followed his notion of an ideal ruler: A good ruler is 
the man who is capable of enforcing his will without violence, who is lenient 
to the people and does not turn against the evil actively. 
In the era of the Han Dynasty, between 206. B.C. and 220 A.D., again 
Confucianism became the official ideology of the State. Confucius was deified 
officially. Since King Tcheng had the books of Confucius burned, the theses 
attributed to him had undergone a metamorphosis. In this period, Confucian-
ism manifested itself already as a doctrine directed against feudalism, and 
thus it became the tool for laying the foundations of the bureaucratic order 
of the State, as the official doctrine. In 220 A.D. the Han Dynasty fell, and 
the teachings of Buddhism began to spread in China: 
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India was the cradle of Buddhism, at about 500 B.C. Before >Buddhism, 
Brahmanism ruled in India. I t expressed the ideology, of the caste of priests 
standing above the "unclean", and within this ideology it developed its political 
and legal doctrines. In point of fact, Brahmanism was the means of the 
sanctioning and preservation of the caste-system in India. In order to sanction 
the caste-system, Brahmanism proclaimed theses according to which the priests 
sprang forth f rom the mouth of primitive man, the knights from his arms, the 
common people f rom his. hips, and the "unclean" f rom his soles. Brahmanism 
guaranteed the dominant role for. the caste of the priests. The priests ensured 
their dominant rule by training. The priests were, recruited from the sons of 
the first three castes. For ten years they were taught by priests and even af ter 
the completion of their studies, they remained under. the supervision» of priests 
throughout their lives. Unlike Brahmanism, Buddhism displayed the doctrines 
of ; the caste of the knights, i.e. the military aristocracy. Strictly speaking, 
Buddhism tried to reform Brahmanism as . a teaching of religious origin. 
Buddhism owed its birth to the lively trade and the developing industry. In 
fact the caste-system clogged on economic development. Hence; the opinions of 
the merchants, i.e., the ideas of the common people found an expression in the 
circles of the knights. Unlike Brahmanism, Buddhism emphasized that not 
everybody must practice asceticism (i.e. nobody had to abandon the family at 
a definite age). Accordingly everybody must take care of his own salvation. 
In addition, Buddhism recognized the order of hermits and monks, and every-
body could join this order. Although Buddhism carried on a struggle against 
Brahmanism and gave expression to the endeavours of the knights and 
merchants, and also of certain layers of the common people, still with its ideal 
of passivity it paralyzed the masses. In fact Buddhism taught that the acme 
of wisdom was despisé of life and indifference to all things: Beyond doubt 
this doctrine was not directed towards an abolition of the caste-system. It con-
tinued to reinforce the power of the priests and knights, as the economically 
ruling classes, in particular their power over the "unclean". It reinforced it also 
by sending the Buddhist monks into the fold to teach the, people to indiffe-
rence. Indian political and legal doctrines found an expression in the various 
Indian epical poems, so in the Mahabharata and ' the Ramayana. - Still these 
doctrines turned up also in Manu's Code, which was edited by the Brahmin 
Kautilya. According to Kautilya, the State was composed of seven elements. 
The first of the elements was the king, fur ther elements were the ministers, 
the territory, the capital, the Treasury, the army and the international alliances. 
The genesis of a political organization in a .definite territory was duei to a 
corruption of• the customs and habits of men, i.e. "men have been, seized by 
the desire of possession, they have extended their arms towards the strange, 
have become the slaves of passions, did not know what they must do and 
what they must not, they could not distinguish permitted and forbidden acts, 
have failed to discover á difference between sin and virtue, the good and the 
evil, iri one word, between the forbidden and the permitted". The epics and 
the law-books praised power, because the ruling classes considered the power 
of the king to . be the safeguard of order, and proclaimed unconditional 
obedience of the subjects. The principles of human coexistence were summed 
up in the so-called Trivarga. The Trivarga in fact combines three, systems of 
norms. These included the. legal norms, the norms of customary law, and 
religious duties. The second system of norms implied the norms governing the 
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practical activities of man, i:e. the system of norms controlling economic 
activities, artistic endeavours and efforts directed towards the achievement -of 
definite targets. Of the systems of norms, the first had the greatest 'sig-
nificance. It was called the Dharma. r 
The epical poems and Manu's Code clearly revealed the relations between 
State and law: They made it clear that the ruler could not wield power unless 
he had disposal of the treasury and ' the army: "The treasury relies on violenté; 
the law rests on violence." The State must be headed by an inexorable man 
of action, who while safeguarding the interests of the State could even infririgè 
thé laws. According to- Kautilya, the good ruler was one who consulted^'tHe 
wisest men, who was Considerate, wellbalancëd, who acted Consistently artd 
quickly, who kept a* watch on dangers. The epics and Manu's Code made thié 
happiness of society dependent on the maintenance of the caste-system. The 
upper three castes approved the caste-system,, although there was altercátióñ 
among them. Still this did not affect the caste-systêm which was a t tached ' to 
the history of the Aryans in India. -
Babylon was a theocracy. In the middle of the 18th century B.C. Hammu-
rabi succeeded to the throne. He united the former Sumerian city states, arid 
appointed lieutenants to govern them. He took care of an efficient administra*-
tive system • a treasury and an army. He promulgated several laws and consiv 
dered these laws as being of divine origin. The laws were engraved in a twó¿ 
metre high diorite block. Hammurabi entrusted the priests with the main-
tenance-of legal order. He considered these laws unchangeable. It cannot -be 
argued that the teaching of the divine origin of the laws was in harmony 
with the doctrines proclaiming the = divine origin of the ruler arid his powef. 
The king was considered the elect of god. The rulers took utmost care of the 
demonstration of the legality of their power and'of its legal confirmation. The 
Sun-god Shamash watched over law and justice. The ruling king was believed 
to be one who was capable of acting as intermediary between god and msfïil 
The secular power of the king coalesced the divine power, thé political power 
with the religious power. This found expression in the thesis that an apposition 
to thé royal' comrnand, i.e. disobedience to the legal provision, was qualified 
as blasphemy. It was held that man was the shadow of god, thé slave was ;the 
shadow of man, and the king was the equal of god. Thus thé inequality :óí 
society and the exploitation of the slaves were sanctioned. The oppressed 
classes expressed their bitterness in several religious songs, called into doubt 
the wisdom of the gods, and complained of the indifference of the gods. : 
The political and légal doctrines of the Jews were given expression in the 
various books of the Bible. These doctrines were intertwined with religious 
elements. The king was believed to be the anointed of the God Yahvé, i.e. his 
son. The Jews considered themselves the chosen people of God, a thesis which 
was capable of welding them together. They thought that all other peoples 
were living in blindness and they were called to be fa i thful to their god. Thé 
idea of Messianism developed among them in their struggles with their enemies 
and in response to the special economic and political conditions. They firmly 
believed that God would send to them the Saviour, who would restore thé 
power of the kingdom of the Jews. Unlike the earlier political and légal 
opinions they believed that God would govern directly, a circumstance which 
weakened the royal power. The Jewish people took the field for the rights' Of 
the people through its prophets and in their struggle came into conflict with 
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royal power, è.g. Moses in Book Two took a stana for the people and insisted 
on a special treatment :of Jewish slaves. The prophet Amos criticized the way 
of living of the propertied class, the prophet Hoseah condemned the kings, 
Jeremiah protected the poor against the oppression of power and arbitrariness. 
The ruling classes pitted their own prophets against those of the people. Among 
these Esekiel-was the most prominent. In Messianism, or in its. political and 
legal theses, , the conflict between the popular elements and the aristocracy, 
the.priests and the king found an expression.Mn facLMessianism reflected the 
clàss warfare of the âge. It tried to give expression; to the social and political 
demands of. the indigent. classes on the one hand, and propertied classes on 
the other. 
- - If á study of. the political and legal views of anciënt Egypt is made,Ctheir 
theocratical character will be obvious first of all. These views believed .that 
the ruler, the Pharaoh was a god "who never dies, only reposes above the 
eternal hónzon". The; Pharaoh;: was. at. . the samé time -thé high-priest, thé 
supreme commander of the .army,v.and the supreme judge. In Egyptian political 
and legal" doctriné, the Pharaoh was the gods' equal,, moreover even of superior 
order. Efforts were made in order that the cult of the Pharaoh might strike 
root in the people. Thé subjects had to prostrate themselves before him, .and 
kiss his. footsteps. It may justly be said that the pharaohs consciously based 
their power oh violence and terror, and also that the civil servants were led 
by mercilessness. . This systém of doctrines considered the lowest strata of 
society wholly worthless and made their happiness dependent on the mercy 
of .those holding power.. For : the propagation of submission and: i ts reinforce-
ment, the priests worked out ra special system.. This .was ¿n. the-interest of?,thé 
ruling classes/ as m Egypt often revolts of slaves . and peasants broke out 
against the propertied classes. Many a : dynasty was overthrown by these revolts: 
However, the suppressed, slaves and have-nots had a; foreseeing ideology, the 
so-called hedonism, whose doctrines were summed up in the so-called song of 
the Harp-player, in the 15th century B;C. era. "Hedonism'' taught, careless life; 
and also that the slaves should seek their- salvation from the burdens of a 
humiliating life in death, i.e. by throwing off the yokes of the theocratical 
system. The oppressed wanted to discover a desired genuine equality in death. 
[2.] When the social and economic cbn-ditions of ancient Greece a ré made 
subject of a study, the disintegration ,of the clan organization should be menti-
oned first of all. Thé disintegration of the- Greek clan organization set i n 
simultaneously with the development of private ownership and concomitant 
of i t was the. segregation ;of the wealthy and the indigent. The first period of 
Greek history, the. period when still patriarchal tribal relations were predo-
minant, has been designated as the "heroic age". What was characteristic of 
the social conditions of ancient Greece was the birth of the many small city 
states, the polis, and the proliferation of particulárism. In the Greek city states, 
the class of the wealthy split up into several layers in the wake of the growth 
of Greiek industry and trade. In Greek society the non-propertied,belonged to 
the mass of slaves. Certain layers of the ruling classes soon became impo-
verished. A picture of the impoverishment within the ruling classes was drawn 
by Hesiod in his work "Toils and Days". The views of the rich, i.e. the no-
bility, was described b y Homer in his Iliad and Odyssey. Ultimately the Greek 
population was split lip into landowners, wealthy artisans and merchants, and 
rural poverty. In addition there was a huge mass of slaves. 
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- In the history , of the growth of the Greek city states special stress has . to 
be laid on Athens. In Athens social-and economic conditions developed which 
permitted, moreover, insisted on, the formation of a variety of legal and 
political opinions. This does not mean as if in-the other Greek city states no 
political and legal doctrines had sprung, up. In fact the evolution of the state 
organism, i.e. of an organism segregated f rom society, took place in every 
Greek polis and an explanation of the essence and structure of . this organism 
became inevitable. Several doctrines of politics and law appeared, e.g. in 
Ephesos, where Heraclite preached political opinions and views of law which 
favoured the interests of the wealthy. In Abdera, Democrite expounded his 
doctrines. 
The evolution of Greek society presents a continual struggle between 
aristocratic and democratic ideas in the theory of State and law. 
- About 500 B.C.,. momentous changes took place in ancient Greece. From 
this t ime onwards Athens firmly established her economic and political posi-
tion, in particular in the wake of her victory in the war against the. Persians. 
In consequence of ..this victory a system of economic and political dependence 
was established between Athens and a number of Greek city states. The 
organizational basis of this dependence was. the so-called Maritime Alliance. 
Far-reaching changes took place in Athens proper, where the rule of the 
aristocratic clans was superseded by democracy, whose characteristic feature 
was that except the slaves every freeborn citizen had a say in government and 
the management of the af fa i rs of the State. In this age the doctrines on politics 
and law were embodied by the teachings of. a number of thinkers, so by the 
ideas of the sophists, e.g. Protagoras, and by those of Socrates and Platón. 
Considerable influence was exercised on public opinion by the cynicists. In the 
years following the Peloponnesian war the power of Athens began to decline, 
and .only in the closing years of the 4 t h century B.C. did Athens enter a new 
phase of economic development. Amidst the, economic revival, Aristotle made 
his appearance in the history of political and legal thinking. 
Aristotle was born in Stogiros in Thrace, in 384 B.C., and died in 322 in 
voluntary exile. Aristotle, whom Engels called the - "most universal brain", 
studied at the Academy of Platón from 367 B.C. onwards, and then later he 
himself began to teach. Marx wrote that Aristotle was the first who subjected 
the form of value, with many other forms of thinking together with social and 
natural forms, to an analysis. His most prominent works, aré Politics, Meta-
physics, Organon, Poetics, and the State of Athens, in. 335 B.C. Aristotle 
founded a school in Athens, called Lykeion. Its members under his leadership 
took a stand against the Platonic ideas and believed in the need for an 
empirical collection \of data and their : processing. Aristotle set out f r o m , the 
thesis that for the creation of general notions it was necessary to examine the 
single objects. 
In his investigations of State and law, Aristotle tried to give a reply to 
the question of the origin of the State. In this investigation he set out f rom 
the theses that Man is by nature a political being, i.e. a "zoon politikon". Man 
strives for social coexistence, and as the outcome of his efforts established a 
number of ties and created several organizations. Among the organizations, 
the family was the first. With the growth of the family, also cooperation among 
men began to develop. From the need of the exchange of goods, or barter, and 
the union of the various families, the village, or settlement came into being. 
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According to Aristotle, the State was . the community of highest order consisting 
of several villages or rural communities. He believed that the State was not 
the result of some sort of .a contract, but the product of natural evolution. 
Hence in his notions the family preceded , the State, which differed from the 
family qualitatively and quantitatively. Since the State was the natural form 
of coexistence, and as such eternal, Man could not live without the State. On 
continuing his analysis of the State, Aristotle meditated on its ends and func-
tions. Of the ends and functions of the State, he said that the end of the crea-
tion of the State was self-preservation, its final end was the supreme good. 
According to the notion of Aristotle the State was created to guarantee the 
welfare of Man. As a matter of fact the end of human life was the achievement 
of happiness, whose content was welfare. Happiness was unimaginable and 
unachievable without the activities of the State. Therefore the organs of the 
State had to guarantee happiness and contented life, furthermore the citizens 
had to educate the collective of f ree citizens in the spirit of solidarity. Happi-
ness as a moral goal meant tha t the State guaranteed appropriate leisure for 
the free, promoted the development of their physical properties, and exerted 
its influence that the f ree persons helped their friends. Hence friendship, i.e. 
righteousness, legality and equity appeared as great virtues in the notion of 
Aristotle of the end of the State. He also set forth that only a slave-holder 
could be happy within the State, as Aristotle recognized and justified slavery, 
and considered it the essential foundation of every State. Among the functions 
of the State,. Aristotle mentioned autarky, the fostering of the religious cult, 
fur ther the education of the free citizens and the definition of correct and 
incorrect conduct. 
Aristotle analyzed the problems of the forms of government in detail. In 
his view, there were two forms of government, viz. a correct and an incorrect 
form of government. He made it clear that the "monarchic form which re-
spected public interest was called a kingdom, the form of constitution which 
vested the few, yet more than one person with power, was aristocracy, finally 
when the people exercised the sovereign power for the public good, this is 
the given name common to all forms of constitution, viz. politeia". Besides 
thé proper forms of government, Aristotle enumerates also the wrong forms 
of government, which regarded private interests, and not the common weal. 
Among these were tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. These were the de-
generated forms of the proper forms of government, i.e. tyranny that of 
•kingdom, oligarchy that of aristocracy, and democracy that of polity. On analy-
zing the forms of government, Aristotle combined them with the various 
categories of ethics, e.g. he believed that oligarchy guaranteed wealth, and 
democracy freedom. Aristotle recognized that in the description and definition 
of the forms of government, property had an important role. Consequently 
oligarchy was the rule of the propertied or weaithy classes, democracy that 
of the indigent. It was not essential therefore of how many persons the orga-
nization governing the State was composed; the decisive fact was which 
stratum of owners enjoyed protection of their interests by the various forms 
of government. Undoubtedly, by defining the forms of government on the 
ground of their relations to property, Aristotle rightly approached the gist 
of the problem. 
Aristotle thought that of all forms of government defined by him, politeia 
was the best. In politeia he distinguished three groups of the population, viz. 
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the wealthiest, the middle class and the very poor. He believed that the domina-
tion of the middle strata had to be ensured, this being the most useful for the 
State and most interested in the continuity of the regime. What was charac-
teristic of the middle class, wrote Aristotle, was moderation, cautious action,; 
moderation was of fundamental importance in political activity. The temperate 
middle class could avoid extremes, and could put a brake on the excesses of 
the poor and the wealthy. With this statement Aristotle appeared as a partisan 
of the peace of classes and of compromise in the thinking on politics and law. 
Strictly speaking, Aristotle adopted the views of Solon, who was active in 
Athens in the 6 t h century B.C. Solon was the first to give expression to the 
doctrine' of a compromise. Solon stated that "I have conferred as many privi-
leges on the people as were sufficient, I did not depress the esteem of ' the 
people, nor did I overrate it, and I tried to save those on whom money bestor 
wed splendour and honour, f rom being humiliated by a base deed." "I pro-
tected the two parties with my strong shield, and never allowed that either 
should gain a victory over the other." It was the conscious end and endeavour 
of Solon to follow the idea of the golden mean, and of safeguarding of the 
equilibrium and harmony of society. Essentially the reforms of Solon reinforced 
the position of the wealthy classes and quietened the revolutionary tendencies 
of the poor. . 
Aristotle realized that the fundamental factor in the changes of the forms 
of government was the tendency directed towards the elimination or the conT 
solidation of inequality, i.e. the contradictory character of society. On this 
understanding he wanted to establish a definite form of government perma-
nently by helping the middle classes to power. He thought that the wealthy 
and the poor could be brought closer to each other, i.e.- that as far as property 
was concerned, property of medium size was the best. He considered the- form 
of government firmest where the owners of fortunes of medium size constituted 
the majority of the population. He believed tha t the slaveholders and the f ree 
men should join hands, because this joining of hands was the condition of a 
f irm form of government. Thus the politeia would have to put into practice fi 
moderate democracy, where solidarity in the affairs of the community would 
have been fundamental, irrespective of the financial position. He also thought 
of increasing the number of members of the middle classes, for where the 
Aiilddle classes were predominant, disruption among the citizens was of the 
rarest: Thus the risk of revolts or revolutions could be eliminated. Hence ArisT 
totle pushed through the idea of a compromise consistently in-his political and 
legal doctrines, of which he wrote: "Obviously, the golden mean is the. best. 
This is the only one which does not lead to dissension; where there is proper mar 
deration, dissension and disturbance are the rarest among the citizens. There 
are fewer disturbances in the great states, because there the middle classes are 
large. On the other hand, in the smaller states the population disintegrates 
more easily into two parties, so that a middle class does not even remain, and 
also there is, so to say, everybody either poor or rich." The doctrines of Aris-
totle about the middle classes cannot be accepted because they are wholly 
Utopian. As Marx made it clear in the Communist Manifesto, the history of 
the various groups or of society itself demonstrates that power is held by those 
in whose hands wealth concentrates, i.e. the State will manifest itself always. 
as the power of the economically ruling stratum or class, or classes. Economi-
cally the middle stratum or middle classes do not dominate. In addition, these 
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classes are wavering. This explains why the middle class mostly means a 
transition into the stratum of the rich or the poor, as the case may be. The 
struggle between the classes cannot be eliminated with the insertion of the, 
so-called middle classes. The middle classes never did hold a leading role, and 
cannot- even hold one, in the processes in society, as in history the middle 
class always took the side of one or the other of the contending classes. The 
middle class did not advance either the reconciliation of the classes or the 
mitigation of the class contrasts. What appears to be important or decisive in 
the conduct or role of the middle classes, is merely the manifestation and the 
result of the compromise. The compromise has some sort of significance, yet 
only a tactical or transitional one, as historically it cannot become decisive in 
the face of the class warfare. 
. The ideal State of Aristotle would have been one where the citizen had 
limited ownership, and where the function of the State would have been the 
guarantee of the happiness of the individual, i.e. of virtuous life, by way of a. 
congruity of interests, where the military and political functions were perfor-
med by the very same .persons in succession, where matrimony would have 
been regulated in a way that women would have contracted a marriage at the 
18th year of age, and men at their 37 thj in winter. Still matrimony could be 
contracted even earlier, yet in this case the married couple would not have 
been allowed to provide for progeny. One of the fundamental ideas of Aris-
totle was that the State should bring up the children, and not the parents. The 
principles of State education were that the children of the parents exercising 
power and those of the parents under the rule of others should be brought up 
under equal conditions, since also the children of parents under the rule of 
those holding power might come into power one day. Education should begin 
with physical training, and continued with the education of the soul-. Aristotle 
laid particular stress on the training of the mental faculties. From their seventh 
year onwards children should take part in common occupation, where they 
had to learn gymnastics, grammar, drawing and music. 
Aristotle was the disciple of Platon for a long time, however, his views 
departed from those of Platon, in particular his doctrines of State and law. 
They agreed in so far as both recognized the need for slavery. However, they 
differed in their opinions on which layer of the class of slave-holders should 
be the holder of power. Unlike Aristotle, Platon believed that in Athens the 
aristocracy should rule rather than the middle strata the golden mean. In this 
connexion he stated that the slave-holders i.e. the free, or the population, had 
three classes, viz (1) the philosophers or the class of the wise; (2) the warriors 
and the class of guards; (3) the artisans and the tillers of the soil. According 
to his doctrine the virtue of the philosophers only relied on sense, i.e.. only 
the philosophers were in the possession of wisdom. The property of the war-
riors or the guards was the virtue of valour which relied on the will. The 
artisans and the tillers of the soil possessed the virtue of temperance which 
relied on the suppression of sensuality. Platon set out from the thesis that 
wisdom and valour were the property of a few selected slave-holders only. 
The artisans and the tillers of the soil, or in one word, the demos, were capable 
of the virtue of obedience only. According to Platon, the three classes were 
united by the virtue of righteousness.. This virtue prompted the philosophers, 
the warriors and the artisans to discharge their individual duties only. Ac-' 
cording to Platon, there could be no harmon^ among the various classes unless 
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those active in a particular sphere refrained from interfering with the activities 
or functions of the others. Marx appropriately remarked that Platón's doctrine 
of the structure of society was, strictly speaking, an idealization of the Egyp-
tian caste system. In fact this is substantiated also by the other doctrines of 
Platón, stating that the stratum of philosophers could have no property, fu r ther 
that the philosophers and warriors had to be educated in a way that they did 
not place their individual interests above those of society. Platón noticed that 
there were transitions between one class and another, i.e. the virtues, were 
not tied exclusively to the classes he enumerated. Consequently there were 
cases when the various classes did not perform their duties in the proper way. 
This was the reason why timocracy or oligarchy, and democracy or tyranny 
sprang up. In Platon's opinion, timocracy was to some extent close to the notion 
of the ideal State, still it was not identical with it in every respect. He did not 
praise oligarchy either because it meant the power of the few, i.e. the power 
of the wealthy, the slave-holders, the merchants and usurers. Strictly speaking 
he opposed democracy, because in his opinion democracy did not guarantee the 
rule of the wise or the philosophers in society, i.e. it did not allow that reason 
governed valour and temperance, therefore it was not the correct form of 
government. He made it clear that the people could not be philosophers or 
wise. Criticizing democracy, he made the statement that complete freedom 
reinforced by democracy created anarchy and that equality guaranteed by 
democracy was a folly, because in democracy the unequal would become equal. 
In Platon's opinion, tyranny was the worst form of government. Obviously, 
the reason was that tyranny overthrew and superseded the aristocratic form 
of the slave-holder state, i.e¿ exactly the form of government which Platón 
put on pedestal. It is in particular history which demonstrates that Platón tried 
to translate his doctrines into practice. He hoped that he could create the ideal 
state in Sicily, in Syracuse, however, he hoped in vain. This was, for that 
matter, understandable, as it was Platón who advocated that the philosophers 
were called to govern society, yet this doctrine in all certainty did not suit the 
ruler of Syracuse. Later Piaton revised his original notion of the State and 
formed what may be called a realizable notion. In this new notion, the following 
essential traits may be discovered: The basis óf the State is agriculture; in the 
State, special attention had to be given to property, the family, and education, 
because only these advanced the veneration of religion, God and the parents; 
the aristocratic form of government was the most ideal (and óf course relied 
on a social inequality of a very high degree); the soil had to remain in the 
ownership of the State, the landowner could merely be the leaseholder, with 
the lease being inheritable, still indivisible; the authorities had to supervise 
family life rigorously; the maximum of property had to be defined; a popular 
assembly, even a narrower council may be organized, still the eldest, most 
experienced citizen, and not a philosopher had to be at the helm of State; the 
supreme official organ of the State should be a body formed of thirty-seven 
representatives. 
Obviously Aristotle gave expression to the interests of the middle classes 
(which, was quite understandable, as towards the end of his life he, too, was 
medium landowner), unlike Platón who represented the interests of the reactio-
nary aristocracy. . • 
Aristotle exposed important doctrines also on the law. In his work "Poli-
tics" he pointed out that the "law is nothing else but the order of the political 
community, and the law is the measure of justice". As regards the law in 
particular, his work Nikomachean Ethics is worth studying. In this work he 
investigated the relations between law and morals. He set out from Man, and, 
on analyzing the relations of law and morals, from the thesis that "the law-
breaker is unjust and the law-abiding man is just". What follows is that in a 
certain sense things permitted'by. the law are always just and right: what the 
law decreed is lawful, and what is lawful is believed to be just and right. The 
law in general controls everything, and serves either general public interests, 
or only the interests of the ruling class, irrespective of whether the ruling class 
owes its privileges to some sort of a distinction, or to any other circumstance. 
According to Aristotle the essence of law is justice, i.e. the law is a measure 
which is applied in a way that formally equal subjects are compared, and from 
this point of view justice is an order where the advantages of the best and the 
most virtuous have to be guaranteed. Further the general welfare of the citizen, 
the complete guidance of their life, the complete and partial freedom of men, 
and a certain equality of men have to be guaranteed. Aristotle explains that 
where power is unlimited, where there is no proportionality, law is out of the 
question. Namely "proportionality" means that equal punishment has to be 
imposed on everybody if equal crimes are committed. On the other hand, 
"proportionality" also means that every citizen has to respect the law equally 
and uniformly. This he expresses in his works Politics by stating that "Man is 
the noblest creature* of a l l . . . who, if he departs from statutes and from law, 
is the basest of all". It cannot be argued that proportionality, or, in other 
words, the equality of the law is abstract, i.e. it cannot have regard for the 
specific differences of the individual. This means that one has to observe the 
law irrespective of one's individual properties or individual characteristics. In 
connexion with the law, Aristotle does not only lay special stress on justice, 
but also on the antithesis of it, i.e. he subjects also injustice to a detailed 
analysis. He does not keep injustice and crime apart. He believes that an unjust 
act is e.g. larceny, robbery, or adultery. (Naturally today the epithet "unjust" 
is not any more applied to these acts: with a legal term they are called unlaw-
ful, so e.g. larceny or robbery, but not adultery which has ceased to be a 
criminal offence.) According to Aristotle everything that violates statutes is 
unjust. Hence robbery, because'i t violates the law, is unjust, and the robber 
as law-breaker is simply unjust . Naturally the problem has certain moral 
aspects which are outside the scope of the present work. Namely in the moral 
sense, righteousness tries to grasp the proportionality expressed in the relation 
of one person to the other. On this understanding, righteousness is the regulator 
of the relation between an individual and another, e.g. among friends. 
Aristotle did not deal only with the essence and functions of the law, but 
also with its sources and the systematic division of law. According to his 
doctrine law has written and unwritten sources. He stated that the statute as 
a written source of law owed its existence also to an unwritten source of law. 
This doctrine of Aristotle was clearly associated with his opinions on the 
systematic division of law. According to Aristotle, there are so-called nature-
made legal rules, and there are ones created by the State. According to his 
opinion, nature-made law is in fact independent of Man. The rules of nature-
made law are the general rules of coexistence, are Universal and natural truth, 
and even if never put down in writing, are accepted by all men, because they 
are in fact moral postulates and their content best suits the moral good. But 
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as soon as Aristotle gets down to facts, the subjective character of his position 
becomes manifest at once. Namely, according to his doctrine, natural law 
includes e.g. slavery, property, ownership and warfare. In this connexion we 
would remark that, according to Aristotle, the Greek people was the centre of 
the world, which partly lent contradicting properties to it, partly raised it 
above the other peoples, i.e. the barbarians. This doctrine of Aristotle may be 
regarded as the root of the racial theory. 
The law created by the State is called positive statutory law. With Aristotle 
natural law is not the standard of positive law. He sees no contrast between 
natural law and positive law. In connexion with legislation he states that 
legislation can be of general validity, still it may at the same time be wrong. 
Accordingly, both the legislator and those in charge of the application of the 
law may mend the errors of the statute, for he who acts correctly applies the 
law not according to its letter, but according to its spirit. 
The opinions on the law appeared in Greek society already before Aris-
totle. e.g. Pythagoras believed that harmony was the primeval principle of 
law. This harmony was expressed by the equality of numbers. He believed that 
equality and compensation were the purpose of the law. By justice he under-
stood the numbers multiplied by themselves. Heraclite, too, dreamt of the rule 
of the "logos". The sophist Protagoras believed that law was changing, condi-
tional and expressed the despotism of Man. Socrates conceived the law ex-
clusively in its positive legal sense and proclaimed that every citizen had to 
live according to the law, the obedience to the law being a virtue. According 
to his theory the moral foundation of State-made law was the unwri t ten 
divine law, i.e. justice and legality were synonyms also in his theory. Socrates 
insisted on a strict observance of the statutes expressing the interests of .the 
minority. 
Aristotle's doctrines on law and morals also departed from those of Platon. 
An interesting "dispute" developed on the essence of law between Platon on 
the one, and Socrates and Trasymachos on the other part. The dialogue bet-
ween Trasymachos and Socrates on the one, and Platon on the other part 
centred round the following questions. Trasymachos exposed that "every 
government makes statutes so as to suit its interest, i.e. a democratic go-
vernment makes democratic statutes, a tyranny tyrannical ones and so on. 
Through the legislation the governments declare exactly this, i.e. their own 
interests, as just to the citizens, and anybody who dares to depart f rom the 
law would be punished as a law-breaker and as a man doing injustice." What 
stands to reason is that Trasymachos recognized the class character of the law, 
i.e. that the law in all cases expresses the interest and the will of the econo-
mically ruling class. Accordingly on this understanding, legality also has a 
class character, it is a class notion, or, in other words, justice is also of a class 
character in all times. He too, like Aristotle, incorrectly identified the obser-
vance of the law with justice; This identification of t ruth with law, i.e. the 
identification of the legal with the just, as has been demonstrated by Marxism, 
is incorrect. Aristotle differed from Platon exactly in that he identified the 
concepts of rightful and just, whereas Socrates and Platon operated only with 
the moral truth-concept, and did not demonstrate the divergent concepts of 
truth of the opposed social strata. 
[3.] In the age of Aristotle, and after him, several doctrines of politics and 
law brought to bear an influence on public opinion in Greece. The economic 
foundation of these political and legal doctrines was the economic and political 
decadence of the Greek city state, their ideological foundation was overwhel-
mingly the teachings of the cynics. Of the trends of ideas so developed, Stoicism 
had a significant effect in Rome, and Stoicism had the strongest influence also 
on Cicero, this greatest orator of that era. 
Roman history had its beginnings in the 8 t h century B.C. At this time 
the Roman primitive community changed over, to a politically organized society, 
and at that time, as the outcome of the intrinsic contradictions of Roman 
society,, the Roman governmental organization was born. The Roman State 
passed through several phases of evolution. In the beginning it was a kingdom. 
Later the era of the Republic followed, where the patricians and the plebeians 
were engaged in a particularly keen class warfare. The plebeians in the first 
place insisted on the right to take part in the management of the affairs of 
the State. This struggle was of extreme importance. The plebeians succeeded 
in creating the institutions of the people's tribune against the arbitrariness of 
the civil servants of the patricians. It was in thé age of the republic that Roma 
grew from a small Italian city state into a great power ruling. the whole Me-
diterranean basin. Rome began to build up her power from 246 B.C. onwards. 
At that time, the nobility governed the republic and the Senate was the sup-
reme authority. Towards the end of the republican era, the social contradictions 
heralded by the great slave risings, grew more and more intense. These contra-
dictions in Roman society brought about the fall of the republic to be followed 
by the coming into power of a series of military dictatorships. Military dicta-
torship was introduced by Sulla in 83 B.C. The war-lords became the decisive 
factors in politics, as in fact Rome continued, and even intensified her wars for 
territorial expansion and plunder. One is even tempted to say that the army 
leaders bought the people for the achievement of their political goals with the 
money extorted from the provinces. 
In 63 B.C., Marcus Tullius Cicero entered the political scene in the Roman 
senate. In the same year he was elected consul, and it was due to the action 
he took in the Senate that Catilina and his partisans were brought to the 
scaffold. Cicero adopted the Stoic philosophy. The Stoic philosophy propagated 
by the Greek Zenon and Chrisippos suited Roman politics irrespective of that 
some of its theses were subjected to criticism. Cicero visited Greece several 
times. He was even in Athens. Of this visit he informs 'us in his work De 
supremo bono et malo. 
In the beginning Cicero was the representative of the democratic wing in 
Romë. — Later he became the leading figure of the conservative camp. Cicero 
did not take over the Stoic doctrines directly from the Greeks, but through 
Pànetius as intermediary. Rome received Stoicism with understanding, more-
over the authorities agreed that several Greek Stoic philosophers should lecture 
in Rome. In. the doctrines of Panetius, Stoicism manifested itself completed 
with the elements of the teachings of Platon, Aristotle and other tendencies. 
Thus in Panetian Stoicism the philosophic doctrines combined which suited 
Roman spirit best. The political and legal doctrines of Stoicism so transformed 
laid a stress on the sense of duty, individual responsibility, and devotion to 
public affairs. Thus it lent an idealistic colour to the Roman policy of conquest. 
Cicero was the foe of Caesar, and in his opinion Scipio was the ideal of a 
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statesman. When Ceasar took arms against him, Cicero saved his life by going 
voluntarily into exile. The consulate of Cicero came to an end in 46 B.C., and 
then he was banished officially. In this year the Populares came into power. 
In the fift ies Cicero returned to Rome and f rom then onwards he took up 
literary work. His most prominent work was De Re Publica written in 51 B.C. 
In this work Cicero adopted the theory of the State of Polybios. Poly bios was 
the disciple of the powerful clan of the Scipios and an enthusiastic adherent 
of Roman world rule. 
In his work De Re Publica Cicero deals with the problems of the organi-
zation of the State. He believed that Rome needed a political organization 
where power would be divided and exercised by the popular assembly, the 
Senate and the civil servants of highest rank. According to his views the 
division of power has to ensure an equilibrium of power. In situations of special 
gravity and of decisive importance, he approved of a termination of the divi-
sion of power on the plea that in critical times the best policy was to entrust 
power to the worthiest of the citizens or to an ideal statesman who would act 
as an intermediary between the controversial forces of- society. 
Speaking on the origin of the State, he stated that in society the family 
is the narrowest group, the smallest element of statehood. Then comes the 
municipium and the State in order of magnitude, as the other elements of 
society. This thesis of Cicero bore a certain resemblance to the doctrine of 
Aristotle, and was an adaptation of the latter to Roman conditions. His doctrine 
on the division of the branches of the political power on the other, hand ref-
lected the views of Polybios according to which three principal forces kept up 
the equilibrium of the social system of Rome, viz. the power of the consuls 
embodying the monarchical principle, the Senate embodying the aristocratic 
principle, and the popular assembly representing the democratic element. This 
was what corresponded to the theory of the mixed forms of government. In 
fact Polybios thought that Rome owed the constancy of her power to the form 
of government composed of several elements. 
According to Cicero the "State is the community of men united by com-
mon law and common interests". Still at the same time he accepted the Stoic 
thesis according to which there was a widest community which embraced 
mankind in its entirety. This thesis waSj strictly speaking, the idea of a world 
state proclaimed by the Stoics, and for that matter of a world state where 
there would be no. slaves, no judiciary, no church, and not even money. (Of 
these ones Cicero did not speak.) It is worth mentioning that according to Poly-
bios the State changes its form in the course of its evolution, yet always returns 
to its earlier form. In the beginning the State is a monarchy, later it. becomes, a 
tyranny, the tyranny transforms into an aristocracy, later on into a democracy, 
and then into an ochlocracy. Polybios called democracy the phase of- destruc-
tion, for although this form guaranteed the prevalence of the rights of the 
people, later evil instincts and selfishness get the upper hand and so democracy 
eventually degenerates into tyranny. According to Polybios democracy is i ts 
own grave-digger. He praised the aristocratic order of Rome. He believed tha t 
the purpose of the State is the protection of private property. His ideal was 
the peace of the classes, the unity of the wealthy classes, against the indigents. 
In the sixth book of his work De Re Publica Cicero raised the idea what the 
person saving the State deserved. His answer was that such a person was 
rewarded by heavenly bliss, because the State was dear to the gods and its 
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leaders were received in Heaven. The closing myth of De Re Publica, the 
dream of Scipio, was well suited to inspire with patriotism and encourage to 
the unselfish and self-sacrificing service of the country even after the change 
.of the forms of society. 
Speaking on the law Cicero distinguishes the eternal and unchanging law, 
i.e. natural law, and the law . valid in a given period, i.e. the law he called 
ius humánum. Ius humánum was human or positive law. Hence Cicero accepted 
the notion of natural law and believed that there was an eternal and unchan-
ging justice whose foundations were laid by the divine laws of nature, and 
which was valid for all men. He explained the existence of natural law by the 
uniform conviction of man, i.e. that natural law was in the consciousness of 
all men and that everybody could become acquainted with it with the aid of 
the intellect. He believed that by nature certain deeds had to be valued nega-
tively, and others positively. He made it clear that human conduct was defined 
by the consciousness of the natural essence of Man and that it was the laws 
of nature that permitted the classification of the particular acts of Man as just 
or unjust. He combined the question of natural law with justice, and' stated 
that everything that peoples at all times considered just was in fact just. .He 
thought that natural law was most perfectly expressed by the so-called Law of 
the Twelve Tables of the Romans. Besides natural law there was man-made 
law, the ius humánum which according to him could be divided further. Within 
the ius humánum there was the ius gentium which gave expression to the legal 
ideas of mankind as a whole, and which was the most perfect reflection of 
natural law. Within the ius humartum there was the so-called ius civile, which 
consolidated the statutes of the particular peoples. In fact the ius civile was 
valid for the citizens of Rome and did not extend to the aliens, to legal re-
lations existing with aliens. The ius gentium was some sort of a "world law", 
which came into being by the side of the ius civile, for the regulation of legal 
relations with aliens. 
In the wake oi Cicero's oratorial and literary activities the Stoic doctrines 
exercised an influence also on the average standards of Roman jurisprudence. 
The Roman lawyers thought tha t positive law brought into being perfect 
justice, and they also agreed that power originated in the people. They attri-
buted an ethical character to law and held that positive law depended in a 
hierarchical order on unchanging natural law. 
Cicero was an excellent orator. This is borne out in particular by his 
speeches for the prosecution and for defence. Cicero set forth that "there are 
two vocations which raise man to the highest level of dignity, namely those of 
the leader and the orator". He took a stand before court against. the large-
scale speculations. Romé and her army leaders systematically looted the newly 
occupied territories and even the civil servants of Rome governing the provinces 
were eager to exploit the conquered population. In general the abuses of the 
governors grew to considerable proportions. In the suit against the quaestor 
Verres, Cicero acted for the prosecution, and with his speech against Verres 
he won the confidence of the people. A characteristic feature of the age was 
the active violation of the law. He pleaded for .the defence in a number of 
cases before court (so e.g. in the case against the son of Sextus Roscius). 
At the turn of the years 44 and 43 B.C. the aged Cicero once again took 
a stand for the defence of the Senate, when Antony strove for power. In 43 
B.C. Antony had the 64-year-old statesman killed. 
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Cicero owed his popularity in Rome partly to his faculties as an orator, 
partly because he criticized one-man rule, so besides that of Antony, also the 
despotism of Sulla and Julius Ceasar. At this timé the theory proclaiming the 
unrestricted power of the ruler (e.g. an emperor) was not yet popular. 
Cicero, the practical-minded Roman, went beyond his Greek masters in 
that after a juxtaposition of thesis and antithesis he did not hesitate to draw 
definite conclusions. His method was the considerate and effective means of 
the prevention of predictable contradictions. In this method, Voltaire emphasi-
zed the force liberating from dogmatism and stated: "We despise them, the 
coarse scholastics, who for such a long time ruled us, still we esteem Cicero 
and those men of Antiquity who taught us to reason." 
[4.] At the time of the Empire, in particular during its last phase, the 
Roman Empire went through a period of crisis in economics, in home and 
foreign politics. Even in the sphere of ideas, a period of fermentation set in. 
Mysticism was spreading and then the teachings of Christianity. In its founda-
tions, Christianity is a mixed theory, it is mixed because it incorporates the 
doctrines of the Stoics, fur ther the elements of Oriental cults, so such of Budd-
hism (e.g. the belief of Osiris as the dying and renascent god), and also 
incorporates Jewish Messianism. In the beginning the Roman emperors perse-
cuted the Christian doctrines, but later, in a modified form, they themselves 
embraced them. (In the age of the Empire the established religion of the State 
deified the emperor.) It was due to the growth of trade that the population of 
Rome could penetrate into territories surrounding the Mediterranean. Know-
ledge and experiences acquired there shook the established religion of Rome 
in its foundations. Christian views of either society or the various kinds of 
human relations were basically of a progressive nature. Still they were idealist 
in a sense that they reflected the doctrines of Platón, i.e. that the spirit had 
priority over matter, that the material world was pervaded by the spirit, as 
the Stoics taught it, that one had to be indifferent to temporary things and 
that one had to wait for the advent of the Saviour and to believe in a single 
God. 
The first great theoretician of Christianity was St Augustine, who lived 
between 334 and 430 A.D., i.e. in the period when the political and. economic 
crisis of the Roman Empire gained in intensity and when the onslaughts of 
the Barbarians against the frontiers of the Empire grew in fierceness. The 
other Christian theoretician of renown was St Thomas Aquinas, who in the 
middle of the 13th century entered the scene with his teachings. As it is known, 
later on. Christianity was split into two branches. Prominent representatives 
of the new trend in Christianity were Thomas Muenzer, John Calvin and 
Martin Luther. 
St. Augustine wrote his principal work, De Civitate Dei, between 412 and 
427 A.D. In this work St Augustine advanced the official views of the Church 
on the State. St Augustine was in fact a disciple of Ambrose, bishop of Milan, 
who taught that in matters of the soul the Church was sovereign; whereas in 
secular matters the emperor was sovereign. This meant that in secular affairs 
the emperor could freely direct his subjects. Still in spiritual matters decision 
lay with the Church, and here not even the emperor was excepted. Ambrose 
made it clear that it was not only the right, but even the. duty of the clergy 
to condemn the immoral acts of the rulers. In fact Ambrose defended the 
sovereignty of the Church against the State. Strictly speaking, St Augustine 
exposed doctrines on the relations between State and Church, and thought, he 
had to go fur ther than Ambrose. He indoctrinated the opinion, and tried to 
justify it theoretically, that t he Church stood above the State. He believed that 
in the history of mankind two "orders" were contending, of which the one was 
the Civitas Dei, the other the Civitas Terrena. The State of this world was 
organized on the ground of base instincts, it was in fact the rule of evil and 
sin, which originated from Kain, and through the dominion of the Assyrians, 
Babylonians, Persians, Greek discharged itself into the Roman Empire. On the 
other hand, the Kingdom of God was organized on the ground of the belief 
in the salvation of the soul, for the achievement of eternal repose in the next 
world, and not on the ground of evil and sin, i.e. of various base instincts. 
According to St Augustine, the State of God had its origin in Abel, and deve-
loped through the patriarchs, judges, kings and prophets to Christ and His 
Church. Hence, according to St Augustine the Church was the principal power 
of the world. With this doctrine he laid the foundations of the theocratical 
notion of the State. However, he believed that Church and State had to coope-
rate, still in this cooperation the State was subordinated to the Church, for in 
fact the State was an evil phenomenon in society. He thought that coercion 
and violence were necessary, because both coercion and violence were but the 
penalty meted out by God for the sins of mankind. According to his doctrine 
Man is free by nature, i.e. everybody was born free, however, in consequence 
of his sins Man lost his freedom. He declared that in point of fact slavery must 
be considered the due of the wicked. Hence the first cause of slavery was sin, 
on account of which the one man was subordinate to the other, and personal 
liberty was limited. All this happened according to the judgment of God. 
Slavery was occasionally useful, and for the purposes of the service of God 
always useful, he wrote in Civitate Dei. Slavery was also a consequence of sin. 
Therefore men, i.e. the slaves had to be improved morally and religiously, 
and it was not necessary that socially all men should be equal. 
As regards domination and power, St Augustine taught that secular power 
had to be subordinated to the Church. The Church appeared with her claim to 
power at a time when the Roman Empire was in the state of crisis and its 
disintegration was almost complete. St Augustine made it clear that with the 
birth of the Christian Church a turn would follow in the history of mankind. 
From this date onwards only the Christian State could exist, whose function 
was to assist the Christian community in its endeavour to achieve spiritual 
perfection. 
In 325 A.D. the Roman Empire was divided into two parts. The West 
Roman Empire collapsed in 476, the East Roman, or Byzantine Empire survived 
till 1454. On the ruins of the West Roman Empire new states sprang up. In 
613 the Frank Empire became united. The feudal Frank Empire flourished in 
particular during the reign of Charlemagne. In the beginning Charlemagne 
ruled together with his brothers, still in 771 he became the sole ruler of the. 
Frank Empire. As a ruler Charlemagne excelled with an extraordinary ability 
for organization. His surroundings and the clergy inculcated on him the belief 
that he was appointed by Providence the ruler of his empire and that his 
primary duty was the translation of the Augustinian concepts into reality. The 
imagination of Charlemagne was strongly influenced by the political doctrines 
of St Augustine. According to contemporary records, at dinner he was wont to 
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listen to either music or lectures. The tales and the history of Antiquity were 
read to him. He was very fond of the works of St Augustine, in particular of 
De Civitate Dei, Charlemagne vindicated the claim to bring into being the 
Kingdom of God on earth and to pave the path to eternal bliss for his subjects. 
Although he wanted to carry into effect the doctrines of St Augustine, he 
placed himself in the first place in the State and attributed a decisive signifi-
cance to his person. Charlemagne concentrated secular and spiritual power in 
his hands. The secular power was not indifferent for the Church, therefore it 
went out in praises for the rule of Charlemagne, although theoretically the 
relations between the spiritual power and the secular power did not manifest ' 
themselves in the works of St Augustine in the manner as these relations were 
embodied by the empire of Charlemagne. During his reign the Church did not 
succeed in subordinating the secular power to her rule. The Church could not 
establish her dominion in the world, although on the ruins of the Roman Empire 
she cherished this idea, which was in particular one of the favourite concepts 
of Pope Gregory the Great. Charlemagne had a decisive role even within the 
Church. After his death the situation changed. 
In the opening years of the 9 t h century Christianity put up an opposition 
to the interference of the rulers with the affairs of the Church. In the 9 t h 
century secular power rose above that of the Church to the full extent. It 
stands to reason that in the 9 t h century again the thesis turned up according 
to which the popes were superior to the secular power. In the 9 t h century the 
doctrinarians of the Church tried to set limits to the power of the ruler by 
means of religious, moral and legal norms. They, expounded the thesis that the 
ruler was bound to enforce the law unconditionally, that he had no right to . 
create law arbitrarily, and that he could not change the statutes of old. The 9 t h 
century was almost wholly absorbed by the struggles of the West-European 
rulers against the various invaders from the North. In the middle of the 10th 
century a lull set in in the onslaughts from the outside, and on the ruins of 
the Carolingian Empire a series of new states became established. 
In the 11th and 12th centuries doctrines hostile to the Church, i.e. heresies 
emerged and began to spread over Europe. The age gave birth to thousands of 
heretics. The teachings of St. Augustine proved ineffective in the fight against 
heretics. There was need for a theory which would at the same time be a 
suitable weapon against the heresies. In this age the growth of handicraft 
industry, commerce and the natural sciences also called, for new theories. The 
creator of the new ecclesiastic theory was St Thomas Aquinas who belonged 
to the highest circles of the feudal hierarchy. Although his doctrines were not 
wholly his own, St Thomas Aquinas nevertheless did excellent service to the 
Church. The teachings of earlier thinkers had a decisive influence on his 
doctrines. Pope Urban IV commissioned St Thomas Aquinas critically to inter-
pret and mend the earlier translations of the works of Aristotle. Of this work 
Lenin wrote that " the clergy killed in Aristotle what was still alive, and revived 
in him what was dead". 
The standard work of St Thomas Aquinas was his Summa Theologica. On 
investigating the origins of the Sta^, St Thomas Aquinas, following the 
footsteps of Aristotle, combined the origin of the State with the community 
nature of Man, and taught that Man was a political and social being, that the 
life of the individual had to coalesce with that of the community in a har-
monious manner, for it was only on this understanding that Man could reach 
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his ultimate goal, God. He accepted the State as a means of the achievement 
of religious ends, yet as a means which had to be analyzed in a manner 
independent of religious values. Consequently he also recognized non-Christian 
rulers. He conceived the State as a natural phenomenon of all ages and all 
societies i.e. in his opinion the relation between those governing and those 
governed was of necessity. He took a stand for the aristocratic system, i.e. for 
the system where prominent persons held power. He taught that Man living 
in the framework of the divine order owed allegiance to the political power, as 
political power had its origin in the laws of nature. In contrast to traditions, 
in his opinion submission to power, even to the most despotic, had to be 
passive.. On the other hand, power that infringed the laws of God and compel-
led the subjects to commit sins had to be overthrown. Also the power had to 
be overthrown which neglected the interests of the community. However, in 
certain cases he disapproved of an opposition to power. In his opinion the rule 
of a tyrant was still better than revolutionary anarchy. He' believed in the need 
for a dual guidance of human affairs. On this understanding he made it clear 
that the guarantee of the common weal of the citizens did not absorb the 
functions of the State wholly, for the function of the State was also the 
achievement of eternal ends. From this thesis it follows that secular power 
was essential, still this power depended on the spiritual power, i.e. secular power 
had to be subordinated to the pope absolutely. Accordingly the pope was the 
temporal vicar of God and the supreme arbitrator in both religious and secular 
matters. The pope was the master of the world and every secular prince was 
his vassal. 
On analyzing the problems of law, St Thomas Aquinas emphasized that 
there was a so-called lex naturalise i.e. natural law, which in fact was the 
reflection of the lex aeterna in the human soul. This natural law, i.e. the lex 
naturalis permitted the guidance of human will. Natural law taught man what 
was good, and what was evil. The concrete norms of good and evil implied in 
natural law were then defined by positive law, i.e. the lex humana. The lex 
humana i.e. positive law was but the supplement of natural law, and as such 
was composed of a variety of detailed rules and instructions. The enforcement 
of the concrete, norms implied by the lex humana was guaranteed, by coercion 
and other sanctions. The lex humana was one of the links, yet not the most 
perfect of the divine order. It was created by the human intellect, and human 
inellect reflected the ideas of God. S t Thomas Aquinas mentioned yet another 
group of rules, the lex divina. The lex divina was aligned by the side of the 
lex aeterna, the lex naturalis and the lex humana, and it meant the divine 
statutory law. This statutory law was incorporated in the books of the Old and 
New Testaments. St Thomas Aquinas also raised the problem of the im-
provement of the law. In connexion with the evolution of law he exposed that 
appraisals could often be erroneous, that they often considered only the outside 
of conduct, and that the prescriptions of the law could not be extended to 
each individual case. Therefore supplementations, changes and modifications 
were needed. But he did not leave the modification and changing of the law 
to men. He added that although the individual could ascertain a conflict 
between human norms and natural law, still this finding did no t ' authorize 
insubordination. According to his doctrine it was always God who supplemented 
human law with concrete instructions, and in this respect the lex divina had 
to be respected. If therefore statutory law conflicted with the divine law, the 
individual could, and even had to, refuse obedience on the ground that divine 
norms were always above man-created norms. According to his position the 
lex naturalis justified the existence of feudal political and legal institutions. 
He criticized the statement according to which these institutions owed their 
existence to sin. He even criticized the doctrine according to which before the 
origin of sin men were free and equal, i.e. they did not know power, slavery 
and private property. In the notion of St Thomas Aquinas, sin, strictly speak-
ing, threw difficulties in the way of Man in his endeavour to achieve the final 
goal. According to him, private property brought under regulation by thé lex 
humana was not conflicting with natural law. He recognized the right of the 
State to promulgate laws provided with sanctions and to resort to any means 
for the preservation of its subsistence. St Thomas Aquinas maintained the 
division of the ius gentium and the ius civile within the framework of the 
lex Humana. 
The influence of St Thomas Aquinas lasts to the present days. The philo-
sophy relying on his teachings has been given the name of Neo-Thomism. 
Neo-Thomism even today tries to reinforce Catholic doctrine and spread it 
within as wide à sphere as possible. The theses of Neo-Thomistic theory 
essentially do not depart from those proclaimed by St Thomas Aquinas. Marxism 
opposes Neo-Thomism and holds that its theses are not worth discussion. 
Here it should be mentioned that the Reformation turned against, the 
feudal Catholic Church and its teachings. The Reformation is split into à 
bourgeois and popular tendency. Luther was the representative of the bourgeois-
moderate tendency, whereas the doctrines of the popular tendency were 
formulated by Muenzer. Essentially Luther betrayed the popular movement. 
He believed that the princes were ruling by the grace of God, and insisted on 
passive obedience on the part of the people. His doctrines of the State and its 
functions were extremely primitive. According to his doctrine "it is not the 
right of the Christian to oppose injustice and unlawfulness; it is his duty to 
endure and to suffer". In Luther's notion the State had priority, i.e. the 
clergymen were in fact the officers of the kings. 
The representative of the popular tendency of the Reformation was Thomas 
Muenzer. His doctrines were strongly influenced by those of the Czech 
Taborites. Muenzer gave expression to the interests of the exploited strata of 
the population. He taught that all. power had to be exercised by the common 
people, and that the exercise of power had to be controlled. The civil servants 
should be nominated and elected by the people. Muenzer, unlike Luther, the 
initiator of the Reformation, drew the conclusion that feudal differences had 
to be abolished. He insisted on the termination of the classes living f rom the 
work of others, i.e. on the metamorphosis of the whole social and political 
system. For the creation of the new social order, Muenzer demanded the 
formation of a party, which would have received the name of Christian Union 
and Brotherhood. He thought that a new social and political system had to be 
called to life, and for this purpose agreed with the recourse to violence in 
addition to persuasion. He was the first to raise the idea of the withering away 
of the State, after he made it clear that in the new society everbody had to 
work and that no one could live from the work of others. Everything would be 
common, there would be no need for a political organization, because the 
armed people would be the community itself. 
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PART TWO 
EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL THINKING OF THE 
BOURGEOISIE, AND CRITICISM OF THE FEUDAL POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL IDEAS 
1. Machiavelli. — 2. Hobbes. — 3. Montesquieu. — 4. Rousseau. — 5. Kant. — 
6. Hegel. — 7. A Hungarian political thinker: Lajos Kossuth. — Basic Literature. 
[1.] Social and economic development converted Italy of the 14th century 
into the leading country of the Renaissance. However, in the closing decades of 
this century Italy was swamped into economic and political, and partly also 
cultural bankruptcy. The causes of her decay must be sought for in the first 
place in the internal economic structure, namely in the fact that in the various 
city states commércial capital gained the ascendancy over industrial capital. 
Commercial capital had no productive basis of its own, and consequently its 
autonomous growth brought the small-scale producer into a state of existential 
dependency on the procurer, it put a brake on the fur ther evolution of the 
productive forces, threw obstacles into the way of a liberation from the shackles 
. of feudalism. The need for revolutionizing industry to take the place of the 
manufactures became a pressing need. The leaders of- the city states were the 
grassi (stout), i.e. the rich merchant bourgeoisie, which also owned landed 
property, and maintained the feudal forms of an exploitation, of the minuti 
(slim). This period represents clearly the class warfare between the oppressors 
and the oppressed, and provided a favourable soil for the formation of the 
principalities, i.e. personal or aristocratic dictatorships. These dictatorships did 
not destroy the fetters of feudalism, they even strengthened them in the small 
city states. 
It was in this period that Niccolo Machiavelli entered the scene. It was 
also the period when Alighieri Dante, Tommaso Campanella, Thomas Morus, 
and then later on Giambattista Vico exposed their doctrines. 
Machiavelli lived in the Italy of the 15th and 16th century and in his works 
he sought for a reply to the question how to take a stand towards capitalist 
evolution. He even tried to find a solution. The reply, to this question was of 
utmost importance, since as is evident from what has been set forth earlier, 
at that time in Italy the original accumulation of capital was completed, 
although in forms other than in England. Machiavelli tried to answer the 
question by looking for the best form of government within whose framework 
the evolution of capitalism could take place. In his work The Prince he came 
to the conclusion that the absolute monarchy was the form of government 
which could advance the evolution of capitalism in Italy and could save Italy 
from the ruin. However, the call for the absolute monarchy at the same time 
raised the problem of how the national unity of Italy could, and even had to, 
be brought about. Namely at that time Italy was split into a large number of 
small states. Consequently there was no uniform national economy in Italy, 
there was no united territory on which a domestic national market and political 
power could have taken shape hence it was the dismemberment of Italy into 
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the many small states that prevented the growth of Italy. According to 
Machiavelli the continuity of capitalist evolution had be be maintained in 
Italy. The principal obstacle was the absence of a united national state, and 
for the creation of such a state the absolute monarchy was. most appropriate. 
One of the principal obstacles in the way of the birth of Italian national unity 
was the power of the Church, of Papacy. Machiavelli in his work The Prince 
encouraged Lorenzo de Medici to conquer Italy, to create the united national 
state, to drive out the barbarians from this soil. In The Prince Machiavelli 
dealt with the various types of monarchy and the methods of acquiring power 
and keeping it. He analyzed hereditary monarchy specially, and so also the 
mixed monarchy, and then illustrated and proved his statement with examples 
taken f rom history. What is new and of significance is Machiavelli's idea of the 
raison d'état.. In Chapter XVIII of The Prince Machiavelli exposed that the 
monarchs tried to achieve the various ends of the state by two methods, viz. 
by law and by force. He wrote that when with the one the prince could not 
succeed he had to resort to the other; although it was t rue that the one was a 
human property, the other brutish. He made it clear that the prince had to 
make use of his brutish nature properly, he had to follow the fox and the lion. 
The lion was powerless against the snare, and the fox could not escape the 
wolves. Therefore the prince had to be a fox acquainted with the snare, and a 
lion terrifying the wolves. 
Machiavelli thought that the social good, which brought evolution on 
mankind, could be achieved also through the evil. i.e. Machiavelli approached 
the problem of the united Italian state and its political form, the absolute 
monarchy, f rom the side of morals. He believed that if the final goal served 
evolution, or promoted the progress of mankind, recourse to whatever means 
was justified for the achievement of the end. Machiavelli, like Smith and 
Ricardo, approved of the growth of the productive forces, although their 
advancement might be fraught with loss. 
Machiavelli recognized the historical necessity and, knowing that he 
appealed to Lorenzo de Medici to obey his historical mission, i.e. to create the 
independent and autonomous Italian state. Machiavelli's reply to the great 
question of the age was at that time correct, and from the point of view of 
historical evolution, of a progressive character. 
Subjectively Machiavelli was an extraordinarily great humanist, yet the 
circumstance that he was living in a society burdened with enormous contra-
dictions, instigated him to the elaboration or formulation of certain "cynical" 
categories. He saw that this contradiction was to a certain degree even neces-
sary, still he asserted that Italian national unity had to be brought about by 
any means, by reducing the evil side of the. contradiction to the possible 
smallest degree. The style of Machiavelli, as Gramsci points out, is that of an 
active man, a man who prompts to action: his style is that of a "par ty mani-
festo". He studied the question what the task of an absolute monarch, i.e. the 
prince, and the leader really living at his age was. As Gramsci emphasizes 
Machiavelli wanted to convince the "nescients", the revolutionary forces of 
the age of the heed for a prince who knew what he wanted, and also how he 
could achieve what he wanted, and inculcate on his contemporaries that they had 
to receive such a prince with enthusiasm even when his acts run counter, or 
appeared to be running counter, the generally current ideology of the age, or 
religion. According to Machiavelli the prince has to deal not only with what 
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exists, but also with what has to be, i.e. he has to be provident, and so has 
to create new power relations, and to this end he will always have to examine, 
whether the "new" is necessary or arbitrary only. (In this respect the distinction 
Gramsci makes between the "diplomat" and the "politician", the scholar of 
politics and the active politician is most apposite.) Machiavelli believed that 
it was the duty of the prince, the necessary trend of his activities, to fight 
through rough and smooth for the creation of a progressive economic order, 
for the suppression of the obstacles in the way of capitalist evolution. This 
was the principal goal, for whose achievement the prince might use any means, 
as was confirmed by experiences of earlier political practice: he could have 
recourse to conviction, to murder, to poisoning, to intrigues. Hence the question 
of the means was indifferent, what was important was that it should advance 
the achievement of the ultimate goal. His ideal was Cesare Borgia, who for the 
achievement of his objectives, the creation of the absolute monarchy extending 
over whole Italy, shrank back from no means. Machiavelli thought that a 
recourse to the means referred to before was for the achievement of the ulti-
mate goal needed only against the grassi, but not against the people. This 
suggests that Machiavelli demanded from the prince not any violence, murder, 
or treachery, but only such as was directed against the reactionary feudal 
forces. From this idea then Machiavellism has sprung up, i.e. the doctrine that 
a final moral end could be reached on an immoral path. However, this is a 
narrowing down of Machiavellism of a later age. As a matter of fact the term 
Machiavellism does not simply denote that the holder of power can shrink 
back from no means for the achievement of the goal. In point of fact with 
Machiavelli the goal was not merely an individual one, but the promotion of 
progressive social evolution. The widespread erroneous opinion as if Machia-
velli had justified the means for any end, is untrue. The question of the 
means cannot be studied in itself in Machiavelli. Frederick the Great, King of 
Prussia, who wrote a book, Anti-Machiavelli, had recourse to any means for 
the exercise of power, yet with the difference that he acted- in the interest of a 
reactionary social end. Hence immoral policy or measure for the achievement 
of a non-progressive social end is not justified. It is not correct to brand 
Machiavelli's The Prince as a notorious work, as the cynical apology of political 
perfidy and double-dealing. It was not Machiavelli's fault that his morals 
which sprang up from the historical situation of the Italy of his times have 
been generalized for the rulers of all times. He was wrong in so far as he 
wrote a book purposing the solution of a given situation with a claim to 
generalization. As a matter of fact a monarch will always find an excuse for 
temporarily setting aside the norms of morality and for formulating lofty ends. 
Machiavelli as a Florentine politician and thinker wrote several books. 
Among these his Treatises on the First Ten Books of Livy and the History of 
Florence deserve special mention. His The Prince has to be analyzed in 
conjunction with these two works. It is the Treatises written in 1519 that 
present the historical, outlook of Machiavelli. From his works it is evident that 
Machiavelli analyzed the problems of society, the State and power from the 
point of view of the class warfare raging between the merchants and the 
lords paramount, and also between them and the have-nots. What has to be 
emphasized in the first place is that he is the representative of the national 
principle, that the national state he wanted must be recognized as an indepen-
dent secular institution free of all religious deposits, and that he recognized 
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no natural law. There were no legal or moral considerations for him. Essen-
tially he recognized a single principle only, viz. political expediency. Machia-
velli, although he recognized the historical function of the absolute monarchy 
in the creation of the united Italian national state, was in the last resort 
against tyranny, i.e. he valued a free republic more. This is in connexion also 
with the circumstance that from 1498 till 1512 Machiavelli was secretary of 
the Florentine Council of Ten. On the other hand he also recognized monarchial 
power, however, only if monarchial power was limited by laws (this would be 
some sort of a constitutional monarchy) and if it was free of arbitrariness. 
With the recognition of the royal power, i.e. the monarchy, he wanted to make 
his contemporaries understand that a monarchy might also have a function 
in the creation of the centralized national state. Further he proclaimed that 
the fundamental condition of the creation and the stability of a republic was 
the equality of the citizens. For where there was equality, there was no 
absolutism, no tyranny, which would bring about ru in . and decay. In his 
opinion a republic relied on virtue, i.e. on the love of freedom, on patriotism. 
The fundamental functions of the State were the defence of freedom and 
independence, however, he believed in wars against foreign oppression and 
also in territorial expansion. The State was strong, when the people had a 
role in its life, as in fact in his opinion there was more wisdom in the people 
than in the prince. In the state fundamentally the common weal had to prevail 
and not the personal interest of the few. In the miliatry sense he belived that 
the strong national army would guarantee the freedom of Florence. He sug-
gested to organize the army from the members of the people, i.e. he preferred 
a national army rather than one of mercenary troops. In the creation of a 
national army he wanted to discover the other principal duty of the prince. 
Machiavelli recognized the great consolidating force of the! common language, 
the common customs, traditions and beliefs. He thought that the prince could 
not govern with success, or even launch an attack, or put up defence, unless 
he assessed the effects of his deeds on the given society and the single 
members of the people. For the purposes of government he thought the 
knowledge of the psychology of the single man and of society was indispen-
sable. He was convinced that a stateman ought to be a good "doctor" at the 
same time. He considered religion a means of government, and as such he 
subordinated it to the State; he qualified the Church as the corrupter of 
society. 
On speaking in connexion with the forms of government, the movement 
of society, Machiavelli set out from the theory of cycles of Polybios. Ac-
cordingly, society moved from freedom, through oligarchy to the monarchy, 
and meanwhile also forms of retrogradation were apt to develop. In his 
opinion a mixed form of government could check these cycles and bring about 
a unidirectional evolution in the State. In this mixed form, of government, the 
new type of a prince would keep society in a state of equilibrium, and by 
relying on the forces of the people put a brake on the oligarchy, yet he would 
rely on the oligarchy against the people. 
A study of Machiavelli and the valuation of his oeuvre cannot stop short 
of an analysis of his The Prince. Nor can only certain sections of this work 
be made subject to a study, for in this case no adequate picture can be formed 
of the doctrines of Machiavelli. Accordingly Machiavelli is not the ideologist 
of tyranny, and in The Prince he does not raise the general problems of the 
governmental arrangements (although the problems have been discussed in a 
generalized form). He tries to find a way out of a society fraught with contra-
dictions, a society living between feudalism and capitalism, when the power 
of the liege lords can be overthrown with violence, i.e. with the aid of a 
dictatorship. On this understanding it cannot be argued that against classes, 
which have outlived their day, dictatorial measures may also be taken. The 
problem cannot be solved merely by one-sided moralizing, and therefore the 
political aspects of the question cannot be ignored. It the oeuvre of Machiavelli 
is. studied as a whole then it will be obvious that he considers dictatorship a 
temporary, transitional means for the achievement of the principal goal. He 
favours the establishment of a republican system of government as soon as 
dictatorship has performed its functions, and this on the ground of bourgeois 
democratic principles. He wanted a form of government where a parliament 
would defend the laws and restrict the power of the monarch. It is true that 
Machiavelli emphasizes power, dictatorship and violence in his work The 
Prince, however, in this respect he does not stand alone. Other great political 
thinkers also proclaimed the need for power and force, or the ' establishment 
of a dictatorship. As a matter of fact as long as there is a state and classes 
opposing one another, the classes, or the parties representing the interests of 
these classes will always be striving for power and all of them will outstrip 
the other and gain a preferential position to bring 'under regulation the living 
conditions of the conflicting classes, strata, or groups. 
Marx and Engels thought the greatness of Machiavelli lay in his emphasis 
of the temporary character of dictatorship. The doctrine of the need for a 
revolutionary dictatorship, in a concrete form the dictatorship of the prole-
tariate, had great significance also in the political and legal concepts of Marx 
and Engels. They wanted a dictatorship of the proletariat merely as a transition 
from capitalism to-socialism. 
As a matter of course not only Machiavelli, but also other thinkers of the 
age wanted to give a reply to the social' problems and tried to find the paths 
leading to a solution of the historically mature problems. Unlike Machiavelli, 
Alighieri Dante, the poet, living at the turn of the Middle Ages to Capitalism, 
also a native of Florence, proclaimed the need for a unity of his native country 
by setting out from a sentimental ground rather than from a political one. He 
exposed his ideas in the Divina Commedia and in his work The Monarch. He 
. believed that the idea of unity relied on charity. Charity would lead to the 
harmonious coexistence of mankind as a whole, i.e. to- the world monarchy. 
Dante was convinced that mankind would achieve freedom if it decided 
autonomously on its activities and could live without constraint. Unlike 
Machiavelli, Dante wanted to discover the fundamental form of the coexistence 
of men in the municipal organization. This, i.e. the policy of a maintenance of 
the disunity accounts for his diffuse concepts of a united Italian state. Dante 
did not expect the liberation of Italy and the establishment of a world mo-
narchy from an Italian prince like Machiavelli. For this he was looking at 
Emperor Henry VII, although in the beginning he was anti-imperialist. In 1302 
he was exiled from Florence, or more exactly, prevented from, returning to 
his native town. He was threatened with being burnt on the stake, should he 
attempt to return. As a matter of fact Dante took the side of the Whites i.e. 
the rich merchants, who were engaged in a keen struggle against the aristoc-
ratic party faithful to Rome, i.e. the Blacks. With the death of Emperor Henry 
VII in 1313, Dante's earthly dreams melted into thin air. He wrote several 
books on the Aristotelean pattern, still he proclaimed the idea of equality, 
fought with ethical means against the inequality of property. He believed that 
dishonesty was the source of wealth. On the pattern of the Aristotelean ideas, 
he, too, set out from the thesis that Man was a zoon politikon and that it was 
the wars which frustrated mankind to achieve happiness. In his opinion only 
a world monarchy, i.e. imperial autocracy could curb the evil inclinations of 
Man, as he tried to make it clear in his work The Repast, wri t ten under 
Ciceronian influence. In his work The Monarch written after the death of 
Henry VII he opposed Papacy. In this work he proclaimed his idea of the 
world state. The world state would be headed by the Emperor, as a uniform 
power standing above mankind. Only a power of this type could guarantee 
universal peace. According to Dante, divine providence directly elected the 
emperors to govern over the world. (Earlier he thought the Romans would be 
fit for. this role.) Dante believed that imperial power should be made indepen-
dent of the spiritual power, i.e. Papacy. He quotes the Scriptures, which do 
not just ify an interference of the Church with secular affairs. He thought tha t 
the Earth should be segregated from Heaven, political life from spiritual life. 
The world state of Dante, as referred to in the Divine Comedy, would consist 
of small urban communities: In his opinion the fundamental form of a union 
of mankind lies in the municipal organization. It stands to reason that this 
idea of Dante's is closely associated with Florence. 
The work of Dante, The Monarch, was burnt in public in 1329. The ideas 
embodied by this work never materialized. On the other hand, Machiavelli's 
doctrines prevailed in their entirety, e.g. in the age of Charles V, Louis XIV, 
or Frederick II, however.much Jesuits, kings, lords, Catholics ridiculed and 
criticized them. Still Machiavelli's dream of the birth of a united Italian state 
came to naught, because the conditions had not yet matured. Machiavelli died 
at the age of 58, on June 22, 1527. Only as late as 1787 a memorial was erected 
for him in the Florentine Santa Croce. "No praise is sufficiently worthy of his 
great name" is inscribed on it. 
Problems concomitant of the growth of capitalism emerged also in other 
countries, not only in Italy. Thomas More gave a reply other than that of 
Machiavelli to the question confronting him. In like manner, a reply different 
from Machiavelli's, yet similar to that of More, was offered by Tomaso 
Campanella. 
[2.] In the 17 t h century, capitalistic evolution moved from Italy-to England. 
In Italy there were no guarantees for the creation of the united Italian state 
of Machiavelli's dream, and the reactionary feudal Church with her activities 
stood in the way of capitalistic evolution. In England the original accumulation 
of capital took place, which carried with it many contradictions. On ana-
lyzing the historical circumstances of these contradictions, we have to point 
first of all out that between 1588 and 1679 there was an absolute monarchy 
in England. In this period, in particular with the accession of James I and 
Charles I to the throne, the harmony between the bourgeoisie carrying capita-
listic evolution and the monarchs broke up. Controversies sprang up between 
Parliament representing the bourgeoisie and the institution of the monarchy. 
Processes came to pass where the anti-national traits of the reactionary feudal 
forces came into prominence. The contrast between the class in statu nascendi, 
i.e. the bourgeoisie and the feudal class carrying the earlier relations of pro-
duction could not be mitigated till the middle of the 17th century, and then 
in 1646 the English bourgeois revolution broke out. In this revolution a variety 
of forces took part, groups representing a variety of interests struggled against 
one another. The targets of the revolution found an expression in the basic 
contrast, namely the contrast of interest of the bourgeoisie and the feudal 
forces. The great leader of the English bourgeois revolution, Oliver Cromwell, 
was prompted by the idea to create an absolute monarchy relying on national 
foundations, a monarchy which would give expression to the interests of the 
bourgeoisie as well as to those of the broad masses. However, this target of 
Cromwell's was never reached, because at that time the conditions of constitu-
tional monarchy were already present in England. After the death of Cromwell, 
the Restoration followed, which lasted for a short time only. The revolution 
came to an end with a compromise. Obviously there are historical situations 
which are apt to change, mould and transform a given political idea within 
a brief spell. In these circumstances of extreme complexity, i.e. before the 
Revolution and immediately after it, i.e. in the age of Cromwell, and then in 
the period of the Restoration Thomas Hobbes stated his political and legal 
doctrines. 
Thomas Hobbes (1588—1679) . was a political thinker whose political and 
legal doctrines, when the underlying historical conditions are considered, 
underwent a change during the comparatively short time of hardly ten years. 
This makes it clear that Hobbes cannot be considered the representative of the 
earlier, reactionary, absolute monarchy. Owing to the change his doctrines 
underwent, and for reasons of expediency, it is suggested to set out from a 
work he wrote in 1640. This is The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. In 
this he still takes sides with the king. Later, in his Leviathan, written in 1651, 
he ceased to oppose the bourgeois revolution, and not only defended the power 
of an absolute monarch, but at the same time he wanted to grant a role to a 
collective body at the head of the State. 
In Leviathan Hobbes deals with the phenomena of the State in their detail. 
In association with the problem of the State, Hobbes is in the first place 
concerned with the origin of the State. This he subjects to a detailed analysis. 
He explains the birth of the State on psychological grounds. He believes that 
Man created the State in his fear of death, his desire for peace, and based on 
the wish to escape from the chaos of a natural state. He makes it clear that 
in a natural state Man does not live under the dominion of a common power 
which intimidates or curbs him. Consequently, in a natural state Man is a 
wolf of his fellows. In this state the one man tried to take what was the 
property of the others, i.e. men hated one another. Later they came to the 
conclusion that they could live in peace, and waived their natural right that 
everybody could do as: he liked. Men therefore met, "entered into a contract 
with one another, and in this contract they surrendered their congenital 
natural rights to the monarch (the king). The king, or the sovereign represen-
tative of the State, carried in him the natural rights of all inhabitants, i.e. all 
subjects. Consequently the ruler could do as he liked, for under a contract he 
• was entrusted with his. right by all men. This was the way. how bourgeois 
society (the State) developed, which at the same time guaranteed the welfare 
of Man. It should be remembered that at that time the thinkers did not draw 
a line between society and State. Hobbes himself studied the origins of society 
and State on the same level. However, as pointed out by Marxist political 
doctrine, this was not correct. As a matter of fact the State seceded . f rom 
society, it is a mechanism segregated from society, and consequently the two 
have to be kept apart. It is only on this understanding that the problems of 
the class character of the State, its class target and functions can be grasped. 
Hobbes • deals not only with the origin of the State, but also with the 
problems of its mechanism, form. He says: "The only way to erect such a 
Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of For-
e igners , and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such 
sort, as that by their owne Industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may 
nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and 
strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all 
their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one W i l l . . . " 
The various organs of power receive their power to apply force by authority 
conferred on them by living men, for safeguarding internal peace and for a 
successful struggle against the external foe. According to Hobbes, the unlimited, 
sovereign power may be exercised by one man, or by one assembly of men. 
In both cases those wielding power have to embody the will of those creating 
it, to represent the persons of those creating it: "which is as much to say, to 
appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one 
to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever be that so 
beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which 
concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, 
every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment." 
On examining the origin of the various organs of the State in a concrete form, 
Hobbes makes it clear that they owe their origin to a mutual covenant. 
However, these organs can be created also by force, e.g. in a war the monarch 
may grant pardon to the enemy on the condition that he submits himself to 
the will of the conqueror. In "Leviathan" Hobbes deals in detail with the 
privileges of the institutional monarch and the freedom of the subjects. In this 
sphere he strictly speaking analyses the relations between the governmental 
organs and the individuals. He sets out f rom the thesis that men enter into 
this covenant with one another "to confer all their power and strength upon 
one man, or upon one assembly of men, that they may reduce all their Wills 
by plurality of voices unto one Will". Power and right of the State is derived 
from this bestowal, because men have made this covenant with one another 
and not with the monarch. Consequently the ruling individual or assembly 
cannot break the covenant, nor can a single subject escape from the superior 
power of the ruler or assembly. Hobbes believes that if the ruler signed 
separate covenants with each of his subjects, a mass of covenants would 
accumulate. He criticizes the point of view as if power were conferred on the 
ruler conditionally only. 
In connexion with the right and freedom of the subjects, the question 
emerges, whether the subjects may violate the social contract. This question 
is of extreme significance, because it concerns the right of men to act against 
the covenant, the right to put up resistance against those wielding power, the 
right to a revolution. In Hobbes's opinion, the social contract is indissoluble 
arid the individual is authorized to act against the covenant in one case only, 
i.e. when he wants to save his life. Hence the individual may terminate the 
covenant when e.g. the ruler wants to execute him, i.e. he may then put up 
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resistance against the ruler. However, collectively the covenant cannot be 
dissolved. Here the intention of Hobbes is to provide a theoretical basis for 
the unlawfulness of revolutions. On this understanding Cromwell's revolution 
was also unlawful, because it dissolved the covenant between subjects and 
ruler collectively, and because it beheaded a monarch. Hence the people has 
no right to a rising. The power of the monarch will come to an end only when 
he cannot anymore guarantee the safety of the subjects, i.e. the subjects are 
in fact the dependents of the king. The safeguard of order is the function of 
the State. In this connexion Marx points out that Hobbes flashed back the 
capitalistic peculiarities of his age, when Man was in fact the wolf of Man, 
to a prehistoric age. i.e. when Hobbes speaks of prehistoric conditions, he 
understands by them the reflection of the given capitalist circumstances. In 
his reflection of these circumstances Hobbes advances the statement that in 
his primitive state Man followed his own selfishness. This own selfishness is 
always directed against the selfishness of another man. In the age when there 
is already a State, Man again follows his own selfishness, because all men are 
born egotists. However,- since there is a State in the last resort, the innate 
egotism of Man will be subservient to the benefit of the State itself. It is 
beyond argument that a spontaneous pursuit of the own interests cannot lead 
to a pursuit of the interests of society as a whole and of the State. This 
doctrine reflects the age when in the pursuit of their own interests the capita-
lists in fact pursued the interests of their own class. Hence class interests 
loom up behind the pursuit of individual interests. However, this doctrine does 
not hold its own, for in class relations it is the interests of the class as a whole 
that are primary, and not individual interests. Economic interests cannot be 
separated from political interests. Consequently even if the doing of something, 
or its prevention, may be an evil in view of the interests of a particular 
bourgeois, it may nevertheless be beneficial for the bourgeois class as a whole. 
Hobbes deals with the definition of the State and here he has recourse to 
the category of the essence of the State. According to his doctrine the State 
may be defined as follows: "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by 
mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the 
Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall 
think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence." 
The "person" is always embodied by the ruler whose power is sovereign. The 
sovereign may be a man, or an assembly: The notion of Hobbes of a. single 
person, strictly speaking, embraces the king and the collective bodies irrespec-
tive of whether the latter stand for democracy or aristocracy. He believes that 
the State is a plurality united in a single person, which he calls the Great 
Leviathan. In his doctrine the soul of the plurality united in a single person 
is the sovereign, i.e. supreme power, which might be a man as well as an 
assembly of men: "The Sovereignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which 
once departed from the Body, the members do no more receive their motion 
from it." 
In addition Hobbes points out that the State has not merely a soul, but also 
intelligence. The intelligence of the State are justice and the laws. In addition 
the State has joints, these are the executive organs and the judiciary. These 
refer at the same time to the mechanism of the State, and also to the fact, as 
Hobbes states, that the State is the creation of Man, who was basically moved 
by the instinct of self-preservation. Here he comes to the problem of coercion 
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by the State. In his opinion the State exercises its power by coercion, as Man 
has to be constrained by the means of intimidation. 
Hobbes analyzes the problem of law and the statutes in all their details. 
He does not approve of the division of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers, for in his opinion such a division of powers may become responsible 
for dissent in the State. According to his doctrine in the same way as Man can 
create a state artificially, so he may enact laws of the State. Strictly speaking 
the purpose of the statutes is to strengthen the close relationship between 
power and individual, i.e. the statutes connect the mouth of power to the ears 
of the subjects. However, he adds that the lips of the State, i.e. a single man 
or an assembly, as the case may >be, cannot bring under regulation all acts of 
men. He believes that where there are no laws Man is free and in the interest 
of his greatest profit he may freely do as he likes. He attributes a great 
significance to the power of the State in the observance of the laws and makes 
the statement. "The lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword 
in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution." 
Hobbes recognized the relations between property and the State. He writes: 
"The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution of 
M i n e , and T h i n e , and H i s ; that is to say, in one word P r o p r i e t y; and 
belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power. For where 
there is no Common-wealth, there is (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall 
warre of every man against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his 
that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety, nor Com-
munity; but Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate 
defender of Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the 
Law Civil, Let the Civill Law, saith he, be once abandoned, or but negligently 
guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be 
sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children. And again; Take 
away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another 
mans. Seeing therefore the Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-
wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the 
act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make 
that have not the Soveraign Power. And this they well knew of old, who 
called that "Nomos" (that is to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and 
defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own." 
Consequently the nature of law consists in the observance of valid covenants. 
However, the validity of covenants began with the organization of the 
sovereign power. The sovereign power is strong enough to compel Man to 
observe the covenants. This is the point where property has its origin. Hobbes 
professes the simultaneous birth of property and State. However, he states 
that although sovereign power is immortal, it is nevertheless . exposed to a 
violent death. The death of the sovereign power, i.e. the State, is brought 
about partly by wars, partly by the ignorance and passions of Man. He 
emphasizes that internal disunity in a igiven society carries in itself many a 
seed of the natural death of the State. Hobbes also defines the notions of the 
statutes and law. According to his statement the law or statutes are the totality 
of rules relating to the subjects to which everybody has to apply, or in another 
formulation law or statute are." "Civil Law, is to every Subject, those Rules, 
which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other 
sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and 
Wrong; that is to say of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the 
Rule." 
He also raises the question of the scope of validity of the law and declares 
that the statutes may apply to all citizens, to certain professions, or to certain 
men only. He then analyzes the relations of law and justice. He sets out f rom 
the thesis that the legislator may be the sovereign, i.e. a single man, or the 
assembly of men. The legislator is not subject to the statutes enacted by him, 
he may repeal them, and create new ones. In his opinion natural law and 
positive law mutually include each other and are of uniform extent. Accor-
dingly he writes: "The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in 
all Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part 
of the Dictates of Nature." 
Among laws the positive ones are in fact the true laws. Only the sovereign can 
guarantee the punishment of those infringing, the laws. Strictly speaking the 
social contract relies on a respect for the laws. Consequently observance of 
positive laws is also part and parcel of natural law. He denies the difference 
between natural law and positive law, although he recognizes that the goal of 
positive legislation is to bring under regulation natural law, i.e. the natural 
freedom of Man. Without such a regulation there is no peace in society. He 
believes the principal function of the institutional sovereign is partly the 
creation of laws which promote the various crafts (e.g. shipping, handicraft), 
partly the creation of good laws. In his opinion a law is good when it is 
necessary, serves the welfare of the people, and in. addition is easily unders-
tood. Hence it is not the just law that is good, for he sets out from the thesis 
that no law can be unjust. 
In Leviathan Hobbes discusses not only the problems of State and law, 
and of society. Beyond these he touches on a number of other problems, e.g. 
he discusses problems of economics and religion. He insisted on the subordina-
tion of the Church and religion to the State, for religion and Church as some 
sort of a bridle might be useful for the State. He stressed the problem to a 
point where he thought that the State should define the articles of faith. He 
stated that the people had to accept the articles of faith in the same form as 
they take the pills prescribed by the doctor. He believed that religion was fear 
of an invisible power either invented by the intellect, or. imagined on the 
ground of generally accepted fairy tales. 
In his work on methods he deals with the relations between the philosophy 
of State and the philosophy of morals. He believes that the two can be kept 
apart. He also discusses the relations, of language and State, the notion of 
intellect and science. He wants to discover the essence of intellect in counting, 
i.e. in addition and subtraction. He thought that political writers add up the 
treaties in order to establish the obligations of people; on the other hand 
lawyers sum up the laws and deeds in order to establish what is right and 
what is wrong in the action of people. 
In the period of Hobbes's activities many other political and legal thinkers 
were at work. Before Hobbes Jean Bodin, the ideologist of French absolutism 
formulated his ideas. Hobbes had a considerable influence on the political and 
legal thinking of Spinoza. Earlier other doctrines were formulated in the 
Netherlands by Althusius Lipsius, Grotius, in England by Bacon, then by John 
Lilburne, Gerald Winstanley, John Milton, James Harrington, fur ther Benthan 
Burke, J. Austin and Jonathan Swift. 
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[3.] At the end of the 18th century and in the beginning of the 19th France 
presented the picture of a feudal society, where capitalist evolution was 
unfolding vigorously. Thus a keen contradiction sprang up between the 
economic needs of the age and the feudal institutions of society then still 
existing. The third estate, i.e. the bourgeoisie, artisans, small-scale producers 
insisted on the liquidation of the feudal institutions, whereas the aristocracy 
together with the noblesse de robe and the high clergy made efforts to preserve 
the obsolete institutions of feudalism. In the controversy Montesquieu stood 
up for the bourgeoisie, and for that matter for the haute bourgeoisie which 
showed no interest in the abolition of all feudal institutions, as these protected 
the interests of the haute bourgeoisie against the exploited workers. 
Montesquieu (1689—1755), or by his full name: Charles-Louis de Secondât, 
a devoted French adherer of the constitutional monarchy, a representative of 
geographic determinism in the 18th century, in whose career the philosopher 
(the author of the Lettres Persanes) in the chronological order preceded the 
lawyer (the author of Esprit des lois). Montesquieu was interested in society 
and progressed from society to law, and not the other way round. In his first 
work of renown, the Lettres Persanes, written in 1721, there was so to say the 
total essence, the gist of the teachings of enlightened philosophy. In his criti-
cism of the Church, this ideological support of feudal society, Montesquieu 
was equal in rank with the other philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment. 
Also in questions of natural philosophy he agreed with the doctrines of his age. 
Even in the philosophy of State and law he believed in the need for the 
exploration of the natural, i.e. objective laws of society. 
Montesquieu devoted his life to find a scientific explanation for the errors 
of society he criticized in his Lettres Persanes, and to provide the principal 
means for the improvement of the fate of mankind. Of his undertaking he 
said: "There is no more beautiful idea than leave mankind happier behind us 
than we have found it." 
In his investigations he set out from the hypothesis that the life of society 
had its objective laws in the' same way as nature had its. This statement of 
Montesquieu was of considerable weight, and for its originality of remarkable 
ingenuity. In his work "L'esprit des lois" he made it his goal to explore thé 
laws according to. which political institutions and legislation came into being. 
The spirit of the laws was the essence of all laws, the objective regularity 
defining their birth. What Montesquieu wanted was to investigate and explore 
the natural and social regularities of legislation. This was the first attempt at 
laying the foundations of a scientific notion of society. 
Montesquieu conceived the State as an association (he saw no difference 
between State and society) and according to his doctrine the republic was the 
ideal form of government. As a matter of fact he hated tyranny (he criticized 
the absolutistic governments of Louis XIV and Louis XV in sharp terms). Thé 
love of the republic and the hatred of tyranny were the ideas which permeated 
the Lettres Persanes. He sympathized with the republic, however, later on (in 
about thirty years) in his work L'esprit des lois his sympathy turned towards 
the constitutional monarchy. Here, besides his class allegiance, also his thesis 
operated that enlightened feudalism could also bring about freedom, the true 
end of life. His work L'esprit des lois, which was published at a period of the 
radicalization of the opposition of the feudal monarchy, of the immediate 
proximity of the Revolution, and the final intensification of class controversies, 
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already wanted to serve the idea of a class compromise, i.e. to meet the 
demands of the haute bourgeoisie in a manner not conflicting with the existence 
and interests of the feudal monarchy. 
When he returned home from England, he brought with him an enthusiasm 
and passion for the constitutional monarchy, and setting aside his earlier 
republican ideas tried to popularize the political conditions of the post-
revolutionary England in a pre-revolutionary France. 
Since Aristotle it has been customary to distinguish the systems of govern-
ment with the purpose to establish which is the best form of government. In 
Montesquieu's opinion the soundness and excellence of any form of government 
were relative only, therefore at a classification the outset should be from 
historical and not from philosophical considerations. Systems of government 
could be classified only on the basis of an investigation of states actually 
existing, or which had existed. Incidentally Montesquieu distinguished the 
republic, the monarchy and the tyranny from one another. 
Notwithstanding the physical and social conditions, he did not consider 
the governmental systems unchangeable, and this for the very reason that the 
intellectual, and to a certain extent even the physical factors, were subject to 
changes. Changes were justified owing to the various, abuses, the elimination 
of these abuses, the supervention of new conditions, further the adoption of 
methods or examples which had stood the test. He pointed out that the 
adoption of an example or method must not degenerate into mere imitation. 
In the course of legislation, attention should always be given to the climatic 
conditions, morals, customs, etc. of the country in question. 
The forms and systems of government have different features, and guiding 
principles. (The principles are the feelings of those governing and those 
governed which present the given system, describe it, and which are the 
incentives to the decisions of those governing or governed.) According to 
Montesquieu the fundamental principle of a republic is virtue, that of a 
monarchy is honour, that of tyranny is fear, in the "acquisition" of virtue, 
or of the basic principles in general, he emphasizes the importance of educa-
tion. "First of all we become acquainted with the laws of education, these 
prepare us for becoming citizens. If the people has a guiding principle, the 
families will also have one. The laws of education differ in all systems of 
government. Their subject-matter in a monarchy is honour, in a republic it is 
virtue, in tyranny it is fear." 
Virtue means political virtue. The essence of this is abidance by the law, 
identification with the public interest. Owing to an identification with public 
interest, the essence is the love of one's country with which equality has to be 
associated. In a democracy equality extends to everybody. It . is only in this 
way, i.e. the respect for the basic principles, that freedom can be guaranteed 
in the State. The model of political freedom laid down in a constitution is for 
Montesquieu the English system. 
In his opinion men were born equal. However, this equality disappeared in 
social coexistence, so that in his opinion the law had to restore this equality, 
He disapproved of a policy which did not grant to women the same rights as 
to men. Also he disapproved of exaggerated equality, and believed that this 
would be dangerous. In his opinion exaggerated equality was the situation 
when all men wanted to be equal to those whom by their election they ap-
pointed to a position where they ruled others. Democracy had to avoid all 
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sorts of exaggerations. True equality does not want, nor does political freedom 
in a democracy consist in the fact that all can do as they like. "Freedom is 
the right that everybody can do what the laws permit." Democracy would 
deteriorate not only when the spirit of equality faded away, but also when the 
spirit of equality was carried to extremes, and everybody wanted to be equal 
to those whom they elected to command. "The people wants to perform the 
functions of the authorities, i.e. the people does not anymore respect them . . 
According to Montesquieu true equality demanded that those who for their 
birth, wealth or rank excelled among the others should be accorded a proper 
share in legislation. By the side of the people's claim to legislation he 
proclaimed the participation of those excelling for their birth, wealth or rank 
(i.e. the aristocracy and the haute bourgeoisie) in legislation. 
According to Montesquieu there must be a harmony between the nature 
of government (i.e. what government is like) and the principle (i.e. what 
prompts to action), i.e. between the structure, and the moving passions (ideas). 
One has to remember that as the outcome of self-preservation the main 
principle of government is security, and also that as the effect of the wealth 
of the country ambitions awake in the heart, and that, on the other hand, the 
effect of poverty is despair. Thus the wealthy are egged on by work, whereas 
the indigent find solace in inactivity. 
He believed that the best, form of government is the one which steered on 
a middle-course. This is the form which can achieve its object at the expense 
of the least sacrifices and for the most part leads men in a way suiting their 
nature and inclinations. He came to the conclusion that the form of government 
defined the laws, whereas the form of government was a creation of the 
climatic conditions and other geographical factors. However, when developing 
these few and erroneous results Montesquieu made a large number of correct 
comments on politic and law going into minute details. What Montesquieu 
analyzed as the spirit öf enactments later Marxism discovered as the economic 
and social foundation of the political and legal superstructure. What Montes-
quieu wanted to discover in the form of government, may actually be found 
in the forms óf society. What Montesquieu recognized as the determing factor 
of the climatic conditions, had been explored by the cognition of the method 
of production of material goods in its fulness. 
Montesquieu and the liberal wing of French enlightenment set out directly 
f rom Locke. Montesquieu too was a follower of Locke's constitutional monarchy. 
Montesquieu was not the immediate promoter of the Great French Revolution, 
however, those who had a hand in its preparation relied and drew on him: 
they marshalled the course of events consciously towards its outbreak. 
One of the roots of the geographical determinism of Montesquieu was the 
doctrine of one of his predecessors, Jean Bodin, who explored the factors 
operating on history and according to whom the history of a country was 
determined by the geographical situtation of its territory, the character of its 
people and the economic conditions. His recognition of vital importance was 
that there were no eternal laws suitable for every people, that there were no 
rules independent of time and. place which would be appropriate for a regula-
tion of the relations of men and pepples at all times and everywhere. "History 
has to be understood by means of the laws, and the laws by means of history" 
he said to substantiate this recognition. 
Montesquieu was unacquainted with the general theory of evolution. 
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Instead he accepted partial generalization. Historically he acted an important 
part even so. As an early cultivator of comparative political science and law, 
Montesquieu recognized that history had its origin not in the random, nor in 
the wisdom or narrow-mindedness of the sovereign, it had not its origin either 
in the grace of God. The well-known situations and events of history were 
creations of universally active forces, physical and intellectual factors. 
On exploring the objective regularities of society he enumerated four 
natures of law which operated on society. These were (a) the law of peace; 
(b) the law of nutrition, self-preservation; (c) the desire for mutual approxima-
tion; and (d) the law of living in society. Erroneously he derived social and 
political order in its entirety from the effects of natural conditions and physical 
factors. He narrowed down the notion of the laws of nature to the phenomena 
of social life, i.e. he tried to find the clue to the explanation and understanding 
of world history in nature outside Man. 
He conceived social metamorphosis in an evolutionary form. He approved 
of the demolition of obsolete institutions, however, as for the means he showed 
moderation and caution. Since the methods of exploration discoverable in his 
works are of greater importance than the particular results achieved, we may 
say that Montesquieu got as far as the threshold of reality. Strictly speaking 
he was looking for the foundations of political and legal arrangements in the 
methods of production without, however, having a clear idea of the. essence of 
the methods of production. On criticizing the political and economic ar-
rangements of his society, he condemns usurious rates of interests, unearned 
profits. He warns to exercise moderation in taxation and proposes progressive 
taxation. He prophesies that the time will come when money will be banned. 
He recognizes the influence of economic factors on the development of the 
political system of the State, on the regulation of its relations in the "spirit" of 
statutes to be enacted. 
In his view the purpose and function of the State is to further public 
interest, to ensure the common good, self-preservation and freedom, and thinks 
that all this can be realized also by a constitutional monarchy as a form of 
government, although ideal realization is possible only by a republic. The com-
mon good means — in the bourgeois-individualistic formulation — the protec-
tion of the person and of property. He respects private ownership, but objects 
to the excessive growth of the property and incomes of the clergy. 
Montesquieu did not consider a complete abolition of the privileges of 
nobility, nor a complete liquidation of the reactionary feudal system. Since. it 
is not possible to maintain "original" equality of property, he demands that 
statutes should provide for the redistribution of land, for the regulation of 
inheritance, of dowry, etc. lest excessive inequality of property should come 
about. He suggests that the nobility should not engage in trade lest they grow 
excessively rich. 
Montesquieu was neither an illusionist nor a Utopian. Recognition and 
declaration of the complete obsoleteness of feudalism are absent from his 
work. The illusionistic elements of a bourgeois aspiration for freedom do exist 
in his work, but he "finds" these not only in a new society, but also within 
a reformed, enlightened feudalism that is free f rom tyrants and has assumed 
bourgeois features, and thinks that they can be realized also in such a feudal 
system. This compromise connects in a peacful manner feudalism with capi-
talism, the monarchy with constitutionalism, and absolutism with legality. 
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Montesquieu is the searcher for the best form of political system. He is 
aware of that there is no political system which would suit every people and 
every society. He also knows that the legislator has to respect the peculiarities 
of the "spirit" of his own nation. Therefore he wants to become acquainted 
with each political system, discover the reasons of the birth of the particular 
systems and the grounds of their comparison. 
His standard of a comparison of the various political system is freedom 
as the purpose of the State. This is the supreme human good and therefore 
Montesquieu sets out from the idea of freedom when he analyzes and criticizes 
the political systems and the properties of government. Freedom does not 
mean that one can do as one likes to, for in this way one man would encroach 
on the freedom of the other. The state showing moderation best suits human 
nature yearning for freedom. Political freedom (which again is indispensable) 
is the feeling of security, the awareness of man that he lives under the protec-
tion of the law in safety, that he has not to fear the government or any other 
citizen. Hence people can feel free where nobody can force them to a conduct 
which the law does not decree and where people may do anything which the 
law does not prohibit. In this connexion he refers also to the "difficulties" of 
freedom. "Even freedom itself appeared insupportable to peoples which were 
not used to live in it. It may happen that pure air will harm those who are 
living in marshland", he writes in L'esprit des lois. 
In the sphere of problems of freedom he refers to the claims and rights 
of conquered peoples. "It is not enough to leave to a conquered nation its laws, 
it is even more necessary to leave it its customs, because the peoples know 
their customs better, they cherish and defend them . . . It is hard for a nation 
to endure the pride of the conqueror, yet it is even harder to endure his 
immodesty and importunity, which are by far more hurt ful because they 
multiply the insults." 
Montesquieu, on analyzing the problems of the political organization, goes 
into details in his investigation of the mutual relations of the particular organs 
of the government, mainly for finding the guarantees of a state of equilibrium. 
Here the pith of his political and legal ideas is the division of powers. In his 
opinion a division of power guarantees the freedom of the citizens. The essence 
of his oeuvre is the idea that for the guarantee of public freedom the organs 
or branches of government which would mutually restrict one another, should 
be segregated f rom one another. This thesis he deducted from his study of the 
English constitution, because he thought that the cause of English public 
freedom lay in the segregation of the legislative, executive and judicial organi-
zation. From the end of the 17th century onwards there is a parliamentary 
government in England, which, however, is not identical with a separation of 
the branches of political power. As a matter of fact in this system there is an 
intermediary institution above the legislature and the executive power, viz. the 
cabinet (the administration), which is the depositary of the trust of both, 
unites legislation and execution, guarantees and stabilizes their harmony and 
mutual influence. A division of power alone is not enough. For a good opera-
tion of the "division of labour" a number of guarantees are needed or else the 
desired equilibrium remains a pious desire. On the other hand if a division of 
power were carried through consistently, the government could hardly operate 
in a normal manner. The division of power would in this case fr i t ter away 
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sovereignty, put an end to the unity required for the normal operation of the 
State. 
The thesis tha t there are three powers in the State (viz. legislative, execu-
tive and judicial) that for the freedom and security of the citizens these three 
powers have to be divided lest , the same person should exercise all the three, 
has grown into an article of faith. If the three powers are divided, then 
sovereign power cannot degenerate into tyranny, as the "divided" powers 
control and balance one another, i.e. in the event of a division of power 
"power will set a limit to power", it will prevent abuses, so that the feeling 
of security and freedom of the citizens will be intensified. 
Those who turned the famous thesis of Montesquieu into an article of 
faith or dogma failed to recognize that Montesquieu wanted to guarantee an 
equilibrium among the branches of the sovereign power, arid never thought of 
their rigid separation. For that matter it should be recognized that "the 
separation of the branches of the sovereign power" does not stand for a 
segregation of spheres of power. What is meant with the separation of the 
"branches of power" is merely the division of functions (competences), i.e. the 
division of labour within the State. (Power is united always and everywhere.) 
Marx said that the theory of the division of power was but the simple division 
of labour applied to the machinery of the State. 
According to a considered and correct interpretation of the teaching of 
Montesquieu, the guarantee of freedom is not a segregation of the spheres of 
powers, but the respect for legality. The guarantee of this respect for. legality 
lies in the equilibrium of the competences of the appointed organs, their 
mutual control and the harmony of their operation. 
What is essential in his oeuvre is the exploration of how freedom can be 
achieved and secured. He does not completely trust the people, because 
people is either too active or too passive. "Often with its hundred thousand 
arms it upsets everything, at another time it will advance with its hundred 
thousand feet like a caterpillar." He would have the rights of the people 
restricted to the election of its representatives, however, he does not consider 
the organ of popular representation a decision-making agency, but only, a body 
suitable for controlling functions. In his opinion the most desirable system is 
the constitutional monarchy, which with its respect for the spirit of the law, 
the organization of legislation, the guarantee of legality may proceed in safe-
guarding freedom and the common weal. He created this structure merely 
because he wanted to forestall the revolutiori by the help of thinking and 
political practice. 
. In respect of political organization his oeuvre incorporates also reactionary 
elements, e.g. he wanted to secure a privileged position for the nobility: he 
insisted on a separate representative organ for it. This organ is the so-called 
"second chamber" which transmits and sifts the decisions of the popular 
representation; He also believed that noblemen could be called to account only 
before a court of noblemen. 
Here, too, we may find an embodiment of the idea of a compromise. 
On analyzing the law he states that "everything" i:e. the social phenomena, 
the elements of the governmental mechanism, are closely related to one 
another. Another essential trait of his study of law is that he sets aside' 
natural law, for natural law will fail to explain why positive laws (the legal 
systems) differ f rom one another, are changing and contingent, although Man 
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is the same everywhere and always. He wanted to come to the cognition of 
the content and meaning of positive law through an exploration of historical 
evolution. In conformity with the ideas of Enlightenment, eventually he derived 
law (the statutes) from human reason, i.e. he distinguished natural law and 
positive law, yet failed to explain their mutual relation. 
A fundamental and decisive thesis in connexion with the statutes is the 
need for their harmony with the nature and principles of the existing govern-
ment or the government to come. The statutes must therefore be in harmony 
with the physical potentialities of the country: climate, the quality of the soil, 
the way of living of the population, the degree of freedom, religion, the wealth 
of the country, the number of its population, commercial activities, morals, 
fur ther the mutual relations of these, their origin, ends, and order of their 
subjectmatter. The totality of these relations is the spirit of the laws. 
On analyzing the spirit of the laws, the reason of the birth and creation 
of laws he recognized the fact that here the material factors of a country had 
a considerable and decisive role. Although owing to the standards of the science 
of the age he could not come to the proper conclusions, still' this recognition 
was a landmark in the evolution of political and legal thinking. There could 
be talk of evolution because this recognition marked out the path or road oil 
which the correct solution, i.e. the scientific exploration, of social relations,, 
could be. approached and eventually reached. 
Among the material causes creating the law, Montesquieu gives prominence 
to the climate of a country and the conditions of its soil. He supplements these 
physical properties with the quality of human activity. In this respect a certain 
simplification may be discovered in him, still what is essential is that he 
• adduces objective facts against dogmatists relying on authority and moralists 
in the search for eternal truths. He was the first to formulate the natural 
history of the statutes and of law and to attempt the establishment of the 
relations of social potentialities to other factors. 
Montesquieu was not interested in the content of statutory law, he was 
more interested in legislative activity, in the causes which brought about the 
laws, and the method how these laws came to life. However, Montesquieu 
overrates the potentialities of legislation (the creation of law), so it is under-
standable that he expected from legislation the carrying into effect of his 
solutions and ideas. 
On examining the relations of law, morals and propriety, and the human 
relations, he makes the statement that education is worth more than courtesy. 
"Courtesy flatters the faults of others, education prevents the manifestation 
of faults of our own. . . it is a barrier which has been set up lest men should 
spoil one another." To prevent confusion, he believes in the need for a distinc7 
tion of law, morals and propriety. He refers to Lykurgos, who consolidated 
law, morals and propriety in a single code, and also to the legislators of China, 
who acted in the same way. "They confuse these", he writes, "because morals 
represent the laws, and propriety morals". He specially emphasizes that 
propriety is "not all", it is not Identical with law. 
On analyzing legislation (the making of law) he sets out from the thesis 
that in a free state, governed by man made free by reason, all men have to 
govern themselves. Consequently the whole people is holder of the legislative 
power. Hence the people has a right to take part in legislation. However, the 
university of the people cannot exercise the right of legislation, therefore a 
body elected by the people has to exercise legislative power. What is progres-
sive here is the idea of popular sovereignty, which manifest itself partly in the. 
right of resistance, partly in the right of popular representation. According to 
Montesquieu all this follows from the fact that he yearns for human freedom 
and wants to restrict absolutism. For the constitutional guarantee of the 
freedom of the individual he believes that the people has to exercise legislative 
power. Yet immediately he values the people in a way that he would have this 
"power" limited, because of the inability of the people to discuss the affa i rs 
of the country, and also because in a large country the totality of the people 
cannot exercise this power (owing to organizational considerations) unless 
through representatives. Eventually he recognizes the election of the represen-
tatives as the sole right of the people. 
He also wants to guarantee legislative power for those excelling owing to 
their wealth, birth and ranks. He believes that t rue equality can be enforced 
only when the body of those excelling in rank, birth and wealth may in like 
way bring to a stop the initiative of the people, just as the people is entitled 
to bring to a stop the initiative of the body of the privileged legislators. From 
this the conclusion may be drawn that Montesquieu is in favour of a bicameral 
legislature, from which again his opposition to the abolition of feudal privileges 
follows. 
What is characteristic of his liberalism is the following statement relating 
to the legislator: ". . . the legislator ought to be guided by the spirit of modera-
tion. The correct policy, and the correct morals will always be found between 
the two extremes". 
In connexion with legislation he appeals to his contemporaries that nobody 
should change the national spirit by statutes. "If we want to transplant a spirit 
of narrow-minded pedantry to nation by nature cheerful, the State will gain 
nothing by this in either this country or outside it. Let the frivolous things be 
done seriously, and the serious things cheerfully." 
His demand for legality is another important idea. He studies the problem 
of legality not only in its bearings on the theory of politics and the State, but 
even beyond this, on a level of legal policy, in the sphere of legislation and 
the application of law. He opposes absolutism and describes it in the following 
words: "When the wild men of Louisiana are craving for fruit, they cut the 
tree in its trunk and so collect its fruits. This is absolutistic government." His 
opinions and proposals put forward in the discussion of certain questions of 
criminal law are. associated with legality. In his opinion the gravity of penalties 
meted out is characteristic of the general situation in a country. He believes 
that "any punishment not dictated by exigencies is a tyrannical act. The law 
is not purely an act of power; the regulation of things, by their nature indif-
ferent, does not come within the scope of law." If the penalty does not meet 
the requirements, i.e. the requirements and principles of society and State, it 
may be responsible for corruption. A kind of "corruption" is when the people 
ceases to respect law, another kind of it is when the law spoils the people. 
Of the justness of the legal system he holds that its criterion is essentially 
the adaptation of the content to the spirit of the law; another criterion is the 
elimination of logical contradictions. He deals with the division of the' legal 
system and divides it into international law, public law, civil law and criminal 
law. 
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By objective standards, Montesquieu's L'esprit des lois is a counter-
revolutionary work. This is borne out by the fact that at the formation of the 
ideology of the bourgeoisie which came to power in the revolution and at the 
time of the taming of the revolutionary character of the ideas of Enlightenment 
in a liberal sense, Montesquieu, the prerévolutionary progenitor of the post-
revolutionary liberalism, again became popular. His oeuvre suited this end, 
because the content of his theses, their conflict with reality were those of the 
class of society to which Montesquieu himself belonged. However, the acumen 
of the formulation of the theses, the discovery of the underlying rélations, i.e. 
the formal values of the theses, are his own. His political and legal doctrines 
reflect the ideas of the ha!ute bourgeoisie of his age. (e.g. his thesis that "Not 
the man is poor who has nothing, but the man who does not work" sounds 
cruelly erroneous. In Marxist formulation the thesis would read "Not the man 
is rich who does work, but the one who has all.") However, .in courage and the 
fixation of the critical positions he even goes beyond this. His ideas are 
permeated by a love for mankind and by humanitarianism. Notwithstanding 
his superficial social criticism and inconsistencies, the optimism of a progres-
sive thinker prevails in his life-work, of a progressive thinker who fought 
against religious fanaticism and dogmatiscm, who struggled against chauvinism 
(I am of necessity a man, yet only by accident Frénch, he wrote at one 
instance), who denied the subordination of the State to the Church. 
His teaching that there is a deep relationship between scientific t ru th and 
social righteousness, the progress of science and the progress of mankind, is 
of great moment and still timely. In the last resort these pairs will have of 
necessity to meet somewhere. In the Preface to L'esprit des lois Montesquieu 
professes: "In a state of ignorance no doubts will arise in Man, even if he 
does the worst; however, at a time of enlightenment, may he follow the best, 
he will be overcome by fear and trembling. We shall feel the absurdities of old, 
we shall see the w a y of mending them, however, at the same time we shall 
see the improprieties in mending." 
The close relationship of scientific t ru th and. social righteousness, of the 
progress of science and the progress of mankind, and their encounter will be 
the great rule of the humanitarianism of science, to be followed by scientific 
socialism after centuries. 
[4.] The contradiction between the forces of feudal society and the rising 
bourgeoisie grew in intensity in the France of the second half of the 17 th 
century. The intensification of the contradiction found an expression in new 
political and legal doctrines. 
New tendencies sprang up in political and legal thinking. These may be 
segregated f rom one another most clearly by their concept of equality. The 
most important representative of the first tendency was Voltaire, who worked 
out the notion of freedom in its formal sense. The second tendency discovered 
the inequality of property lurking in the background of equality, and made 
it a point that each citizen should own property of approximately the same 
value, i.e. property which he could produce with his own work. In this tendency 
expression was given to the interests of the petite bourgeoisie of the towns 
and the wishes of the peasantry living in feudal bondage. The principal 
representative of this latter tendency was Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712—1778). 
[The representatives of a third tendency recognized that for private property 
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no maximum could be fixed, it could not be levelled, moreover it was a source 
of all social and economic inequality. They thought that equality was identical 
with the abolition of private property, the source of inequality. In the 18th 
century the followers of this doctrine (e.g. Mably, Morelly) represented the 
plebeian strata of society and the early proletariat.] 
Rousseau in his principal works "Discussion about the Reasons of Inequa-
lity of People" and "he contrat social" stood up against absolutism and the 
feudal system. 
On exploring the origins of the State, he believed that at the beginning 
men lived in a state of natural freedom and equality and only with the growth 
of social organization (the birth of private property and the State), i.e. with 
the creation of inequality among men, the ruin of mankind set in. (In this 
statement he conflicts with Hobbes and Hume, who assumed a state of "a war 
of all against all" before the creation of the State, although Rousseau too 
recognizes the existence of violence in the primitive state of mankind.) 
In the beginning Rousseau entertained a close, relationship to the Encyc-
lopedists (mainly with Diderot). However, in a number of questions he profes-
sed ideas different from theirs. The Encyclopedists waged war against the 
Catholic Church, religious prejudices, superstitions;, they were atheists and 
materialists. Rousseau was a believer and in the general problems of philo-
sophy he opposed materialism. The Encyclopedists were the enlighteners, Rous-
seau on the other hand viewed Enlightenment with doubts, because he thought 
that civilization, science and the ar ts were noxious to Man. 
Rousseau was in favour of progress still he wanted to prevent the growth 
of the inequality of property or of capitalist property by an equal or more 
uniform distribution of property: he wanted to preserve small-scale production. 
He pointed forwaird and backward at the same time. From the maze of 
contradictions he wanted to escape by sounding idealistic concepts. This "libe-
ration" was helped by the subjectmatter of his research, his interests in politics. 
For Rousseau the discussion of the governmental establishment and of private 
property were problems of primordial importance. 
His paper written on science in 1750 defined his ideology for his whole 
life. This ideology differed fundamentally f rom that of the other thinkers of 
the time. Rousseau set out f rom the thesis that nature created Man "perfect", 
and came to the conclusion that culture and civilization brought unhappiness 
on mankind. In response to the effects of culture and civilization natural Man 
changed to an "artificial Man": he lost his properties bestowed on him by-
nature. 
In 1754 he wrote his work "Discussion about the Reasons of Inequality of 
People" a sequence to his first paper. In this he discussed the problem of Man 
in the first place, and set out f rom the abstract assumption of a natural state 
of Man. He handled the „natural state" not as a fact, but as a method, or 
.rather as a hypothesis. With the aid of this hypothesis he thought he could 
solve more easily the probiems confronting him. The essence and gist of the 
problem was the study, how in the course of history, owing to the social and 
political order, Man changed into an artificial being, and how from natural 
equality the differences between man and man developed. In this connexion 
he stated that inequality sprang up from the differences of the size of a germ: 
the results of the gradual metamorphosis of the human organism. 
53 
He recognized that Man had changed in the course of history, and threw 
out the question what factors defined the changes which took place in Man 
in the course of history. Rousseau thought to have discovered two instincts 
serving evolution in Man, viz. the one instinct prompted Man to preserve his 
own welfare, and himself, the second created a natural disgust in Man against 
the suffering and loss of any living being, principally in one similar to him. 
Man acted in response to these two instincts. 
He really raised a focal problem by exploring the causes of inequality of 
man and by this demonstrating the driving forces of the historical and cultural 
evolution of mankind. Although he chose the wrong starting point, still he 
made a number of discoveries in this field. 
So his starting point, i.e. the rationalistic hypothesis that there was a 
natural, primitive man, who lived a solitary life and was an individualist, was 
wrong. Science later on established that the history of mankind began with 
primitive communism and not with individualism. (The arbitrary start ing point 
makes it clear that Rousseau's goal was individualism.) It was due to the choice 
of this starting point that Rousseau was unable to explain the enormous 
progress in whose course Man conquered nature, created civilization, sciences, 
the arts, and unparalleled technics. 
According to his doctrine primitive man possessed senses only but no 
reason, for reason was the product of civilization and of historical evolution. 
Rousseau pronounced a severe, yet partly sound judgement on civilization. 
However, he was not right in what he eventually stated, namely that the 
reasoning Man was but a. degenerated, etiolated animal, therefore the simple, 
uniform and solitary way of living as defined by nature for Man should be 
maintained. 
Rousseau properly saw the situation developed in society, where inequality 
was dominant and where the class of the rich and poor stood in conflict with 
each other. However, he was wrong when he hold human culture and civiliza-
tion, responsible for the decay of modern society. He recognized the antagonistic 
character of progress within class society, however, he was wrong when he 
denied progress and evolution in general. 
However, it was wholly absurd to make the statement that as soon as Man 
began to think, he turned into a "degenerated animal". With this doctrine 
Rousseau held the natural state in higher esteem than a cultured or civilized 
state, which in his opinion "distorted" the t rue physiognomy of primitive Man. 
On the other hand, he had acumen enough to find that it was impossible to 
return to Nature. 
The principal subject-matter of Rousseau's investigations was inequality 
which was closely associated with private property. In this investigation he 
dissociated himself from abstract rationalism and idealism, and came close to 
a materialistic concept of history. This made him one of the greatest thinkers 
of modern times. 
He drew the picture of the gradual evolution of mankind, and wanted to 
demonstrate that the negligible inequality in the "natural state" grew with 
the gradual evolution of civilized society more and more in intensity. The 
social conditions took shape in which one part of men looted the other part, 
the strong suppressed the weak. He was right when he thought that inequality 
dominant in the civilized state relied on private property, the story of whose 
birth he told thus: "The first man, who enclosed a certain territory and took 
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the liberty of 'uttering the words «this is mine» and found people who were 
simple enough to believe this, was the t rue founder of civilized society." 
He stated that private property brought with it misery and serfdom, 
r He made it clear that competition and the resistance of interests, fur ther 
the secret desire to earn a profit to the prejudice of others, were the first 
consequences of private property, and the inseparable concomitants of the 
developing differences. In civilized society a desperate struggle was going on 
(we should say class warfare). 
Rousseau tried to explain the origins of the State (power) and of the laws 
(law) from a materialistic position. He explored the dialectic nature of the 
process. Therefore he may justly be called one of the precursors of the 
materialistic concept of history. 
He recognized that man was not a social being by nature, i.e. nature did 
very little for the association of men, for in a blissful, idyllic, natural state 
men had no need of their fellow-men. (This idea suits the social ideal of 
bourgeois society, i.e. idealism.) Rousseau also recognized that his environment 
shaped Man and that Man had an active effect on his environments. Therefore 
he considered education an important condition of the creation of a good 
society. 
With his fundamental idea that social inequality had its origin in civiliza-
tion, he recognized the essence of the rococo or Baroque culture of the ancien 
regime, and divined the intensifying contrasts between physical and intellectual 
activity in an antagonistic society. 
Rousseau wanted to discover the source of the differences among men, 
governments and peoples in richess. (Other sources of differences were noble 
birth, the social position, power and personal merit.) 
The differences in wealth gave birth to political inequality and differences 
among private persons. Social inequality created political inequality and condi-
tions of subordination. This political inequality intensified and developed in-
equality manifesting itself in private life. 
According to Rousseau the evolution of inequality had grades. These were 
(a) the birth of the laws and ownership; (b) the creation of authorities; (c) the 
transformation of lawful power into despotic power (relying on arbitrariness). 
The tyrant turning up in the third grade of evolution should in his opinion 
be expelled. (With this statement he had France in mind, and the statement 
itself was an appeal to the people to rise in a revolution.) 
According to Rousseau the progress of civilization inevitalby leads to a 
total decay of the civilized state, society would return to the primitive equality 
of the „natural state", which, however, was already contaminated by progress. 
Strictly speaking this stage of progress was already equal to regression. 
As stated by Plekhanov, the gist of Rousseau's teaching was that equality 
dominant in the natural state would be upset as soon as mankind would make 
a noteworthy progress in the development of the productive forces. Each new 
step ori this path increased inequality. The antagonism of the classes of the 
rich and the poor (according to his doctrine these classes were created by the 
processing of metals and agriculture) created the State, which was in the 
hands of the rich. The successes of the sciences and the arts only intensified 
inequality and consequently moral depravity. 
Since mankind and so civilization advanced too far in the degeneration of 
the original (primitive) equality, there was no return to the original state, i.e. 
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the historical process of civilization was irreversible. Therefore it was natura l 
that Rousseau contemplated culture and civilization in a pessimistic mood. 
Rousseau did not believe in the restoration of equality (for he thought 
that inequality was becoming even more intense), and he took the position 
that fur ther intensification of inequality had to be stopped or slackened down, 
i.e. property ought to be levelled up. To this end he favoured the middle 
estates, the middle classes. 
According to Rousseau in his natural state Man had freedom relying on 
his physical strength. This freedom was in direct proportion to Man's physical 
power, i.e. all was his he could acquire. In the civilized State the freedom of 
Man was limited by the will, the law, and positive law. This was the start ing 
point of Rousseau. 
The transition f rom the "natural state" to a civilized state (the State) took 
place by way of the social contract. Accordingly the subjects entered into a 
covenant with the sovereign, who as leader guarded the freedom of Man. 
(Hobbes, too, was acquainted with the contract, still according to his doctrine 
Man resigned all his rights for the benefit of the sovereign by this "covenant".) 
Rousseau spoke of a bilateral contract, where the people and the sovereign 
opposed each other as parties of equal rights. In his opinion the contract could 
be terminated at any time, even by the people. The bourgeoisie took Care of 
the safeguard of its property, therefore its ideologists worked out a variety of 
theories to this end. The social contract brought about radical changes in so-
ciety: the institution of property was born, without which there was no bour-
geois society. 
What was the advantage of the social contract? It substituted formal 
equality for the earlier natural equality, moreover physical inequality, i.e. 
through the contract and the law all men became equal. Witb the birth of 
this contract Man did not forfeit his freedom, freedom was given a new sanc-
tion, according to the law Man became free and equal. 
The theory of the social contract was a weapon against the sovereign 
governing by divine right already f rom the 16th century onwards. In the middle 
of the 18ht century the absolutists said that certain men were born for govern-
ment, at the same time an infinite number of men were born for obedience. 
Rousseau stood undoubtedly on the soil of enlightenment. The intrinsic 
contradictions of his ideas follow from the revolutionism of the petit bour-
geois. He represented a class which wanted to free itself of the feudal bonds, 
and at the same time it wanted to be protected against the menaces of the new 
bourgeois system of economy. 
In Rousseau's notion the "law of the stronger" did not exist, because this 
expression was meaningless and would permit the reinforcement of the state-
ment of the theologians, that all power came from God. To conform to the 
ideals of the age there was need for some sort of a. covenant or contract to 
call to life a lawful power. Therefore Rousseau reverted to the primary 
contract, the social contract, which did not rely on violahce or force. When 
Man could not live any longer in his natural state (owing to evolution) and 
for his subsistence he had to associate with other men, a form of association 
became necessary which guaranteed' common defence for all. Hence in his 
work Rousseau tried to lay the foundations of civis freedom. He did not intend 
it as a means of tyranny or despositism, as many of his antagonists alleged. 
It is not true that Rousseau opposed the idea of progress. Engels wrote of 
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him that his work Discussion presented the history of evolution of Man grown 
out of the natural state. Naturally this evolution was fraught with contradic-
tions. 
The reason why it is difficult to ^understand his work is that Rousseau 
segregated the legal and actual situation. In his work Discussion he tried to 
present facts. In Le contrat social he laid down the ideal priciples of law. i.e. 
the idealist method threw out' problems. There are opinions saying that had 
not Rousseau expressed himself "thus", but in an open manner, then Le contrat 
social would have been a proclamation, an appeal to action. This is exactly 
what Rousseau did not want, as he was not a revolutionary, he was not the 
man' of action. Still he yearned for blazoning abroad truth and for teaching 
the secret of happiness to mankind. Le contrat social described an ideal state, 
yet occasionally the ideal is commingled in it with reality, so that in some 
instances the revolutionary sense is camouflaged by logical absurdities. 
Le contrat social was written for the City of Geneva. He wanted to create 
a system for this town which respected freedom. Yet he did not forget about 
the happiness of mankind. He criticized the monarchy (he was thinking of 
France of his age). He thought that his doctrines suited small states only, still 
he set a political ideal to all peoples which could be translated into reality 
perhaps in some distant future. 
He believed that Man was inevitably unhappy in society and yet he praised 
a society where Man could alienate all his rights. Apparently this was incon-
sistent. If we analyze his methods, then this inconsistency or contradiction 
could be cleared. Rousseau's method was rationalistic in an abstract sense. All 
he traced back to a few principles based on „common sense". He studied the 
law as a whole rather than particular laws. He explored the universal prin-
ciples of public law, principles which in the ideal civil society had to be 
respected. This method again raised problems. Namely whether in the mind 
of Rousseau the social contract was a historical fact, or merely an ideal. He 
himself wrote that the contract which created a lawful power and transferred 
this power to elected leaders, was a dupery of the people and eventually the 
individuals became equal in a state of unlawfulness. Still if the people brought 
the tyrant to a fall, the path would stand open to the t rue contract. 
Le contrat social confirms that political freedom is the inalienable right 
of all members of the State, which they have not waived and cannot even 
waive. Consequently the sovereign power was the due of the totality of the 
members of the state (the citizens). 
The clauses of the covenant were perhaps never proclaimed formally, still 
tacitly they were recognized by all. This covenant alienated all rights of all 
contracting persons for the benefit of the community. However, nobody could 
exploit this state to the prejudice of the others, i.e. freedom was guaranteed 
by equality. The formula of the contract was of necessity the following: "Each 
of us subordinates his person and all his abilities to the supreme authority of 
the common will, and considers each member the inseparable part of the 
totality." 
The social contract is of a peculiar character. Each individual covenants 
with himself, as he is part of the community with which he. enters into a 
contract.Nothing binds the sovereign power in respect of its subjects, however, 
this situation cannot lead to despotism, as the sovereign power can have no 
interests conflicting with those of the private persons. Since apart f rom the 
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public will each individual may have private interests which might silence the 
voice of the public will, the sovereign power may in such cases bring pressure 
to bear on the individual and guarantee freedom for all. 
On analyzing the forms of government Rousseau did not take an absolutis-
tic position. According to his doctrine the forms of government could be 
relatively good. The form of government was a question of secondary impor-
tance for him. Going deeper into the study of "government", i.e. the form of 
government, he concluded that in history various governments or forms of 
government developed. These were according to his doctrine the artistocratic 
form (the case when several persons rose among themselves to about the same 
level and were then elected jointly to power), the democratic form (the case 
when the fate and abilities of those wielding power showed no disproportio-
nateness, and the persons concerned did not move away from the natural state 
to any high degree). In his opinion time would show which form of government 
was the most beneficial for mankind. 
The body politic (the supreme organs of the State) was composed of three 
elements: "The sovereign commands, the government carries out, the subject 
obeys." 
On analyzing government Rousseau concluded that the legislative power 
belonged to the sovereign power, i.e. the people, while government was vested 
in the ruler. 
"The leading principle of political life is hidden in the sovereign power. 
The legislative power is the heart of the State, the executive power its b r a i n . . . " 
There is no government which would be the best by itself: the forms of 
government change from one state to the other. However, Rousseau called 
forth attention to the thesis that "political institutions should never be made 
rigid to an extent that their power could never be suspended". Any risk of the 
upsetting of the public order should be undertaken only in cases of greatest 
danger and only for a short period of transition. If dictatorship becomes 
justified, the State would either perish shortly, or be saved. With the passing 
away of emergency the dictatorship would be apt to turn into tyranny, or 
become superfluous. Tyranny implied particular risks, because " . . . tyranny 
does not govern the subjects to make them happy, but to make them miserable 
in order that it might rule over them". Rousseau considered government a 
science and wrote of it: "In the course of history the most praised kings were 
not brought up for ruling; this is a science which we acquire the less the more 
we study it, and which can be acquired best by obedience than by command-
ing." To this he added the following: "If we wanted . . . to create a permanent 
(governmental) arrangement, we should not have in mind eternity at all. And 
if we wanted to reap success we should not strive for what is impossible . . ." 
However, success was wanted in politics. Results were needed in politics and 
in public life, they were needed for the achievement of the targets, for keeping 
the promises. "What should we believe of the doctor, who promises miracles 
and whose whole learning consists in warning his patients to patience", Rous-
seau asked academically. 
According to his doctrine the best government is the one under whose 
leadership the citizens of the State continually multiply "without external 
supply, naturalization, colonization"; 
Every government advances towards degeneration, i.e. towards a state 
where it usurps sovereign power and breaks the social contract. Before it 
reaches this stage, it narrows down continuously: democracy turns into oli-
garchy, this into a monarchy, then it reaches the state of tyranny. We cannot 
fight against this degeneration unless we convene popular assemblies as 
frequently as possible. "In general government degenerates in two ways: if it 
contracts, or if the State disintegrates. Government contracts, if it changes 
over f rom the large numbers to the small numbers, i.e. f rom democracy to 
aristocracy arid f rom aristocracy to monarchy." 
In the course of an analysis of the functions of the State Rousseau insisted 
on State interference with property relations. 
Rousseau's ideal society was a more or less uniform distribution of social 
goods in a social order suiting the interests of the petite bourgeoisie in order 
that there might be neither poor nor rich in society. He did not oppose 
property in general, he opposed large fortunes only, i.e. he proposed their 
distribution. As a fighter of egalitarianism of the style of the petite bourgeoisie 
he considered small property the foundation of society. 
He saw it clearly that formal equality as proclaimed in modern society was 
the means of preserving partly misery, partly wealth. All vices of class society 
had their origin in the institution of private property. There was the source of 
struggles and strifes in society: the wealthy with the social contract at a single 
stroke, once for all implanted the ownership and inequality. This called for an 
as uniform distribution of wealth among rich and poor as possible, because the 
uniform distribution of wealth guaranteed the stability and the duration of 
the system of government. 
To Rousseau equality was not the uniformity of the degrees of power and 
wealth, on the other hand he insisted and urged a social order which would 
prevent power f rom becoming violence. Therefore he wanted to abolish the 
two extremes viz. immense wealth and dire poverty, in the sphere of property, 
and proposed their mutual approximation as only by such an approximation 
of the two extremes could stability be lent to the State. 
Strictly speaking Rousseau's whole teaching centred round the problem of 
formal political freedom and formal political equality. This feature brought his 
teachings close to the doctrines of bourgeois liberalism. 
In his political works Rousseau exposed the general theory of bourgeois 
democracy. (His theory was a continuation of the doctrine of bourgeois liberal-
ism whose first representatives of renown were Locke and Montesquieu. The 
function of liberalism was to safeguard the property of the wealthy classes, the 
existing social and political order, which guaranteed property and the freedom 
of acquiring property and the exploitation of the workers with this property. 
The liberals demanded that the State should not interfere with economic 
affairs, the relations of capital and work, i.e. according to the liberál doctrine 
a state of freedom was where nothing prevented the bourgeoisie f rom ex-
ploiting the workers.) 
Bourgeois democracy (as the-continuation of liberalism) as a supplement 
to freedom moved the idea of democratism and equality to the focal point. 
This equality was formal, it did not- lead out of bourgeois society, it conso-
lidated this society even more. Although in a bourgeois democracy power was 
formally vested in the people, yet notwithstanding its formal sovereign power 
the people was virtually without rights. 
According to Rousseau the principle of popular sovereignty was the 
foundation of the democratic social and political order. With this progressive 
theory Rousseau was the first to proclaim the ful l powers of the people. 
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Rousseau restated character and nature of human freedom in a novel form. 
He thought that human freedom was inalienable. He extended his idea of an 
inalienability of freedom to the people as a whole, to sovereign power, to 
popular sovereignty. 
Rousseau segregates the notions of sovereign and government f rom each 
other. The sovereign is the holder of the fulness of the legislative power. The 
government is merely the executive power, which acts under a commission 
from the sovereign, and is the intermediary between sovereign and people. • 
He named democracy the most perfect form of government, yet not re-
presentative (indirect), but direct democracy. At the same time he doubted 
whether the establishment of the democratic method of government was 
feasible at all, and in a pessimistic mood he stated that such a perfect form 
of government was not for Man. In his doctrine, virtue i.e. the love of the 
common weal, is the actuating force democracy. When the people cease to 
show an interest in public life, democracy is possible no more. "When people 
begin to say of public affairs: what does it concern me? — then we should 
know that the State is lost." Then again in a pessimist mood he added: "In 
the strict sense of the word there never existed and there will never be t rue 
democracy. It is against the order of nature that the vast majori ty should 
govern and rule over the minority. It is unimaginable that the people should 
assemble at all times to manage public affairs." (It should be noted that 
Rousseau did not consider a system democratic if it relies on representation.) 
He distinguished public will and the will of all on the understanding that 
the latter as a mechanical concept considered public interests only, whereas 
the former respected private interests.. On the other hand, Rousseau denied 
the autonomous role of personality, he subjected it to the totality of society. 
This doctrine contradicted his concept as whole, which was decidedly of an 
individualistic character. . 
This statement of Rousseau was undoubtedly fraught with contradictions 
as the starting point was idealistic. 
The question is often raised whether Rousseau was an adherer of etatism 
or of individualism. When Rousseau was thinking in a political manner, he 
wais not an individualist, in particular when he is placed in juxtaposition to 
Locke. He must be given credit for his recognition that a seemingly f ree 
"covenant" eventually led to servitude, because it surrendered the individuals 
to other sronger individuals. He did not yet grasp class warfare. As spokesman 
of the petite bourgeoisie, which was suppressed by the ancien régime, and 
which was threatened in its property by the growth of the manufactures, he 
turned his attention to the exploitation of man by man. Similarly to other 
progressive thinkers of the age, he too called for individual freedom, still 
unlike others he believed that freedom was inseparable f rom equality. For 
the preservation of the equality of men he demanded the expropriation of all 
natural rights for the benefit of the community. "The individual has to remain 
as free as he was before" he wrote and would achieve this end by means of. 
the theory of public will and the law. 
If there is no freedom according to his notion, the State would disintegrate. 
A case of the disintegration of the State will be present when the sovereign 
ceases to govern the State in conformity with the laws and usurps the sovere-
ign power. Another case of the disintegration of the State is when the members 
of the government one by one usurp power which otherwise they could exercise 
60 
only as a corporation, collectively. In both cases anarchy will follow. Rousseau 
regards any unlawful form, of government as an anarchy. 
He formulated the „great question of politics" in a letter written to the 
Marquis de Mirabeau on< July 26, 1767 as follows: „We have to find a form 
of government which raises the law above Man", then in his Neuchatel MS 
he clearly stated that freedom could be discovered in the obedience to the law. 
He also stated that freedom had no guarantees whatever unless the laws of 
nations were as adamantine as those of nature. Freedom could survive only 
if the will of the individuals was given expression by the common will in the 
nation, i.e. if sovereign power was held by the people. Rousseau thought 
that popular sovereignty was the best guarantee of individual rights. (This was 
the concept of freedom of Antiquity.) The individual was free only in the State, 
therefore he had to adhere to the State with boundless devotion The love of 
freedom was inseparable f rom patriotism and the democratic ideals. 
In his social contract Rousseau raised the political ideas manifesting them-
selves in the most democratic strata of the bourgeoisie of the 18th century, viz. 
liberty, equality and popular sovereignty to a high theoretical level. In con-
tradiction to monarchic tyranny he drew the outlines of the vision of a society 
where law did not depend anymore on the whims of the seignior and did not 
serve the narrow circle of the privileged. 
How did he define his system? He decdared that democracy in its pure 
form was impossible. He stated erroneously that each citizen devoted all his 
time to public affairs. In an exaggerated manner he rejected all representative 
systems, and eventually he found himself in a cul-de-sac. In the same way his 
thesis condemning the parties as if they might suppress the unfolding of the 
common will, also led him in a dul-de-sac. (By party Rousseau understood only 
the aristocratic party; he could not imagine a democratic party.) 
His work, Le contrat social, was, as a typically idealistic work, character-
istic of the age. In the same way as the notion of the social contract is also 
idealistic. It presupposes that the State is the creation of the conscious act of 
all members, as the community was looking, for a reasonable solution for 
overcoming the risks implied in a natural state. These doctrines were then 
definitively rejected by Marxism. Rousseau himself was not sure whether the 
State had its origin in reality (i.e. it was not the product of reason, or some 
sort of an arbi trary decision). 
According to Rousseau law and statutes were expressions of the common 
will, and were binding on the people as a whole. The statutes could not be 
unjust, as nobody could be unjust to himself. True freedom was implied in 
the abidance by the law, because the law was expression of our will. 
The sole creator of the law was the people, yet even if the people wanted 
the common weal, it could not recognize i t in all cases, therefore legislators 
were needed who would make' clear to the people what common weal meant. 
"The individual sees the good, yet rejects it; the community wants it, but does 
not see it." Even if he did not despise the people, as regards legislation he 
was pessimistic about the abilities of the people. He wrote: "The sage, if he 
speaks in his own language to the common people instead of in theirs, will 
not be understood." Therefore the legislator applied the tricks of religion and 
deceived the people for its own benefit. Therefore for him the birth of a just 
society was something bordering on a miracle, for according , to him "gods 
would be wanted to give law to the people". 
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The legislator had to possess the same properties as the gods in order 
that he might give laws to the people. Since the people was unable to appre-
ciate wisdom, it was the proper course to appeal to the authority of religion. 
"The great spirit of the legislator is the true miracle which has to confirm 
its vocation. Anybody may engrave stone slabs, may buy prophecies, pretend 
secret ties to some deity, teach tricks to a bird that it chirps into his ears, or 
invent any other clumsy method for the deception of the people. A man who 
knows only such things may by chance assemble a lot of fools round him, but 
will never lay the foundations of an empire, and his adventurous creation will 
soon perish together with him." 
"Anybody undertaking the organization of a people will have to know 
also how to change human nature to a certain extent in order that he might 
convert each individual, secluded and an independent totality by himself, into 
part of a large community. . ." In addition to education Rousseau also urged 
legal measures: the segregation of ownership and the law of inheritance, re-
stirction of inheritance to the nexts of kin, introduction of progressive taxation 
for the wealthy, and the imposition of excises on luxuries. 
"Only the sanctity of the covenant can become the reason for existence of 
the sovereign power, therefore it cannot bind itself for a purpose which would 
violate this covenant." The sovereign power must not burden its subjects with 
any clog useless for the community, for under the law of reason, just as under 
law of nature, nothing can happen without a cause. The sovereign power has 
no strength other than the legislative power, therefore it can act only through 
the agency of the laws. The laws are the authentic manifestations of the 
common will. Therefore the sovereign power can step into action only when 
the people has assembled. Howewer, the "assembled people" is a phantasm. It 
is impossible to convene the people at frequent intervals, though it can be 
represented. Still " . . . as soon as the people depends on representatives it ceases 
to be free, moreover it ceases to exist as a people at all". Modern democracy 
cannot of course be without a popular representation, still the representatives 
can be controlled continually, they may even be recalled. 
According to Rousseau the sovereign power cannot be represented, being 
essentially identical with the common will, and will cannot be represented. 
With a certain metaphysical savour he states that the delegates of the people 
are not its representatives, they are merely its agents. Consequently the re-
presentative is the servant and not the master of the people. 
The legislative system is directed towards two principal objectives, the 
one is freedom, the other equality without which freedom cannot subsist. 
Equality is not complete, however, the differences of power and property, i.e;. 
inequalities, may be reduced. Hence the legislative system has to be adapted 
to the conditions in which the people is living. Even more important than the 
laws is the introduction of good morals. 
In the wake of Montesquieu, Rousseau came to. the conclusion that not all 
peoples were mature for freedom; "form the nature of things principles may 
be forthcoming which lead to servitude", fur ther "Freedom is not the f r u i t of 
all climates, therefore it cannot be achived by every people", he wrote. 
According to Rousseau in reality the laws are beneficial for those who own 
something, however, to the have-nots they will be harmful. He wants to 
discover the reason for this in "poor government" what of course means that 
the law serves the interests of the wealthy, the possessors. In this connexion 
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Rousseau draws the following conclusion: "The social condition is beneficial 
only as long as everybody owns something and nobody has too much." 
On entering into the social contract, Man placed all his property at the 
•disposal of the sovereign power; the sovereign power left its property with 
Man and guaranteed its enjoyment. However, Man only possessed what he 
needed for his subsistence and what he could sell. 
Notwithstanding the covenant, Man remained free as man, and was sub-
ject to the laws only as member of the State. Everybody gave up his own per-
sonality to that of the State and by this the will of all coalesced into a common 
will. As Rousseau wrote "Will is made a common will by the common interest 
uniting those endowed with a vote rather than the number of votes." This 
common will is the State, i.e. the sovereign. According to Rousseau the sovere-
ign power is an absolute and indivisible power. 
The State,, and also legislation is guided by the public will according to 
the requirements of the common weal. Sovereign power, the manifestation of 
public will is inalienable, for will could not be transferred to another person. 
Sovereign power is the people itself, and the people could not be tied to the 
will of a man. 
Common will is genuine if everybody has a share in it, if everybody sub-
mitted himself to all conditions — this was the guaranty of freedom. (How-
ever, there can be no united common will in class society.) To obey the sovere-
ign power is tantamount to obeying ourselves, so through the agency of the 
social contract we merely exchange these natural rights for civic rights, but do 
not alienate them. 
"Transition from the natural state to the civic brings about momentous 
changes, since in the conduct of Man justice replaces instinct, and in his acts. 
the moral element missing before will come to the fore." 
"The strongest even is not strong enough to remain master for ever, unless 
he exchanges his strength for law, obedience for duty." Strictly speaking the 
laws are the conditions of the union of society. 
Rousseau considered also religion the condition of social coexistence, the-
refore he recommended a civic religion (or in his words, a confession), which 
would proclaim the pledge of conscience in a sense that those who did not 
believe its articles of faith could be exiled, and those who recognized them, yet 
with their conduct belied them should be punished with death. However, there 
were few positive dogmas only; there was a single negative dogma — in-
tolerance: any denomination which did not tolerate the others must be exiled 
from the State. 
The society of the age of Rousseau could instill only Utopian solutions into 
the public: the classes should be raised to a uniform level, measures should 
be taken that there should be neither rich nor poor. Rousseau's democracy 
could exist only in a patriarchal society. His theory of laws abstract to a 
degree that it appeared justified only in a society where a division of labour 
was very primitive.. He, too, recognized that his principles could be applied in 
small states only.. 
Rousseau was aware of the approaching end of the monarchial system. 
His work Le contrat social was a tool only for the demolition of the. monarchic 
feudal state. This work exceeded all others that had been published before 
(for its profundity, vigour, trend towards genuine democracy, the recognition 
of national reality). Rousseau wanted to throw a light on the path to happiness. 
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Therefore Saint Just said of him that this was the "new idea in Europe", i.e. 
that the end of society was the common weal. He transgressed the limitations 
of bourgeois thinking, for he dreamt of a realistic equality (in the face of 
bourgeois formal equality). He dreamt of a nation where there would be no 
•disinherited, nor pariahs. Rousseau's endeavours pointed towards Jacobine 
movement, he himself was not a Jacobine revolutionary. So to present him in 
the history of ideas as if he had been a representative of romanticism, is 
erroneous. As a matter , of fact he formulated the requirements of the age in 
the image of natural law, and called to the struggle against the decayed feudal 
system. Undoubtedly he was the thinker of the 18th century who wanted to go 
beyond the limits of bourgeois thinking, although he could take refuge only 
in Utopia. He strove af ter genuine democracy with a sincerity that no progres-
sive-minded man of the present age can be insensitive to his oeuvre. The 
oeuvre of Rousseau is valuable for all friends of progress, for the ideal depicted 
in it is still waiting for being translated into reality in that part of the world 
which still suffers f rom capitalist exploitation. As one of his reviewers writes, 
his ideas cannot be put into practice, still they cannot be rejected thoughtlessly 
as. long as his name will stand as the synonym of the idea of democracy. His 
work is timely even today, as the modern age has not as yet translated into 
fact Rousseau's programme in the proper sense of the term: the many-sided 
creative faculty of Man has not yet been freed f rom all social fetters. 
[5.] Tradition wants to know of Kant that h e . lived in an extremely, 
scrupulously careful manner, on a very precise schedule to an extent that the 
citizens of Konigsburg adjusted their watches to his walk beginning exactly at 
noon. However, one day Kant failed to appear in the gateway of his house, 
not even when the clock struck twelve. The burghers of the town surmised an 
extraordinary event. In fact on this day Kant received the news of the outbreak 
of the revolution in Paris. 
This tradition is a symbol at the same time: partly because it is an in-
dication of the systematic character of Kant 's way of thinking, and partly 
because it may be an indication of his adjustment to the revolution, or as 
Marx said, the philosophy of Kant was the German theory of the French 
Revolution. 
In the second half of the 18th century, in the wake of the evolution of 
capitalism and owing to the thrust the bourgeoisie made forward, far-reaching 
economic and social changes took place in West-Europe: Instrumental in these 
changes was the French bourgeois revolution of 1789—1794. A new social order 
was victorious, after the annihilation of the feudal order of society, wrote 
Marx. Bourgeois property prevailed against feudal property the idea of nati-
onality ousted provincialism, -the principle and requirement of competition 
triumphed over the guilds, the principle of partition remained victorious aga-
inst entailed property, the domination of the owner of . the land prevailed over 
the domination of the land over the owner, enlightenment was victorious aga-
inst superstitition, the family won the day against the family name, industry 
succeeded against heroic laziness, civil law triumphed over mediaeval privileges. 
In response to the French Revolution an anti-feudal revolutionary mov-
ement sprang up in Europe and the evolution of the historically progressive 
bourgeois ideology set in. This ideology essentially taught that all men had a 
right to freedom, happiness, private property, things feudal ideology denied 
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to Man, although this ideology too recognized these rights as '"natural" and 
inalienable. 
The bourgeois ideologists following in the footsteps of the ideologist of the 
French Revolution taught that Man was the master of nature, and that there 
was nothing unknowable or inaccessible for reason. 
, The splendid idea of the regularity of the social process became a convic-
tion of the progressive bourgeois philosophers, and so also the faith in the 
boundless progress of society. The thinking being was celebrated, the enthusi-
asm of the spirit made the world quiver. . 
The ideological concepts of feudal society fell down in a heap. The re-
ligious humiliation of Man was superseded • by the deeply optimistic cult of 
reason. . 
Unfolding capitalist economy destroyed the feudal conditions, it created 
new branches of production, new social and individual needs moulded new 
classes of society, and encouraged the rapid development of the natural 
sciences. Historical progress was only accelerated by the industrial revolution 
in England a t the end of the 18th century. The industrial revolution laid the 
foundations of industrial capitalism, of largescale production, it opened new 
vistas to the improvement of the productivity of work and to the accumulation 
of social wealth. 
Naturally feudalism did not collapse, neither was it annihilated definitiv-
ely. After the defeat of Napoleon the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty took 
place in France, and as the outcome of the . Vienna Congress, Europe was 
swamped in the tide of political reaction. However, there was no way back-
ward, the feudal monarchical governments had to adapt themselves to capital-
istic evolution. However, attempts were made to stem bourgeois democratic 
changes (yet to a lesser degree capitalistic evolution). • . • 
At the end of the 18th century and in the opening years of the 19th it was 
becoming more and more obvious that the interests of the classes on which 
the hew, bourgeois society rested, did not harmonize. The first revolutionary 
movements reinforced the forms of bourgeois ideology searching for com-
promises, forms which were oriented towards the non-revolutionary path, i.e. 
towards an alliance with the feudal ruling class and its ideology. This develop-
ment of the. bourgeoisie and of bourgeois ideology was characteristic mainly 
of the European states which entered the path of capitalistic evolution with 
a delay. 
In the second half of the 18th century, and at the beginning of the 19th 
century, Germany was a backward feudal state compared to England or 
France. Germany was composed of a large number of petty principalities, 
which were separated by political frontiers from one another. Owing to the 
economic and political disunity, notwithstanding its common language and 
common culture, the German people did not form a united nation. 
The bourgeoisie did not unite on an allnational scale, in the national sense 
it was not a united. class, therefore it was unable to fight feudalism in a re-
volutionary way. 
The awareness of its own weakness and the fear of the antagonistic con-
sequences of bourgeois evolution, prompted the German bourgeoisie to strive 
for a compromise with feudalism and absolutism. The German bourgeois ideo-
logists placed all hope in a spontaneous course of the events calculating that 
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history would anyhow compel the feudal classes and governments to make con-
cessions to the spirit of the age. 
Prussia and other German states were defeated by the revolutionary 
France, and then the problem loomed up before the monarchial German 
governments, how to carry through certain changes in a bourgeois sense, also 
in the interest of the increase of military power. Accordingly in several German 
states (even in Prussia) the personal dependence of the peasants on the land-
lords was abolished, facilities were granted to redeem feudal services, some 
encouragements and statutory guarantees were given to the commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie. 
Ideologists of Prussian feudalism proclaimed that Germany had to be 
united round the Prussian Dynasty of the Hohenzollern. Thus the conditions 
of a compromise were brought about between the German bourgeoisie and 
the nobility more and more venturing on the path "of capitalistic evolution. 
This compromise had its ideological counterpart and received a background 
in the teachings of the German philosophers of the second half of the 18 t h 
and of the first third of the 19 th century, namely in the doctrines of Kant, 
Fichte, Schölling and Hegel. The precursors of the revolution of German 
philosophy were idealists, therefore their struggle against feudalism was in-
consistent, ill-assorted. 
It is an experience taught by history that in economically and politically 
backward countries often more progressive doctrines will appear than in 
developed countries. This was the case in the middle of the 18th century in 
France, and the same happened also in Germany, where by applying the philo-
sophical thinking of the earlier ages use was made also of the achievements 
of the natural sciences (geology, embryology, phytophysiology were already 
well established in the beginning of the 19 th century). 
For the bourgeois ideologists (and so also for the classical German philo-
sophers) the crises appeared as if they were the regular movements of the all-
powerful intellect. It appeared to them as if. the intellect were capable of 
overcoming all obstacles and solve all contradictions on the path leading to 
freedom and perfection. Germany accompanied the evolution of modern peoples 
only with the abstract activity of thinking without taking an active part in the 
real struggle of evolution (Marx). 
A prominent representative of this philosophy was Immanuel Kant (1724— 
1804), the sage of Königsberg, cultivator of philosophy and natural sciences. 
In the first phase of his activities (till the beginning of the 'seventies) he tried 
to solve the fundamental problems of philosophy (being, natural philosophy, 
the philosophy of religion, ethics, logic) on the assumption that philosophy could 
be elaborated and formulated as a speculative science, i.e. without empirical 
data. At that time Kant was still under the influence of the rationalistic philo-
sophy of Wolff and his disciples. In the sixties Kant became acquainted with 
the agnosticism of Hume, and at that time he ceased to believe that the in-
tellect could come to know the true essence of the things in a speculative way. 
In the second phase of his activities (from the beginning of the seventies 
onwards) Kant tried to distinguish the "phenomena" from the "things in 
themselves", which according to him could not be given in experience. He tried 
to demonstrate that the things are in themselves unknowable, Man could come 
to know phenomena only, i.e. the manner how the things in themselves had an 
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effect on us. His teaching, which Kant, called the Critique of Reason, was a t 
that t ime agnostic. 
The critical philosophy of Kant took a shape at the beginning of the 
eighties. His doctrines were developed in. his works The Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781), The Critique of Practical Reason (1790) and The Critique of the 
Faculty of Judgment (1788). In his first-mentioned work he exposed his epis-
temology, in the second his moral philosophy, in the third his aesthetics, his 
teaching of the expediency prevailing in nature. The Kantian theory of the 
things in themselves and of the phenomena is underlying all three works. 
According to Kant there is a world of things independent of our consciousness 
(of perception, cogitation). These Kant called the things in themselves. 
The presupposition of his doctrine of the existence of things in themselves 
was materialistic. For him it was not consciousness that was primordial, but 
the things of the material world. In his investigation of the sources and limita-
tions of cognition Kant already turned his back on the materialistic position 
and offered an idealistic exposition. He considered the form primordial and 
believed that Man, with definite categories, introduced order into nature, 
although he recognized necessity in nature, whereas according to his doctrine 
in society the free will prevailed. 
The social, political and legal doctrines of Kant are embodied by his moral 
philosophy. Namely moral philosophy may be divided into two parts, just as 
Man, too, may be split into two. Man is partly a sensuous being and as such 
part of nature, void of a freedom of will. On the other hand Man is a being of 
reason, a moral being, i.e. one in possession of a f ree will, yet his acts are' 
dictated by an unconditional command of reason. Moral philosophy on this 
understanding deals with the internal life of Man on the one par t (this is 
what is called the doctrine of virtues), and on the other with the external life 
and act of Man (this is called the doctrine of law). 
The social, political and legal doctrines of Kant developed under the in-
fluence of French and English enlightenment, mainly by the effect of Rousseau. 
In connexion with the origin of the State Kant made the statement that the so-
called social contract was an ideal construction, only an idea by means of 
which the State could be justified. In his opinion the natural state of things 
followed from reason, a construction of experience, because it was the logical 
precondition of the lawful state. So there could be no question of violence, of 
evil. In conformity with his doctrine of the unknowable character of the thing 
in itself Kant made it clear that the true origin of the State could not be 
explored, as this would impair the obedience due to the State, and even 
jeopardize its existence. He; stated that popular sovereignty was unrealizable 
in practice and that the will of the people had to submit itself to the existing 
power, and that it had no right to resistance. Thus Kant juxtaposed to the 
democratic idea of popular sovereignty of Rousseau the ideal of Hobbes, i.e. 
the principle of the unlimited absolutism of the sovereign power, and brought 
forward the thesis that in the idea of the social contract it Was out of the 
question as if men had reserved part of their natural freedom. Kant thought 
it was impermissible that the people should take part in the revolution, and 
also that the people should meditate on the method of the birth of the supreme 
power, because this would threaten the State with ruin. However, he did not 
deny, that things as they were ought to be mended, i.e. he recognized the need 
for reform initiated from "above". 
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In his work The thoughts of a cosmopolite about the universal history of 
Mankind (1784) the ideas of the French Revolution were reflected; f rom a few 
lines even the voice of the suppressors of the revolution came to the fore. 
It is a historical experience that every revolution begins with a denial; so 
the social content of Kant's criticism is negative. Kant introverted (he lived in 
Germany), he wanted to explore himself, he wanted to know where the limits 
of his faculty of cognition lay. This is the reason why he did not deal with the 
objects, but with the methods how to acquire cognition of the objects, in so 
far as this was possible in a manner independent of experience (a priori). This 
programme which Kant exposed in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was on 
the social level of dual significance. First, because before following in the 
wake of the French example, the German burgher assessed himself, his 
abilities, strength. Secondly, because our activity of cognition was not an 
adaptation to the things, but the other way round, the adaptation of the things 
to the mechanism of cognition. This was the at t i tude of the revolution, still at 
the same time there was the barrier of the existing and relatively strong order 
Kant reckoned with this limitation, made a compromise and did not ask how 
action was possible, but how safe, "pure" scientific cognition was possible, 
which might provide a foundation for action. 
The adjustment of things to the mechanism of cognition could be re-
volutionary, still it could also mean that the intellect prescribed the laws of 
reality, i.e. that these laws were not objective, but the creations of reason. 
Hence the compromise consisted not merely in the endeavour to reconcile 
idealism and materialism, but also in the conclusion that accurate cognition 
was. possible only in respect of nature, yet not in respect of society, or history. 
This is the clear result of Kant 's apriorism, i.e. even if he put the question, 
how history could be a priori, then his answer could be but what he himself 
wrote: i.e. "if the prophet makes the events himself, and translates into reality 
all that he has prophesied". 
Where does Kant draw the limit for cognition? At the thing in itself (Ding 
an sich); this concept is also of a dual meaning: it designates tha t by the 
means of which the sensing faculty of Man may receive the masses of most 
varied stimuli, it means the chaos of feelings, where then the subjective forms 
of our intuition, i.e. space and time, will create order. And the thing in itself 
can also mean the limit to which cognition may advance. All that is beyond 
this limit is ungraspable essence, the unknown object of an indefinite desire, 
which would mean the final, the solid, the perfect in the face of the continuous 
change, relativization of the world of experience, and also the limit beyond 
which scientific cognition is impossible, i.e. where the world of ideas begins 
which the human intellect cannot grasp. 
The sphere delimited by the thing in itself (Ding an sich) is essentially the 
world of the intellect, the great workshop of human cognition, where the in-
tellect processes matter of experience, the objects of contemplation, i.e. con-
verts the sensorial phenomena into concepts or notions with the aid of the 
categories of logic. 
Two things are needed for all t rue cognition, viz. first, an empirical mat-
erial given in the perceptions, and, secondly, a f rom given in the general forms 
of contemplation and in the notions where in some sort of an order the form 
of intuition of time must always be given. 
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Kant's compromise consisted in that urider the pressure of reactionary 
conditions he was unable to stop at his original programme, viz. the demonstra-
tion of the possibility of intellectual cognition and that by valuating social 
pressure as the "human desire for knowledge" yielded to the endeavour "to 
find the unconditional for the conditioned cognition of the intellect". The 
means of the endeavour for the cognition of the unconditional, the absolute, 
the uniform and completed totality of the world was reason; reason contained 
such pure notions as could not be derived from either intuition or intellect,. 
And in the same way as the intellect had its categories, so pure reason had 
also its ideas: these were notions whose function was the transgression of exT 
perience, i.e. notions which could not be used for helping to scientific cogT 
nition. 
What is therefore the sense of ideas? They serve the endeavour of Man to 
break through the fences of experience and to arrive in the world of trans-
cendence. The ideas offer no scientific acquirements, still they satisfy certain 
spiritual needs, i.e. they do something which so far metaphysics had done:. 
Hence Kant recognizes metaphysics ' as a spiritual demand, yet not as science, 
Kant did not recognize dialectics in the world of experience, he showed 
dialectics into the realm of transcendence, i.e. according to Kant there -was 
no contradiction in reality, hence the contradiction of reason was not a reflec-
tion of reality, bu t an error, an illusion, whereas dialectics were the "logic 
of appearances". 
In his analysis of the form of government Kant took a stand for the 
absolute monarchy, yet considered the republic the ideal form of government. 
He made it clear that emphasis was not on the form of government, because 
even the monarch could govern in a democratic form and could satisfy the 
functions of the State, he could even prevent revolution. He wanted to re-
concile the theory of Montesquieu of the division of the branches of the sovere-
ign power with the idea of the ruler of the all-powerful State, the absolute 
monarch. Like his predecessors he divided power into legislative, executive 
and judicial power, however, only for the sake of a compromise, because 
he did not approve of the revolution. On the contrary he expressly opposed 
it and according to him only reforms should be introduced. 
From the State-creating covenant some derived monarchic absolutism 
(Hobbes), others concluded that it remained the function of the State to serve 
the interests, the freedom and the equality of the few only. Naturally the in-
terests, equality and freedom of those "belonging to the ruling class" were 
understood. It was f rom this notion that the idea of the constitutional state 
was born, one of whose representatives was Kant. 
On examining the functions and the duties of the State, he defined them 
in the inner and outer spheres. 
The State was created by the social contract in order that men might 
unite "under the law" to safeguard freedom. Thus intrinsically the principal 
function of the State was to safeguard "natural" and "inviolable" private 
property. As a matter of fact according to the Kantian doctrine private pro-
perty had extra empirical sources, consequently it' was eternal, universal and 
absolute. A characteristic, in particular intrinsically characteristic end of the 
State, was the guarantee of the abstract common weal, which did not coincide 
with the sensorial picture formed of it. The guarantee of the common weal 
would be the guarantee of the welfare of the subjects (many western theore-
ticians call the capitalist state the welfare state even today). Kant taught tha t 
the principal function of the State was to bring about peace among the 
peoples. He believed that to this end it should not be allowed that an in-
dependent state acquire another independent state and that in the course of 
time the standing armies should be disbanded. No State should be allowed to 
interfere with the domestic affairs or constitution or government of another 
State. An international organization (alliance of peace) should be created 
among the states to guarantee eternal peace. These ideas of Kant were re-
markable achievements of the thinking of the 18th century, although his 
doctrine of peace was a moral ideal, not a concrete historical objective. Still 
its significance was that with his opinions of peace Kant criticized the armed 
adventures of the ruling classes of the Prussia of his days. His doctrines of 
peace were at a later time exploited by the pacifists. He defined the notion 
of the State as "the association of the multitude of men Under legal statues". 
Hence the State was a postulate of the command of reason in order tha t the 
basic rights of men were returned to them in a regulated form. The statement 
may be made that in this definition the demand of the German bourgeoisie for 
legality was reflected, moreover the demand for a united state against 
absolutism. 
Kant derived the origin of the law (the statute) also from reason, i.e. he 
segregated law from reality, and so also f rom the classes of society. As a 
matter of fact in his opinion reason does not express the material conditions, 
so that it is independent of reality, in it the. f ree will prevails. He taught that 
it was not the social and economic conditions, the objective situation of the 
social classes and strafa, but reason (and faith) that set up postulates in de-
pendence on experience. Kant rigidly segregated law and morals f rom each 
other. 
He thought there was an unsurmountable contradiction (antinomy) between 
the empiricial Ego craving for ideals, and giving laws, i.e. the noumenon Man 
and the phaenomenom Man, i.e. between the citizen of the world of essence, 
the Ding an sich and that of the world of phenomena. As a matter of fact the 
reality of the latter (of the phaenomenon) did not permit the laying of a claim 
conforming to the ideal of righteousness, the ethical freedom of the noumenon 
Man was methodological and not genuine freedom. Man could be method-
ologically only burgess of two conflicting worlds at the time. 
The moral antinomies can be solved only in the sphere of transcedence, 
and the regulating principles of pure reason become the postulate of practical 
reason (theses of necessity assumed, yet unprovable, e.g. the immortality of the 
soul, the existence of God). This means that when the moral postulates lay 
claim to a general character and universal validity, they can be only abstract 
and formal postulates, his is how we come to the Kantian moral law "act 
in a way that the maxim of your will could at any time become the general 
principle of law-making". 
Since Kant gave the moral law the character of the categoric imperative 
(the character of an unconditional command), i.e. he placed natural inclination 
in juxtaposition to the striving for happiness, he betrayed by this the social, 
civic sense of the moral law. As a matter of fact in this age, when the rising 
bourgeoisie f rom below waged its battle against the ruling (feudal) powers, it 
could not be allowed that the single man should seek his own happiness. The 
class character of Kantian ethics manifested itself in an even more striking 
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manner in his disquisition according to which moral personality was the free-
dom of a rational being within the limitations of the moral law. 
Kant thought that the antimony that Man ceased to be a beast was in-
contestable, Man in his endeavours did not anymore act under the impact of 
their instincts, yet they were not as yet "intelligent cosmopolites" who shaped 
their history fully according to plan and reason, "from their own intention". 
Kant liberated the bourgeoisie from feudal dogmatism, however, with 
limitations. Man was for him not the end, but a means, a means of nature, 
which had a peculiar clandestine end with Man. Nature smuggled into Man 
the properties which served as the driving forces of evolution, the property, 
i.e. the inclination of Man, to create a society. Kant called it a "companionless 
companionship". (He did not discover the victorious bourgeois Darwinian 
watchword of the struggle for life, nor the Marxist notion of class struggle.) 
Kant did not see class instinct, still he described it, i.e. that Man wanted to 
materialize himself without clear consciousness, anarchistically, by experiment-
ing, stumbling upon contradictions and overcoming them, struggling with him-
self and antagonistically, i.ef Man wanted to create external conditions under 
which the class instinctively found its way home. Man did not even hope the 
realization of the final home, of happiness, moreover he assumed the contrary 
of it. According to Kant it was not essential that Man achieved his objective, 
but merely to come nearer to it, for every approximation also meant the denial 
of the existing. 
In the background of this statement of Kant the understanding lurked that 
under the conditions of the relatively strong feudalism in Germany it could 
not be hoped that bourgeois society, or as he called it "a perfectly just civil 
constitution" would come into being. 
(The same idea manifested itself a century later, when the decay of bour-
geois society began, yet in the proletariat the consciousness of victory was still 
uncertain, in the revisionism of Bernstein as "Everything is the movement, the 
end is nothing".) 
Since Thomasius in the concept of natural law the tendency was making 
headway which wanted to derive natural law not from the natural instincts 
of Man, but f rom his moral nature, and which conceived the postulate of 
morality in the sense of utilitarianism. Kant segregated these two notions in a 
clear-cut way f rom each other. He rejected utilitarianism, and took the posi-
tion that the moral principles had their origin in pure reason free from all 
empirical elements, all instincts, desires, efforts, inclinations. 
According to Kant the moral law from which natural law as well as ra-
tional law may be derived, can be recognized from pure reason and not f rom 
the empirical nature of Man. This notion which without an analyses of the 
natural properties of Man wants to construct the system of ideal legal norms 
merely with the aid of reason, is usually called rational law in juxtaposition 
to earlier natural law. It is in this form that the school of natural law 
completely adopted the position of rationalism. 
It was Kant who was exactly responsible for this turn in the history of 
natural law (although his epistemology was not rationalistic, but rather meant 
an ascendancy over, the one-sidedness of rationalism and empirism). This is 
not surprising when we know that Kant's rational law was based on his ethics 
and not on his epistemology. 
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It is a characteristic trait of the school of natural law that it is blind to 
historical evolution. It derives the origin of law also f rom the f ree covenant 
of Man. Most of the followers of the school considered this covenant a historical 
fact, on the other hand others merely discovered an ideal structure in it 
which would justify the necessity of State and law. ^ 
Kant made the following statement of the notion of law: "Jurists are still 
in search for a definition of their notion of law." 
He himself also offered a definition of law. He stated that law had priority 
before the State (this is founded on the belief in the omnipotence of the law 
and the concept of the constitutional State). He'considered law the totality of 
conditions under which the freedom of the one man had a place by the side of 
the freedom of the other man, according to some sort of a general law of f ree-
dom. "Act in a way that your act should be the rule of the conduct of others 
or of the general conducts." 
The realistic foundation and progressive tendency of the legal doctrines of 
Kant manifested themselves in his juxtaposition of the bourgeois "legal order" 
defined by ownership to feudal lawlessness and arb i t ra r iness . . . In his legal 
doctrines the bourgeois concept of ownership is prevalent. 
Of the relation of law and civic freedom, he taught that Man had freedom 
when he obeyed the laws to which he gave his consent. He considered this 
freedom the inalienable right and property of every citizen. He was an adher-
ent of the equality before the law. 
Hence the French bourgeois democratic revolution passed off under the 
socially backward conditions of Gérmany on the ideological level. 
Kant, the creator of a speculative system of philosophy relying on the idea 
of the duality of the world, who not even in secret took refuge in faith, wanted 
to reconcile materialism and idealism. In his solutions he brought about a 
compromise because he did not believe that under a relatively strong feudalism 
bourgeois society could materialize. . , 
His influence lasts even to these days, and his compromise will for ever 
haunt in both thinking and philosophy. 
[6.] Although as compared to West Europe the Germany of the 18 th cen-
tury and the beginning of the 19th century was economically and politically 
in a backward state, it could nevertheless record remarkable progress in 
political and legal thinking and even gave birth to another great thinker in 
the person of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770—1831). 
In the second half of the 18 th century in Germany agriculture of a feudal 
character had a prominent role. This state of affairs was at the same time 
responsible for the economic dismemberment of the country. Economic dis-
memberment at the same time meant also political dismemberment. At that 
time in Germany the particular princes pursued a home and foreign policy 
of their own. The principalities had a common liege-lord, i.e. up to the Napo-
leonic wars thé electors elected an emperor. The independent and autonomous 
princes exercised the sovereign power through their ministers and civil service. 
The civil servants were recruited in the first place from among the nobility. 
The peasantry keeping up the princes and the nobility was oppressed by an 
enormous tax burden. The situation of the German bourgeoisie then in statu 
nascendi, i.e. of the artisans, merchants who headed industrial development, 
was very much the same. The growth of the bourgeoisie was hampered by the 
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feudal ties. In the opening years of the 19th century liberal reforms were in-
troduced in Germany, or rather in Prussia. These reforms were associated 
with the invasion of Germany by the armies of Napoleon. As a matter of fact 
the defeats suffered from Napoleon prompted the Prussian nobility to in-
troduce measures which meant a change in the face of the earlier feudal 
restrictions. The reforms introduced between 1807 and 1813 abolished the 
personal dependency of the peasantry on the landlords, although all feudal 
services were left intact. The reforms extended the autonomy of the towns, 
although the autonomy was a limited one even afterwards. The reforms 
foresaw the modernization of public administration, and the establishment of 
a bureaucratic, centralized administration was planned. However, this latter 
plan could not be carried into effect owing to the opposition of Napoleon. In 
1812 equal civic rights were bestowed on the Jews. Notwithstanding their 
limited character these reforms shook the feudal system in its foundations, 
operated towards its collapse, and at the same time were instrumental in the 
national rise of Germany and even threw out the idea of the unification of 
Germany. • 
However, the ideals of the bourgeoisie then taking shape were not revolu-
tionary. In this respect they departed f rom the ideals of the revolutionary bour-
geoisie of Frane. The German bourgeoisie thought that the abolition of the 
restrictions hampering its f ree movëment could be hoped also from an en-
lightened ruler, i.e. it expected the limitation of arbitrariness, feudal anarchy 
from an enlightened prince. In this respect the German bourgeoisie resembled 
the section of the French bourgeoisie whose opinions-were given expression by 
Voltaire, Helvetius and Diderot. Hence in this period the German bourgeoisie 
made the principle of compromise its political premiss. 
Although certain changes took place in the wake of the liberal reforms, 
the situation of the peasantry, the artisans, the penurious population of the 
towns, fur ther of the merchants did not improve fundamentally. Therefore 
various popular ând social movements sprang up. These social movements gave 
an incentive to progressive thinking, which was encouraged by the intensifica-
tion of the contradictions inherent in the feudal conditions and which was 
prompted also by the effects of the French revolutionary movement. Without 
exaggeration the statement may be made that at that time drama, music, 
poetry, painting, philosophy had their golden age. All this and in particular 
philosophy, gave expression to the contradictions between the feudal nobility 
and the bourgeoisie, in the form of the controversy between materialism and 
idealism, which notwithstanding all limitations and contradictions rose to a 
high level of evolution. German progressive thinking which took shape at that 
time became part and parcel of the ideological evolution of the bourgeoisie, i.e. 
it was of an international character; as it relied on the experiences of other 
peoples. Yet at the.same time this thinking reflected its own experiences too, 
and consequently had also a national trait. 
Hegel, born in 1770 as the son of a man holding a high rank in the Prus-
sian civil service, studied in Tübingen in the beginning, later he taught in 
Jena, Nuremberg, Heidelberg, and then in Berlin. The ideas of young Hegel 
were progressive, a fact which manifested itself in his approval of the French 
Revolution. He believed that the Napoleonic measures opened a new phase in 
the evolution of mankind, hence Napoleon was the "spirit of the world". He 
approved of Napoleon's measures taken for the union of the German petty 
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states. However, after the collapse of the Napoleonic system Hegel changed 
his revolutionary opinions and openly went out in praise for the Prussian 
State. The radical change of his point of view was related to the doctrines 
professed by the nobility and clergy of the time, and also to the so-called 
Holy Alliance called to life against the revolutionary movements. In response 
to the influence of these factors, strictly speaking, Hegel tried to give ex-
pression to a dual class position in his theoretical theses. This duality on the 
one. part meant the manifestation of the interests of the nobility, and on the 
other gave expression to the interests and tendencies of the weak and co-
wardish German bourgeoisie. Hegel was an idealist, he believed that objective 
dialectics, were the reflection of thought, of reason, and of the idea. He made 
in clear in his Science of Logic, written between 1812 and 1816, that reason, 
idea, thought were the primaries, which in speculative parlance was but the 
so-called substance, that this idea or substance went through a phase of self-
evolution, and that on the other hand it was this substance, which in fact was 
something suppositional, assumed, one may say God, manifested itself in the 
various natural and social phenomena. The idea, i.e. reason in its purity, was 
studied by logic. However, the idea manifested itself also "in its other being". 
The idea "in its other "being" was the subject-matter of the philosophy of 
nature. Furthermore the idea returned " f rom its other being" to itself; with 
this question or problem he dealt in the sphere of the philosophy of intellect. 
The ideas of Hegel expounded above were partly idealistic, part ly dialec-
tical. What is positive in Hegel's oeuvre is the sound foundation of his dialec-
tical method of thinking. The classics of Marxism mainly appreciated Hegel's 
dialectical method of thinking. It was this dialectical method of thinking which 
was responsible for the conradictional nature of the system and method in 
Hegel. Marx and Engels accepted the rational core of Hegelian dialectics, 
stripped it of its idealistic envelopment, and enriched dialectics. 
In 1817 Hegel moved to Berlin. As a matter of fact the official Prussian 
administration greatly valued the statement of Hegel, that the Pruss ian 'Sta te 
relied on intelligence and one had to become reconciled to this, i.e. the State 
had to be revered as a terrestrial divinity. In the preface of his "Foundations 
of the Philosophy of Law" published in 1821, Hegel formulated his famous 
thesis, that "what is rational, is real, what is real is rational". This work of 
Hegel clearly gave expression to Hegel's dual class allegiance. As a matter of 
fact in his theory of the State Hegel expressed the interests of the nobility, 
in his philosophy of law he gave expression to those of the bourgeoisie. Hegel 
in his "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law" offered a uniform theory of 
State and law, although he did not discuss all problems of the State and law. 
His "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law", in addition to analyzing, certain 
categories of State and law, go beyond these categories and deal with a number 
of problems of economics and society. In the following part we shall by-pass the 
intrinsic system of Hegel's philosophy of law, and t ry to tackle the problems 
in association with the principal categories of the State and law, i.e. we shall 
investigate how the problems manifesting themselves in the modern system of 
the theory of politics and law appeared in Hegel. 
In this connexion we shall first of all analyze the problems of the State 
and begin with the general statement that Hegel's doctrine of the theory of 
State was conservative. 
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Hegel also studied the problem of the origin of the State. According to 
his doctrine the State "is the reality of the moral idea". Further he thought 
that the State was the reality of the substiantial will "which is in the special 
consciousness raised to generality, i.e. which is in and for itself rational". He 
made it clear that the historical origin of the State did not belong to the idea 
of the State itself. Hence philosophy was concerned only with the intrinsic, 
cogitated notion. In this sense he opposed the theory of the contractual origin 
of the State. He recognized that credit must be given to Rousseau for defining 
the will as the fundamental principle of the State. He also pointed out that 
the State was above Man, and Man owed to the State what he was, and that 
the existence of Man could be imagined only within the State, i.e. Man had a 
value through the State. Furthermore Man was a moral being, only in so far 
as he was a member of the State. He believed that the foundation of the 
State "is the power of reason materializing itself as will", which lived in the 
citizens. Hence Hegel's ideas of the origin of the State were unequivocally 
idealistic. In fact he detached the origin of the State from the actual social, 
economic and class relations, and also with him the so-called moral idea was 
conditional and independent of the real conditions. 
In his "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law" Hegel analyzes the problem 
of property, and commodity production associated with it. He. appreciates that 
society is divided into several strata. In this connexion he states that the so-
called bourgeois society is split up on the one hand into wealthy and the 
"mob", and on the other into the estates. Since he analyzes the property re-
lations and also the relations of distribution and exchange associated with 
property, fur ther the stratification of society, he comes close to the problems 
of the notion of the type of State. He believed that property relations, i.e. 
private property were carried by the particular estates, and condemned joint 
social property. He considered the estates the moral roots of the State, one 
of the foundations of the State (the first foundation of the State was the 
family). In his doctrine the estates together with the corporations as organiza-
tions of labour constituted the moral roots of the State. According to his 
doctrine there were three estates in bourgeois society, viz. the first estate was 
that of the tillers of the soil, the second that of the artisans, manufacturers 
and merchants, the third that of the civil servants and the army. Hegel called 
the first the substantial estate, the second the industrial estate, and the third 
the general estate. He believed that the division of society into estates was an 
eternal trait of society. 
He analyzed the concrete forms in which the State materialized, and ex-
plained that the first concrete form of the realization or materialization of the 
idea of the State was the internal political mechanism (which was brought 
under regulation by the constitution and the internal political law). The second 
form of realization of the State idea manifested itself in the relations of the 
particular states to other states, etc. 
On investigating the problems of the sovereign power and of the internal 
political sovereignty Hegel rejected the doctrine of Montesquieu of the divi-
sion of the sovereign power and Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty. He 
believed that in conformity with the nature of its concept the State internally 
differentiated its own activities. In §. 273 of his "Foundations of the Philosophy 
of Law" Hegel pointed out tha t "in this manner the political State dissociated 
itself into the following substantial differences: (a) into the power of its 
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general definition and determination, i.e. into the legislative power; (b) into 
• the power of the arrangement of the particular spheres and particular cases 
under the general, i.e. into governmental power; (c) into the power of subjec-
tivity as the power of the final decisions of will, i.e. into the sovereign power; 
where the uni ts of the differentiated powers are merged into a unity, which 
is therefore the summit and the beginning of all, viz. the constitutional 
monarchy." 
According to Hegel the different powers are not for balancing one another, 
but "each of these powers is totality itself", and for that matter these powers 
constitute a solid organic unity. 
Hegel believed that in the constitutional monarchy as form of government 
the moral idea could manifest itself in the best way. He declared that the 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy were the lower stages of the evolution 
of the form of government. 
On analyzing the problems of the mechanism and the intrinsic, sovereignty 
of the State, he set out f rom the thesis that the State as an autonomous alliance 
was a peculiar organization. Marx appraised this statement of Hegel positively; 
however, he thought that the thesis itself ought to be developed. 
The monarchial power was embodied by a political organ as a unified 
person, therefore this power had to be made hereditary. However, as Hegel 
pointed out, the prince must not interfere with all matters, on the other hand 
in a unity he would have to embrace all unique parts and elements of society. 
In the constitutional monarchy it was again the prince who was at the head 
of the State, He represented the sovereignty of the State. In internal relations 
sovereignty meant that all parts of the State were subject to the prince as 
the unified power and that any private end in society was subordinate to the 
uniform end of the alliance. This notion of internal sovereignty was in conflict 
with Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty, which stands to reason if it is 
remembered that Hegel called the people an amorphous mass. Hegel believed 
that sovereignty was the State's due as the embodiment of the world spirit, 
i.e. he attributed sovereignty to the State since the State was a homogeneous 
person, and for that matter this homogeneous person could be only a physical 
person, so that with Hegel the sovereignty of the State was essentially thé 
sovereignty of the prince, i.e. the sovereignty of the "crowned" person. He 
believed that popular sovereignty had its origin in the sovereignty of thé 
monarch and not the other way round. To Hegel the' prince was the personified 
sovereignty, so that the prince or the monarch was identical with the State, 
the notion of the State. 
According to Hegel the organization of the legislative power had to be 
embodied by the representation of the Estates. The first chamber should be 
that of the nobility, composed of . noblemen or landowners, who would become 
members by the privilege of birth. As a matter of fact Hegel looked at the 
nobility as if it were called for political activities in the first place. This 
organization of the nobility was created with the function to conciliate between 
prince and people. Undoubtedly this organization was called to give expression 
to the interests of the Prussian junkers. The members of the second, chamber 
would be the industrialists and their corporations, fur ther the repesentatives 
of the communities and the civil servants, appointed by way of election. The 
principal function of the second chamber would be the mediation between the 
executive power and the people. Strictly speaking the second chamber would 
include the communities of the bourgeoisie whose function was to intergrate 
Man into the State. Hegel believed that although the representation of the 
Estates had to give expression to the interests of the people, still because the 
people was incapable of cognition and insight, it did not know what it wanted, 
therefore the estates had to act as intermediaries between government and 
people. This mediation was the guarantee for the State's "entering" into the 
consciousness of the people. According to his position representation by Estates 
was the pledge of universal freedom, because with its activities this representa-
tion could reconcile conflicting interests. 
As regards the organization of the executive power, Hegel thought that the 
executive power had to be embodied by the hierarchy of civil servants appointed 
by the prince. Hegel went, out in praises for the civil service, and stated 
the civil servants had the best abilities for managing the affairs of the State. 
As a matter of fact the civil service was capable of guiding the State by itself, 
still there was need for the bicameral parliament, in particular because it could 
organize public opinion for the support of the State. He considered the civil 
service the organization embodying all governmental interests and concentrat-
ing all public affairs. The function of the civil service was to guarantee the 
observance of legality, to enforce the decisions of the monarch, and to perform 
certain policing and judicial functions. However, the civil service did not attend 
to all affairs, although the affairs were concentrated in the units of the hier-
archically organized service. Besides the civil servants, so-called corporations 
should also attend to public affairs, corporations in which the particular 
estates were grouped; also the communities managed their affairs through the 
agency of leaders, representatives. The leaders of the corporations or the com-
munities would be either appointed from above or elected from below. How-
ever, in this case their confirmation from above was needed. 
In connexion with the executive power or civil service Hegel also raised 
the problem of an abuse of power. He recognized the potentiality of abuses of 
power. Therefore he believed that the hierarchy of the civil service, translating 
control and calling to account f rom above into reality, fur ther the so-called 
corporations or the administrative rights of the communities guaranteed a con-
trol f rom above and below, and that this structure prevented an abuse of 
power and the commingling of subjective arbitrariness with the executive 
power exercised by the civil service. Hence Hegel believed that the executive 
power should be well trained and hierarchically organized. Hegel sympathized 
with the omnipotent bureaucratic political mechanism, and consequently the 
bureaucratically directed absolute Prussian monarchy was his ideal of an 
executive power. In Hegel the true spirit of the executive power was the 
bureaucracy, i.e. a political organization built up in a definite manner. Marx 
discussed the Hegelian position taken in the question of bureaucracy in his 
critical work in detail. Marx emphasized, what Hegel failed to point out, that 
bureaucracy was needed because society was dismembered into separate groups 
having their private interests, so that the groups of conflicting private interests 
had to be united and subjected to a common end. This was, however, illusory, 
since neither a civil service could eliminate the conflicts of interests of the 
various groups of society, as in fact the existence of the bureaucracy relied on. 
these conflicts. All that the bureaucracy did was to introduce the differentia-
tion of interests of the social groups confronting one another into the manag-
ement of governmental affairs. Consequently, Marx' pointed out, the civil 
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service would become the tool of certain persons wielded against others, i.e. 
the civil service would be forced to represent the formal as content and the 
content as formal. (In our opinion the ideas developed by Max Weber of the 
peculiarities of an organization hierarchically built up may be discovered not 
only in Marx, but even in Hegel.) Hegel believed that the State would be threat-
ened by risks if women would be placed at the head of the government. 
According to Hegel, women were subjective, and would act under the impetus 
of their subjective ideas and inclinations. 
Hegel also studied the problems of the external and internal functions of 
the State, and in this connexion those of governmental coercion and the ex-
ternal sovereignty of the State. 
He wanted to discover the internal end or functions of the State in the 
draining of the contradictions accumulating in "bourgeois society", in the re-
conciliation of the controversies, and this beyond the deference of private prop-
erty. He believed that the State could reconcile all contradictions within soci-
ety. He tried to prove that through its activity the State could marshal the 
instinctiveness of bourgeois society into barriers. However, in this question 
Hegel came into contradiction with himself. As a matter of fact he made the 
statement that the State as embodiment of the moral idea was limited and 
finite. This meant that in the course of time the State might perish owing to 
the intensification of the internal contradictions. This was confirmed by the 
revolutions and the plots. In. connexion with the governmental solution of 
contradictions, Hegel also analyzed the problem of governmental coercion. He 
set out f rom the thesis that in his relation to the State the single man was 
insignificant. He pointed out that a single man was compellable, i.e. he could 
be subjected to. the power of others. Hegel attached coercion to individual 
will and made the statement that free will was compellable only in so fa r as 
it wanted to be compelled. Hence the State could restrict the citizen or the 
individual only according to his own will, so that apparently external govern-
ment coercion was in fact internal constraint. Or in a simpler form: the State 
could restrict the individual only in accordance with his own will, i.e. coercion 
was eventually self-constraint. Consequently in the relation between State 
and citizen there was coercive rule in the one side, and the instinctive obedi-
ence of the subject on the other. Strictly speaking, this is the point at which 
Hegel's concept of freedom joins in. He believed that it was the function of 
the State guarantee the freedom of the citizens more and more. He declared 
that the Prussians had already attained their freedom and that there was no 
need for a revolutionary subversion of the existing order, only reforms were 
needed. Hence in Hegel the relation of the particular citizen to the State meant 
a total subordination and superordination. He thought that the benuine free-
dom of man consisted in his submission to the State and in his identifying 
himself with the State. The supreme virtue of the citizen was commitment to 
obedience, discipline and that his object of l ife was not wealth or individual-
istic freedom. Since the Prussian State already guaranteed freedom, there was 
no need for a revolution againts the State. He declared that action must be 
taken against those harbouring hostile thoughts and feelings against the State. 
Hegel with the idea of human freedom as conceived by him, i.e. essentially the 
complete submission to the State, meant a step backwards as compared to 
earlier thinkers. 
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Hegel deducted the external end and function of the State f rom the 
character of the relations among the states. He set out from the thesis that 
these relations could be friendly as well as hostile. He believed that wars 
ceuld be useful, because they could prevent internal strife f rom becoming 
dangerous. Wars put up barriers to the growth of internal dissension. He analyz-
ed the problem how the contradictions between capital and labour could be 
settled. These resulted partly f rom the process of concentration of capital, 
partly from the growth of misery and penury. He pointed out that the contra-
dictions between capital and labour might lead to the bursting of the national 
framework and by this internal contradictions would become transplanted to 
the international plan. Hegel considered this metastasis necessary. This also 
explained the need for the establishment of colonies, however, such a policy 
was prompted also by the increase of the population in conjunction with the 
contradictions between production and consumption. However, he stated that 
this process would at the same time bring about a struggle between the parent 
state and the colony. The reason was that unequal conditions were apt to 
develop for the subjects in the parent state and the colonies. The struggle 
would eventually lead to the independence of the colonies, i.e. the tendencies 
of the colonies,towards independence were as necessary as colonization itself. 
These processes give expression to the dialectics of the internal evolution of 
bourgeois society. Hence Hegel absolutized war, and justified a policy of ex-
pansion, and was in favour of. colonial depredation. Yet at the same time he 
considered national movements of liberation a necessary development. Hegel 
rejected the Kantian idea of eternal peace, and also Kant's ideas of a federa-
tion of states, or the creation of a so-called "league of nations", yet he took a 
stand against the introduction of a standing army. Further hé thought that 
the State was a total intellectual organism and in this also its sovereignty con-
sisted in its relations, he stood for the idea of the absolute sovereignty of the 
State. He explained that the State had not a judge and therefore when no 
agreement could be reached, the dispute could be settled only by war. It was 
the moral duty of each citizen to sacrifice his life and his material wealth for 
the defence of his country. 
According to Hegel, law was also a manifestation of the objective intellect. 
In his opinion law appeared in several spheres. In the sphere „of abstract law 
certain rights and duties abhered to Man, these rights and duties were the 
due of Man by equal shares. Here Hegel distinguished the concept of Man f rom 
that of thé citizen, and in him these rights and duties were attached to Man 
and not to the citizen. In the sphere of abstract rights Hegel dealt with pro-
perty relations, contractual relations, and in this connexion with the problems 
of wilful demage and delinquency. He emphasized that the various legal re-
lations were relations of the will, and that the one will came to the decision 
to enter into a contract merely because other wills also came to the same 
decision. Erroneously he saw the content of economic relations in the relations 
of will, although properly it should have been the other way round, because 
the content of the relations of will were hidden in the economic relations. 
Hegel believed that according to abstract law the individual was entitled to 
economic rights only, but not to political rights. Hegel contrasts the sphere of 
morality to abstract law. In this connexion he dealt with the problems of inten-
tion and of good and evil, etc. In his analysis of the incentives of human acts 
he came into conflict with Kantian doctrines and stated that in his acts Man 
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satisfied his desires and passions. Hence Hegel did not demand the mastering 
of feelings and did not think that feelings humiliated Man. According to 
Hegel Man had a ful l right to happiness and nobody could condemn him if he 
had made the achievement of his happiness his goal. Hegel associated the 
problem of intention with that of consciousness. One may say that the notion 
of morality is associated with the consciousness of law, i.e. with the notion 
of morality' Hegel tried to grasp the content of consciousness which influenced 
the conduct of Man in his legal relations. He fur ther emphasized that i t was 
the duty of the individual to become acquainted with the circumstances within 
whieh he acted. Hegel analyzed other problems turning up in connexion with 
the law in the sphere of morality. Within this sphere he analyzed the problems 
of the family, the bourgeois society, for in his opinion morality manifested 
itself in these directly. While in the realm of abstract law and morality the 
individual was confronted by the State, in the third stage of the objective 
intellect the unity of highest order of the mutual relations among the in-
dependent entities of bourgeois society materialized and the contradictions 
among them would be balanced. He pointed out that in the State the universal 
will found expression and that this universal will defined individual will in its 
content. It is clear therefore that in Hegel for the definition of the ends of the 
State individual interest and will have no function or significance whatever. 
This also means that participation in the life of the State is mere formalism. 
In connexion with the other categories of the theory of law the statement 
may be advanced that Hegel studied also the relations of law and morals, of 
law and economy. He believed that law and freedom were also associated, that 
law was the existence of freedom, and that law and property were but mani-
festations of freedom. In the relation of law and economy Hegel set forth that 
law governed the structure of a society of estates and defended the property 
and work of each member of society. In his opinion law defined the norms of 
behaviour recognized by everybody. 
In Hegel the problems of the creation and application of law find a place 
in their philosophical generality. 
[7.] Strictly speaking the origins of Hungarian political and legal thinking 
lie somewhere between the period of Turkish feudalism and the unfolding of 
the struggle for independence waged against Habsburg domination. In the 
war againts Turkish feudalism and in the conduct of the war of independ-
ence against Habsburg power, Miklós Zrínyi, and then Ferenc Rákóczi II, as 
the executor of Zrinyi's testament had prominent roles. Ideas of moment were 
exposed by Ignác Martinovics, József Hajnóczy, Ferenc Kölcsey and István 
Széchenyi. However, the most prominent figure of Hungarian political and 
legal thinking was Lajos Kossuth . (1802—1894). 
After the collapse of the war of liberation of Rákóczi, Hungary became 
part of the Habsburg empire, in semi-colonial dependence on Austria. Slowly 
and in a limited form bourgeois evolution began also in Hungary, where the 
positions of feudalism were particularly strong. The aristocrats, with their pro-
Habsburg feelings, stood up in defence of reactionary feudalism. In its founda-
tions Hungarian political and legal thinking became linked up with Austrian 
political and legal thinking, based on the doctrine of natural law of Christian 
Wolf, in this period. However, in addition and in response to bourgeois evolu-
tion, an- enormous intellectual upswing passed off in Hungary, whose political 
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radiation gave the incentive to the conspiracy of Martinovics. However, the 
conspiracy failed exactly owing to the fear from, new ideas. 
The evolution of social and economic conditions called for new elements. 
Since the end of the 18th century seignioral domestic economy began to 
develop. This development is accounted for by the rapid growth of the demand 
for agricultural produce during the Napoleonic wars. As a matter of fact 
seignioral domestic economy was as for productivity by far superior to husb-
andry on fee estates. In addition to higher productivity, the. landlords could 
dispose of the total produce. All this brought about an increase of the area 
of seignioral lands, and a large portion of the peasantry was gradually 
ousted f rom the lands formerly tilled by it. This process of evolution passed 
off slowly, and partially only, in particular the transformation of the peasant 
into' wage-earner, his deprivation of the means of production, and his being 
drawn into the circulation of commodities. At that time in Hungary the feudal 
relations of production remained unchanged. This stagnation was closely as-
sociated with' the fact that owing to the colonial conditions of the country 
the accumulation of capital took place in a protrácted manner. What was 
characteristic of evolution in this process in Hungary was that the growth 
of capitalistic relations of production was lagging by far behind the growth 
of the productive forces. Under the feudal conditions in Hungary the peculi-
arities of the capitalist method of production made their appearance, still at 
that time the bourgeoisie was extremely weak and also capital was wanting. 
Consequently the nobility of a bourgeois mentality began to develop, which 
in the struggle for bourgeois transformation of the country took the leading 
role with its peculiarly feudal means and methods. Under the effect of the 
economic coercive forces, the nobility tended towards bourgeois civilization, 
however, by its attitude to life and way of living it remained linked up with 
feudalism, i.e. the nobility was eager for capitalistic evolution and by this for 
an improvement of its economic situation, still it refused to forgo its privileges 
and instead of a radical revolutionary action tried to patch up its situation by 
introducing reforms. However, the situation of the nobility was becoming a 
precarious one owing to the growing discontent of the oppressed masses of 
peasants and the dissatisfaction of the non-Magyar nationalities. The re-
presentatives of the nobility were aware of that colonial oppression hampered 
the bourgeois evolution of the country, therefore they tried to loosen the ties 
binding the country to Austria, but abhorred radical measures. They did not 
even demand the full sovereignty: of the country, for in the ties to Austria 
they saw a bulwark againts the peasantry and the nationalities, and also 
economically Austria was a good market for their produce. Part of. the nobil-
ity also saw that it had to modify its position taken in the peasant problem. 
The peasantry ought to be won over to their camp and so also' the nationalities, 
as this would be the precondition of the achievement of full independence: 
However, the nobility failed to recognize this, to its full extent and in its 
struggle for independence made no advances to the peasantry. It was this 
narrow-mindedness and egotism which intensified the conflict between nobility 
and peasantry. The discontent of the peasantry found an outlet in the peasant 
rising of 1831, in which about forty-five thousand peasants took part. During 
the rising the Habsburgs declared without disguise that they had their hands 
on the sluices, could let loose the flood on the nobility, and had them slain by 
the peasants: This utterance gave the nobility to think in its efforts for attain-
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ing sovereignty and independence. The nobility .yielded to the demands of the 
peasantry only later and it was Ferenc Kölcsey who insisted that the nobility 
should waive its claims to feudal services. He recommended the emancipation 
of the serfs by way of redemption' of the feudal burdens, in order that t h e 
nobility might change over to the capitalistic methods of husbandry easier. 
This notion was accepted by several members of the Upper House in the Diet 
of 1839/1840. However, the act of compensation proved inadequate for a con-
solidation of the interests of nobility and peasantry. As a matter of fact the 
act failed to decree the contracts of compensation in an obligatory form. Yet 
not only the efforts to bring about an alliance with the peasantry were abortive» 
no agreement could be reached with the nationalities either. 
The continuer of the reform schemes was Lajos Kossuth. Son of a poor 
noble family, he studied law and was admitted to the bar. He appeared in the 
Diet of 1825 for the first time. In the Diet of 1832/1836 he took part as delegate 
of Baron Samuel Vécsey. There he excelled as editor of the reports of the 
Diet. These reports gave summaries of the speeches and they were circulated 
in the form of MSS. In general the speeches of the members of the opposition 
were reported in full, whereas those of the government party were published 
in an abridged form. After the prorogation of the Diet of 1832/1836 Kossuth 
edited a newspaper "Törvényhatósági Tudósítások" (Municipal Reports). For 
his journalistic activities he was imprisoned in 1837. This only added to his 
popularity. In 1840 he was set at liberty and was made the editor of Pesti 
Hírlap. Kossuth made journalism a means of the political struggle and p u t 
the press in thé service of a campaign for revolutionizing the masses. The 
revolutionary tenor of his speeches startled evén Széchenyi. Against Széchenyi 
he defended his position, an act which again increased his popularity. In 1842 
he organized the first Hungarian industrial exhibition. This enhanced his 
hegemony over public opinion. He considered his most important function the 
activization of the nobility, because in his opinion the nobility was the leader 
of the transformation of the country and its mainstay. In contrast to Széchenyi 
he believed in the decisive role of the landed gentry also in the coming state. 
Naturally to this end the nobility would have to resign its privileges as these 
could not be reconciled with the ideas of freedom or the interests of the 
people. He made it clear that the law had to provide the means of the redemp-
tion of the feudal burdens, in a way that this should be obligatory for all 
This would not violate the sanctity of private property. He clearly recognized 
that the serf problem was one of public law and not of private law. His idea 
of a redemption of feudal burdens was to grant a loan to the peasantry f rom 
the means of the State. As a matter of fact in this case the nobility would 
also find itself in an improved financial position, as their lands would now 
be free. All this would promote the switch-over of the nobility to the capita-
listic methods of economy. He took a position for the abolition of entailment, 
and for the introduction of equal taxation, which again was associated with a 
transition to the capitalistic method of production. He tried to persuade the 
nobility to waive their exemption from taxation. However, here his efforts 
failed and exemption from taxation was abolished only in 1847. Kossuth 
recognized that the opposition of the nobility could not thrive without the 
alliance with the bourgeoisie. Therefore he launched a campaign for the 
institution of popular representation. He wanted to encourage the spirit of 
enterprise, the foundation of factories and. commercial companies. He created 
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a society for the promotion. of industry, however, this scheme miscarried. In 
1846 Kossuth launched an attack against tendencies of centralization. He tried 
to make clear the advantages of the system of counties, as in his political 
doctrine the counties were the strongholds of Hungarian independence. In 
1847 he stood for the Diet as the official candidate of the Opposition. In the 
Diet he criticized the so-called administratorial system and appeared as the-
champion of municipalism. However, in this question, he was defeated, and 
this defeat even shook his hegemony in public opinion. At the news of the 
outbreak of the revolution in Paris Kossuth took the initiative. On March 3 
he demanded the organization of the imperial government on a constitutional 
basis, and insisted on the appointment of a responsible government for 
Hungary. 
In the first Hungarian government Kossuth was made minister of finance. 
His principal target was the introduction of general taxation. However, his 
position, was a rather precarious one, as the imperial court demanded military 
and financial contributions. Kossuth recognized the need for rejecting the 
demand. When he received information of the assembly of hostile troups on 
the frontiers of the country he appealed to the Diet to vote an army of two 
hundred thousand and the money needed for the organization of this army. 
In the turmoil of events the radical left wing of the Diet gathered strength. 
The members passed Kossuth's army and finance bill. Kossuth's surmise of an 
impending attack on Hungarian independence proved true and in the autumn 
of 1848 a counter-revolutionary army headed by the Banus of Croatia, Jella-
chich, invaded Hungary. The Committee of National Defence was formed 
under the presidency of Kossuth. 
At the initiative of Kossuth, in particular in response to the promulgation, 
of the constitution of Olmiitz, the Hungarian Diet voted the Declaration of 
Independence. The achievement of national sovereignty and independence was 
the guiding principle of Kossuth's political ideas. However, in the beginning 
he did not interpret sovereignty and independence in an absolute manner. In 
this respect his ideas departed from the wording of the • declaration of inde-
pendence. A tendency towards complete political independence became preva-
lent with him only when he recognized the duplicity of the imperial court. 
However, not even then did he become an opponent of the absolutistic mo-
narchical form of government. For Kossuth the republican idea was rather a 
. matter of tactics and not the ultimate goal. His ideal of a government was the 
national constitutional monarchy and only in the last resort did be advance 
to the political form of a liberal republic of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. 
His class allegiance determined his policy. As a member of the landless nobility 
he carefully attended to the financial interests of the land-owning nobility, 
because he saw in this class the fu ture backbone of the country. This explained 
also why he was reluctant to meet the demands of the peasantry going 
beyond the emancipation of serfs. 
The roots of the political and legal thinking of Kossuth go back to the 
world of natural and rational law. While in prison, he became acquainted with 
French and English doctrines. In the Hungary of these days his ideas could 
be termed as progressive. These ideas provided the ideological justification of 
the new order of production, and the legal and political superstructure. As a 
matter of fact natural and rational law was the foundation from which the 
struggle against the Habsburg state could be launched, whereas the idea of 
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popular sovereignty justified the rising against the ruling dynasty. Kossuth 
took a definite stand for the safeguarding of human rights. Under the influence 
of the ideas of natural law he believed that violence was also justified against 
a ruler who ignored human rights. He even wrote: "Man cannot forfeit his 
human rights in the same way as the people as a whole cannot do through the 
agency of the governmental system of bourgeois society lose the rights and 
power which are concomitant of its nature and are therefore inalienable." He 
defined the notion of freedom by setting out f rom the Kantian categoric 
imperative. In his opinion freedom was but "the faculty to act in a way that 
if everybody acted, the right of action of the one person should not f rus t ra te 
the right of action of the other". 
It has already been mentioned that Kossuth stood up for the county 
system, and here he came into antagonism e.g. with Baron József Eötvös, 
who belonged to the centrists (the promoters of a centralized government). 
The centrists attacked the autonomy of the counties, for they saw in the 
counties the drag on progress, the hotbed of abuses. They considered the 
centralization of public administration, the representative parliament and the 
responsible government the guarantees of progress and the safeguards of 
Hungarian national interests. The centrists based their doctrines on conclusions 
drawn from a comparison of conditions in Hungary and in the western consti-
tutional countries. They demonstrated that in comparison to these, there were 
essential differences in Hungary in both legislation and public administration. 
They pointed out that in Hungary only l/20 t h of the population belonged to 
the nobility, whereas 19/20th were not nobles. In their opinion constitutional 
rights were the due of the nobility, whereas the obligation of the upkeep of 
public life burdened the nonnobles. They emphasized that as regards legislation 
there were several relations of life which did not come within the purview of 
legislation "notwithstanding the constitutional character of the nation". Thus 
only a small part of public affairs came within the competence of the legisla-
tion, Whereas as regards the rest, the nation was living under absolutistic 
conditions. Analyzing public administration they pointed out that administra-
tion a t the same time performed also judicial functions, the judicial and ad-
ministrative competences were: not segregated. They also pointed out that, 
unlike developed countries, in Hungary public administration was not uniform, 
• as its functions were performed partly by the government, partly by the 
municipalities in a manner void of uniform principles and independent of one 
another. In connexion with public administration they recognized tha t the 
principle of responsibility was absent from it. They found that owing to its 
structure the present system of legislation was unsuitable for the service of 
progress and could serve only the preservation of the actual situation. They 
believed that through the conjunction of judicial and administrative functions 
the principle of the independence of the judiciary would • prevail and a t the 
same time the principle of the interdependence of the civil servants would 
cease to dominate. They made it clear that the county system was opposed to 
progress, it did not guarantee its preconditions, i.e. there was no well-organ-
ized legislation which, by recognizing the needs, could take the lead of 
progress. Therefore there was no order and no genuine freedom. They re-
cognized the doctrine of the municipalists tha t under existing conditions the 
county was one of the principal constitutional guarantees. Still under condit-
ions of a responsible government, and a parliament, ' the maintenance-of the 
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obsolete county system was not needed. The centrists thought that popular 
representation was necessary and believed that the precondition of progress 
was order. To this end the unity of public administration, and within it the 
precise definition of jurisdiction and competence were essential. They anal-
yzed the ideas of centralization and responsibility in close association with 
each other and came to the conclusion that in the absence of a responsible 
government the centralization of" public affairs would bring about absolutism 
and that without centralization it was absurd to speak of the responsibility 
of the government, although they considered the preservation of the monarchy 
necessary, as they saw in it the safeguard of common interests. They were 
convinced that the most vital means of the introduction of reforms, and even 
the only means, was the legislature. Hence the reforms could be carried 
through only in the joint presence of two conditions: the guarantee of the 
independence of the legislature and the subordination of the executive power 
to the legislative power.. In our opinion, the centrists, and not Kossuth, were 
right in their question. 
Another grave error of Kossuth was. the misjudgment of the non-Magyar 
nationalities. In the beginning he threw charges against the Slavs and Rum-
anians and recognized only the Croatians as a nationality. Later Kossuth 
became aware of his mistake, and f rom 1849 onwards he initiated negotia-
tions with a democratic group, of the Serbs and the great Rumanian leader, 
Balcescu. If. belatedly, still an agreement could be reached w;hich received its 
confirmation in the Nationality Act passed by the Diet in Szeged. 
• '.. After the defeat of the War of Liberation, Kossuth was forced to go into 
exile, where he launched various political manoeuvres for the restoration of 
Hungarian independence. However, Kossuth set out from incorrect ideas and 
methods. His opinions were far from being realistic, they were illusory merely 
and not even revolutionary. Marx pointed at the wavering weakness, the in-
extricable contradictions and the ambiguity permeating his political career. 
He wrote: "In him we may find all attractive virtues of an 'artistic' character, 
yet at the same time its feminine errors. He is a great artist "en paroles." 
However, this Marxian valuation cannot mean a depreciation of the prominent 
role of Kossuth. Even in exile Kossuth tried to restore the independence of 
his country and what he created between 1851 and 1862, i.e. the plan of a 
.Danubian confederation, a scheme transcending is age, was of particular 
significance. 
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PART THREE 
BEGINNINGS, SCIENTIFIC EXPRESSION AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL THINKING OF THE WORKING CLASS. 
CRITICISM OF SOME OF THE BOURGEOIS POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL VIEWS. 
1. Owen; Saint Simon; Charles Fourier; E. Cabet; M. Stirner; W. Godwin; Ba-
kunin; A. Lorenzo. — 2. Marx; Engels. — 3. Lenin. — B a s i c Literature. 
[1.] In England and in France the so-called technical revolution resulting 
f rom the rapid growth of capitalistic production not only permitted largescale 
industrial production, it's concentration, and the birth of large-scale producing 
plants, but at the same time unleashed enormous changes in society. Social 
metamorphosis in the wake of the technical revolution changed the structure 
of society. This meant that new classes superseded the historical classes, i.e. 
the class of capitalists and that of the workers, or in other words the industrial 
proletariat were born. The new trends in the . evolution of capitalism, were 
responsible for changes in the methods of exploitation and. in the earlier forms 
of social struggles. Evolution of industrial production at the same time brought 
about an increasing impoverishment of the masses. The working class sold 
their working capacity on the labour market, and consequently here, too, the 
principle of f ree competition prevailed. This principle hampered the organizat-
ion of the working class, an organization with the goal to improve the 
situation of this class. Pauperism and the prohibition of combination and 
assembly of the proletariat of necessity led to tendencies towards socialism. 
In England and in France, a variety of doctrines sprang up describing the 
society of the . future. These doctrines fundamentally envisaged the elimina-
tion of the disfunctional phenomena of capitalist society. However, the doct-
rines of Utopian socialism had no contact with social and economic reality. 
Utopian socialism was estranged f rom reality and its creators ignored the 
social force which historically was called to overthrow the capitalist society. 
It is t rue that a t that time the labour movement was not strong enough and 
consequently Utopian socialism had a certain effect on the working classes. 
Still it is also t rue that to the extent that the labour movement gathered in 
vigour and in consciousness, the doctrines of the Utopian socialists withdrew 
to the background. Among the most prominent representatives of Utopian 
socialism,. the names of Robert Owen (1771—1858), Saint-Simon (1760^1825), 
Charles Fourier (1772—1837), Étienne Cabet (1788—1856) deserve to be men-
tioned. 
Robert Owen criticized the existing social order and made the reform 
of the capitalist order of society his goal. In his reform scheme essentially so-
called communistic communities had to be organized which would overwhel-
mingly become engaged in agriculture. As a matter of fact it was in this way 
that Owen wanted to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist form of 
economy and society. He pointed out that changes ought to be brought about 
not only in the economic form, but also in social education which had to be 
reformed. He believed that juvenile work must be prohibited, the working 
hours had to be cut down, old ¿ge pensions, disability insurance and the 
unemployed relief had to be introduced. All these ideas of Owen were built 
upon the abolition of private property. His principal work, was published in 
1820. To translate his communistic ideas, into reality in 1824 Owen bought a 
property in the United States of America, where he tried to bring his doctrine 
to fruition. The attempt proved to be a failure. However, his ideas became 
the foundations of the cooperative movement. The consumers' cooperative of 
the Rochdale weavers also relied on Owen's ideas. He did not believe that the 
working class or proletariat would transform society. He thought that society 
would change with the enlightenment of the human, i.e. he wanted to discover 
the absurdities of the capitalist society, of misery, of unemployment in ig-
norance. . 
Among the French Utopian socialists Charles Fourier occupies a prominent 
position. He pointed out that in society, too, evolution prevailed, and dis-
tinguished eight phases in it. In his opinion the natural state corresponded 
to the paradisial state. According to him the second phase was the era of 
fierceness where robbery, friction and the want, of foodstuffs dominated. The 
third phase was the age of the patriarchs. Here private property and the 
subjection of women were predominant. The fourth phase of social evolution 
was barbarism, where feudalism made its appearance and also industry and 
trade began to take a shape. The f i f th phase of social evolution was civilization. 
From Fourier's description of civilization it appears that he identified this 
phase with the capitalism of his age. He taught that in a "civilized", society 
men become detached from one another, everybody tried to prosper to the 
prejudice of his neighbour. Individual interest disregarded public interest, 
workmen lived in mental darkness. Fourier also made it clear that in this 
society keen struggles were going on between workers and the class of entrep-
reneurs. Fundamentally this was the age of unhappinéss. On this understanding 
he believed that a new phase of evolution had to set in, which in point of 
fact would be seventh pháse of evolution. In this phase men would be living 
in so-called phalansteries, where capitalists and workers would coéxist and 
would have an equal share in the results of production. In this community, 
land would be the property of all and. the means and tools required for work 
to be performed in community would be secured by the floatation of shares. 
In his opinion each phalanstery or community should be formed of about 1600 
to 1800 persons, who would be living in huge hotels and do centrally organized 
work. In the phalansteries, which presented a picture of a society in a period 
of transition, the incomes would be distributed On the following scheme: 
5/12th would go to the workers, 4/l2 t h to the capitalists, 3/12 th. to those in 
charge of management. According to Fourier, in these communities children 
would be brought up by the community and monogamous families would be 
superseded by free love. In this period of transition private property would 
not be abolished completely and even the right to inherit would remain. In 
the phalanstery people would have seven meals a day, after their daily work 
people would spend their leisure with artistic occupations. These conditions of 
living would bring about circumstances where the average span of life would 
be 144 years. Fourier recognized the- existence of a state in this éra, and 
considered the education of the members of the phalanstery the principal 
function of the state. (Madách in his Tragedy of Man adopted Fourier's ideas 
of the phalanstery with certain modifications.) Fourier spoke also of the sixth 
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phase of social evolution. Here the middle classes would receive state credits 
at easy terms, Whereas the workers would enjoy an extensive insurance scheme. 
However, in his opinion his phase could be by-passed. He believed that social 
evolution had an eighth phase, where almost complete harmony would reign. 
Af ter it society, or mankind, would perish he concluded. 
Fourier 's doctrines are void of a scientific quality. Still he seemed to have 
treated dialectics, similarly to Hegel, in a masterly way. 
A prominent figure among the French Utopian socialists was Saint-Simon. 
Society stood in the focal point of his investigations. This is what at least his 
works betray. He made it clear that ownership exercised the greatest 
influence on the life of society. There were two kinds of property in society. 
The origins of feudal property were associated with violence, whereas bour-
geois property relied on production or acquisition. He recognized the existence 
of classes in society and discovered that the history of France was the history 
of class warfare. However, the term worker in his usage denoted the capitalist 
and not the proletarian. Giving expression to the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
he believed that the sovereign power ought to be transferred to the producing 
owners of property, i.e. he wanted to discover the class basis of sovereign 
power in the economic power of the bourgeoisie. He believed that persons were 
needed who had means of production, and were doing work themselves. The 
class practising and industry should occupy the leading positions in society. 
He believed that those engaged in industry were the most valuable class of 
society.- He did not believe in the possibility of a classless society. Only a 
society was possible where the interests of all other classes would be subordi-
nated to the ruling class, in a peaceful manner, without any violence, merely 
on the ground of a sober comprehension of reality. According to Saint-Simon, 
the function of the State was to guarantee the welfare of the masses. In the 
society of the future, as imagined by him, Christian humanitarianism would 
prevail. Namely this would produce a new morality, a new order of work, i.e. 
Paradise on earth. Saint-Simon also spoke of the workers, i.e. the paupers. 
Still their conditions of life could be improved only by means of a social 
policy. 
Two other prominent figures of French Utopian socialism were Cabet and 
Blanc. Cabet summed up and at the same time advanced the ideas of Utopian 
socialism. His most prominent work was published in 1842. In this work he 
made it clear that before all brotherhood should be created among men, which 
was closely related to the elimination of inequality. Inequality could be elimi-
nated by creating a community of goods in a peaceful way and by temporary 
measures. The new society could be established in about 30 to 50, or perhaps 
only in 100 years. In the. period of transition there would still be private 
property, there would be- bourgeois democracy. Cabet tried to carry into effect 
his doctrines in Texas. His attempts ended in complete failure. When his 
second attempt also came to naught, he wanted to restore order by a dic-
tatorship. 
Cabet's doctrines were very popular among the workers. Therefore he 
tried to. come closer to them. Later his popularity began to decline also among 
the workers. 
Among the Utopian socialist, also Blanc brought forward doctrines describ-
ing the society of the future. Since he wa.s member of the French government, 
he organized a variety of national workshops, which were in public ownership. 
He believed that workers had a right to work. However, his experiments 
miscarried. Experiments of this type were apt to create illusions in the work-
ers as if socialism could be reached in a peaceful way, or as if the peaceful 
way were the only to achieve the goal. However, experiences of history did 
not confirm this opinion. 
Besides Utopian socialism, also Utopian anarchism made its appearance. 
Unlike Utopian socialists, Utopian anarchists came to the conclusion that not 
only the capitalist legal order, not only capitalist society should be rejected, 
but, in general, an end should be put to all governmental systems and legal 
order, because all evil had its root in the organized character of society. The 
anarchists believed that any power restricting the activities of the individual 
should be abolished and guarantees should be provided for the complete 
freedom of the individual. On the other hand, the Utopian socialists expected 
the reorganization of economic and social life from the change of the existing 
legal system and the regulating activities of sovereign power. However, the 
doctrines of the Utopian socialists merely led to day-dreaming. The principal 
representatives of anarchism were Max Stirner (1806—1856), Mikhail Aleks-
androvitch Bakunin (1814—1876), William Godwin (1756—1836), Anselmo Lo-
renzo (1841—1915). 
Anarchistic doctrines first emerged in Britain where they were given ex- . 
pression in the ideas of William Godwin. His most outstanding works , were 
"An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice", . published in 17.93, and "Caleb 
Williams". In these works Godwin took a stand first against the State, and, 
secondly, for the abolition of the law or the statutes. He believed that the 
principal obstacle in the way of moral and social life to be brought about 
was the sovereign power and at the same time private property. He made it 
clear that in a society universal welfare could not be. brought about unless 
we accepted and obeyed the commands of justness. Hence the life of society 
had to be organized according to certain moral principles, and if in this way 
the freedom and welfare of men were guaranteed, social harmony would come 
• true. In the wake of this metamorphosis the State, and its government, fur ther 
external coercion exercised by the government, would become superfluous. 
Thus the society of the fu ture could be built up without the organization of 
State and law as an external power. The relations among men could be brought 
under regulation by norms which would be formulated voluntarily and freely, 
and whose sanction would be general contempt. From this he drew the con-
clusion that State and law would be superseded by the fuie of reason: 
Another prominent figure of anarchism was the German Max Stirner, 
or as Marx called him, the "Holy Max". Stirner's principal work was "The 
Unique and His Property" published in 1844. In this work he exposed that the 
State, fur ther morals and law, and even property and religion were products 
of subjective consciousness. Hence Stirner followed the line of Fichte of class-
ical German philosophy. He was a subjective idealist. In Stirner the Unique 
appeared as the creator of reality. The class character of thè State remained 
concealed to him. Namely he believed that no form of the State could be 
reconciled to "My Uniqueness". From this the conclusion suggested itself that 
the individual and the State, the will of the individual and of the State, were . 
in irreconcilable contradiction to one another. Namely the State wanted that 
Man should be moral i.e. it insisted on the performance of the duties towards 
the community by Man. It followed therefore that the State banned Man's 
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egotistic nature. Consequently there would be enmity between State and Man. 
Instead of the State some sort or an association, some sort of a corporation, 
or self-management should be called to life. However, Stirner failed to offer 
a definite answer to the question of what sort this association or self-manage-
ment would be. Strictly speaking Stirner gave expression to the ideas of the 
German petit bourgeois who was afraid of losing his small property, which 
he wanted to keep in all circumstances. Therefore Stirner acted as an egotist 
or individualist and opposed discipline and organization. 
A well-known representative of anarchism was Bakunin, whom Engels 
called the father of anarchism. Bakunin was a Russian. He exposed his doctr-
ines on State and law in his works "Statehood and Anarchy" (1873), "God and 
the State" (1882), "Federalism, Socialism and Anti-Theologism" (1895). He 
believed that the State, which owed its existence to the spontaneous action 
of the masses, was the antithesis of a free, collective society. In his opinion 
the State ought to be abolished, as the abolition of the State was the only 
way to liberate society. He advanced, the thesis that the State created capital 
and consequently the capitalists owed their capital to the State. This doctrine 
contradicted the Marxist teaching of the foundation and superstructure.. As 
regards political activity Bakunin believed that any political activity was 
synonymous with the affirmation of the State. From this thesis he drew the 
conclusion that any particapitation in politics was injurious because it only 
increased the confidence in the State, or in other words,. participation in 
politics consolidated the State. 
The anarchist doctrines made headway within a wide sphere in the various . 
countries. So e.g. in Spain Anselmo Lorenzo had a considerable part in spread-
ing anarchistic doctrines. Lorenzo adopted the theory of Bakunin which in 
fact was a "mixture of Proudhonism and Communism". Lorenzo's most pro-
minent work was "The fighting proletariat". In his opinian the State was a 
phenomenon which maintained the property of the exploiters, and since it 
usurped the natural, rights of the workers, it also prevented the workers f rom 
creating the institutions of society unhampered. Furthermore Lorenzo believed 
that, irrespective of its form, sovereign power -meant violence against the 
members of society. Consequently ha came to the Conclusion that even the 
proletariat need not create the revolutionary state of its own in the struggle 
for socialism. Lorenzo did not understand the class character of the State. 
Therefore in his opinion the goal of the revolution of the proletariat was the 
complete abolition of9 the State, and for the period following upon the victory 
of the revolution, he recommended the creation of the anarchist federation of 
"free associations" in Spain. 
The absurdity of the theory and practice of anarchism was confirmed by 
the class struggle that had taken its course those days. We may safely say that 
the disorganizing activities of the anarchists were responsible for the collapse 
of the Commune of Paris in 1871, and even for the defeat of the Spanish Civil 
War. Marx and Engels were aware of ' the need for demonstrating the counter-
revolutionary antiproletarian character of the anarchist doctrines of the denial 
of all statehood. Engels e.g. in his work „On authority" offered an annihilat-
ing criticism of anarchism and made it clear that in all circumstances the re-
volution was the most imposing thing in the world. It was an act in which a 
section of the population by means of rifles, bayonets and guns, all respect-
commanding means, imposed its will on the other section. The rule of the 
victorious party had to be maintained by the fear which weapons instilled into 
the reactionaries. Had not the Paris Commune. relied on the authority of the 
armed people against the bourgeoisie, it could not have survived even for a 
day. On the contrary, the remark may be made that it made too little use of 
authority. Engels therefore concluded that after the revolution the working 
class had to create the State of its own. In this connexion Marx's work 
"Political Indifference" is of particular interest. Here Marx pointed out that 
anarchism was in fact equal to treason, for the watchword that after the 
revolution no new State would be needed, practically meant that the proletar-
iat should lay down arms. Marx suggested that the theoretical and practical 
consequences of their doctrine ought to be made clear by the propagandists 
of anarchism. However, this they dared not, for in this case the working class 
would send them to hell, as it would be clear to the workers that the anarch-
ists strictly speaking denied them the t rue means of the struggle, viz. State 
and law, means for which the anarchists offered autonomy, self-management 
and doctrines of anarchistic freedom as substitutes. 
The Marxist thesis is amply confirmed by the movements of an anarchist 
character which are in progress in a number of western countries (e.g. -Cohn-
Bendit). ' 
[2.] Capitalist social and economic conditions reached a stage of evolution 
where mechanized big industries and a mass of wage-earning workers sprang 
up. The social character of production and the individual nature of exploitation 
called forth a struggle between workers and the bourgeoisie, i.e. appropriators. 
The working class or proletariat had no definite idea or theory on which it 
could rely in its warfare against the appropriators. Consequently it was in-
evitable that the proletariat should clarify its position and role theoretically. 
The theoretical clarification of the situation of the proletariat and the defini-
tion of its tasks were what Marx and Engels accomplished. 
For the theoretical clarification of the position of the proletariat, which in 
view of the economic, political and scientific exigencies of the age could not 
be postponed any longer, Marx-and Engels had recourse-to earlier scientific 
conclusions, i.e. to doctrines of State; and law, which have been analyzed in 
the foregoing discussion. Marx and Engels gave, special attention to the natural 
sciences, geograhpy, physics, chemistry and biology, f rom which dialectic and 
materialist reasoning so to say emanated. At the same time they relied, also on 
the results of historical research. Marx and Engels revealed the division of 
society' into classes and, as the outcome of this division, the function and signific-
ance of class interest and class will (Guizot, Thiers and Mignet). They made 
it clear that the capitalist social and economic formations or State and law, 
were not the final forms of society (Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier). After Hegel 
had formulated the principal categories of dialectics and demonstrated that 
dialectics extended to all and everything, i.e. were universal, it was easier 
for ' them to tackle their task. Hegel, by setting up the categories of dialectics, 
extended theoretical and methodological aid to Marx and Engels, in particular 
in their investigations of State and law. However, in addition dialectics had 
to be stripped of their idealistic ornaments. In fact Hegel did not conclude 
from reality on the concepts, but applied the dialectics of the concepts to re-
ality. Namely Hegel believed that the world was tied together by reason, i.e. 
that i t was reason, and not matter, what was common in the world. Con-
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sequently, for him being and conciousness became identical, althought he 
borrowed what was called the "objective intellect" from reality, f rom epistem-
ology. Marx and Engels relied also on the materialistic doctrines of Ludwig 
Feuerbach, which understood Man as part of nature and the material world. 
However, they criticized Feuerbach because he failed to speak of Man as a 
social phenomenon. Further they criticized Feuerbach also for his. doctrines 
advanced in connexion with the new religion and also for his rejecting dial-, 
ectic reasoning. 
Here we are interested in the political and legal ideas of Marx and Engels. 
Referred to the previous periods, these ideas have laid the foundations to a 
new way of political and legal thinking. This new political and legal thinking 
manifest itself in all problems of State and law, and in all categories as-
sociated with State and law. 
Marx and Engels laid the foundations for their theoretical investigations 
of the problems of State and law in their early works. Of Marx's early works 
on the investigation of State and law in his "Debates on the freedom of the 
press", "Debates on the law of wood theft", "In defence of the Moselle region 
reporters", "Critique -of Hegelian political law", "The German—French an-
nuals", "Economic-philosophical manuscripts", deserve special mention. In 
these early works Marx developed the following principal theses, mainly in 
connexion with the type of State and law in relation to State and class interest: 
the so-called State interest, i.e. the interest of the capitalist State is in reality 
private interest. Consequently, he pointed out, in a capitalist society the 
customs of the rich and not those of the poor became law. 
He emphasized that the State had to guarantee rights even for the poorest 
classes to provide the foundations for the real conditions of their life. Con-
sequently the law ought to recognize the customary law also of the poor, 
whose existence was also a mere custom of society. It was a deception only to. 
imagine that the State was the sole and exclusive possessor of reason and 
morals. The t ruth was that the State belonged to the proprietors, and it was 
active in their interest. 
Unlike Hegel, Marx believed that the State was secondary only, and not 
primary, i.e. it was the creation of so-called social spheres. He concluded from, 
this that it was merely appearance that the State ruled the material spheres. 
He then drew the fundamental conclusion that if a change should be achieved, 
this change should in the first place be made in the material spheres, i.e. in 
what was called "bourgeois society". It was not sufficient merely to speak of 
the democratization of the State. These ideas of Marx did not contain his 
thesis of the primary character of social relations which he developed in a, 
later phase. In fact at that time society and family were still intellectual 
realities for him, i.e. in this period Marx was still an idealist in this respect. 
In contrast to Hegel Marx makes it clear that the State is the product of 
the self-estrangement or alienation of bourgeois society, i.e. the result of the 
growth of contradictions in society, i.e. the State has become a reality segrega-
ted from the people's life, it has become opposed to the people, as the subject 
of the historical process, so that f rom the popular aspect the State is an extra- . 
neous, foreign, transcendent power ruling the people. It stands to reason that, 
here Marx still harbours abstract ideas of the State, moreover in the feudal 
State he wants to discover the unity of "people, and State". 
.94 
In his early works Marx subjects to a study the form of government. He 
values the doctrine of Hegel that the State is an organism, i.e. the totality of 
a variety of organs and functions, in the positive sense. However, he makes 
it clear tha t a distinction should be made between a political and another, e.g. 
animal organism. In connexion with the governmental form of the State Marx 
points out that the true base of the State is not the monarch, the individual, 
the person, or the personality of the prince, but the people, i.e. men. In con-
nexion with the political system of the State Marx analyzes the problems of 
democracy. He points out that a State conforming to his notion is equal to a 
démocracy which is identical with the self-determination of the people. Ile 
writes that democracy is a genus of arrangement, the monarchy merely a 
species, and for that matter a bad species. Consequently the State conforming 
to his notion is not a monarchy. 
On analyzing the notion of democracy in his early works Marx still set out 
from the thesis that thé State was the realm of freedom, i.e. in his' concept it 
ought to be. He believed that governmental arrangement was the free product 
of Man, and that democracy was thé essence of all governmental arrangement. 
However, the Marxian idea as if the State were the realm of freedom presents 
an idealistic, i.e. Hegelian influence. From what has been set forth earlier 
it followed that according to Marx the non-democratic State contradicts the 
essence of the State. 
Marx discovers in democracy his own social, ideal. He believed that this 
democracy could solve the social problems, i.e. it could carry the social libe-
ration of the workers into effect. In this sense in a true democracy the po-
litical State would cease to exist. At that time Marx was already aware of that 
the struggle between monarchy and republic was merely a struggle within the 
abstract State. He also saw it clearly that the monarchy was the accomplished 
expression of the alienation of Man, and that the republic was merely the 
negation of this alienation within its own sphere. He also pointed out that the 
political republic was merely a democracy within the abstract governmental 
form. 
In his early works, in connexion with the organization of the State, Marx 
analyzes bureaucracy as the power mechanism. According to his doctrine the. 
causes of the existence of bureaucracy must be sought for in the fact that 
society is split up into groups of isolated interests. Marx emphasizes that the 
purpose of bureaucracy is to unite the groups of mutually opposing private 
interests and to subject them to a single end. He concludes that bureaucracy 
can guarantee the unity of these different groups formally only, but is inca-
pable of eliminating the clash of interests. Namely the existence of bureaucracy 
relies on these clashes of interests, because it introduces the differences in the 
interests of the various contending groups into the management of the go-
vernmental affairs. This manifest itself in an attack which bureaucracy laun-
ches against the various groups. Marx points out that earlier bureaucracy 
•fought against the corporations in the Hegelian sense, in order to create a 
living-space for itself. Later (in the 1840's) bureaucracy tried to maintain the 
corporations by force, in order to save itself and its spirit. Going on with the 
analysis of bureaucracy, Marx writes that in principle bureaucracy serves the 
general, fundamental interests of the State, yet in reality it is hostile to the 
true ends of the State, i.e. the interest of the people, the interest for which the 
State has to find an expression. As a matter of fact, Marx continues, since the 
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State has a bureaucracy, it has ceased to serve its original end, and has become 
the means of certain persons wielded againts others. At that time Marx thought 
that the rule of one class over the other contradicted the essence of the State, 
i.e. its ideal essence. At that time he thought this phenomenon was possible 
only owing to the bureaucratic distortion of the essence of the State. (At that 
time Marx did not yet recognize the class essence of the State, i.e. the economic 
basis of the dictatorship of a single class.) The State, since it has a bureaucracy 
and has ceased to serve its original interest, is forced to represent the formal 
as content and the content as formal. Consequently in the State "the State 
ends change into bureau ends, and the bureau ends into State ends". All this 
leads to a point where the State turns into spheres f rom which nobody can 
escape. In fact the spirit of bureaucracy "is the formal spirit of the State" 
(i.e. the voidness of spirit), which in fact is the categoric imperative of bu-
reaucracy. .Since the State has a bureaucracy and has ceased to serve its own 
end, its structure has become a hierarchical one, where the hierarchy of 
knowledge is of fundamental importance. The hierarchy of knowledge finds 
an expression in the arrangement that the summit entrusts the lower circles 
to inspect the unique, whereas the lower circles entrust the summit to inspect 
the general. As Marx points out the outcome is that the two decive each other. 
Hence Marx came to the conclusion that the contrast between power and 
people was in the oppressor State inseparable f rom the bureaucratic system. 
At that time to Marx the State was apparently independent of private interest. 
Also the statement may be made tha t the t rue basis of the oppressor State 
was not formed by the-bureaucratic system, but by the interests of private 
property. Marx had pointed out this earlier, and so unveiled the bourgeois 
illusions relating to the ideal essence of the State. Namely Marx recognized 
that in the presence of private property the State was the mechanism of class 
rule. He wrote that state interests changed into a specific private end in the 
face of other private ends. Consequently with the State the private proprietor 
acquired political domination, so that the State ceased to rule over private 
property. Not the State was the cause, and private property the causation, but 
the other way round: private property was the cause and the State the 
causation. Marx reached the point of neccesity where he had to sever ties with 
the idealist notion of the State of Hegel, and discovered that in the power of 
the political State the power, of private property found an expression for itself 
and that it was merely an illusion that the State decided, in fact the State was 
the subject of decisions. 
In his early works Marx also studied the problems of the functions of the 
State. Here he subjected to a sharp criticism the Hegelian notion as if the 
function of the State were the resolution or termination of the various contra-
dictions. Hegel alleged that the State was a power which would solve the 
social contradictions and reconcile the conflicting interests. Naturally what 
Hegel had in mind was not the contradiction between exploiters and exploited, 
but was the contradiction between the various estates. Hegel who for his part 
wanted to perpetuate the classification by estates, held that the mediating 
activities of the estates would solve the contradictions, between government 
and people. Marx laid down as a fact that the feudal representative monarchy 
did not only fail to eliminate the contradictions between government ' and 
people, but was of necessity the product of these contradictions. He pointed 
out that the causes of this contradiction lay in the fact that the political State 
merely reflected the interests of the wealthiest strata of society and that the 
State was organized by the estates for safeguarding these interests. According 
to Marx, the significance of feudal representation was that it brought to the 
surface and intensified the contradictions and so provided facilities for their 
solution. Hence, according to Marx, the social contradictions can be solved in 
principle and in a revolutionary way, still not by stages, as Hegel would have 
it. However, Marx made it clear that merely for the sake of a reconciliation 
of the contradictions their keenness could not be blurred. In fact their sources 
had to be explored and these sources had then to be presented as the essence 
of given phenomena. The development of these contradictions had to be traced 
to their origin, his conclusion is all the more important because in Hegel's 
view the contradictions by-pass one another, they do not join issue, i.e. they 
avoid clashes. 
There are three more works of Marx which have to be taken into consi-
deration for the understanding of the evolution of his early doctrines. First of 
all, his work "The Jewish Problem" has to be mentioned. In this work he made 
it clear that any form of alienation could be terminated only by the revolution 
through the agency of a new type of political state. In this work he also points 
out that private property could be eliminated only by a revolution, and that 
the abolition of private property would lead to the emancipation of Man. To 
the question of class which would be the leading force of the revolution, Marx 
failed to offer a reply at that time. In his "Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy 
of Law" Marx offered a reply to the question as to the realistic force which 
could carry through the annihilation of private property. He declared that the 
proletariat would have to accomplish this revolution. In this work Marx 
emphasized the leading role of the proletariat, still he failed to raise the prob-
lem of class alliance. He analyzed the problems of class alliance on the ground 
of the experiences of the revolution of 1848—1849. In 1852 he insisted on the 
destruction of bureaucracy. The third work, also important for the evolution 
of the ideas of the young Marx, bears the title "Economic-philosophic MSS". 
This work is of special interest owing to the analysis of the problem of aliena-
tion. In this work Marx lent a historical and social sense to the category of 
alienation, a phenomenon which emerged also in Hegel and Feuerbach. Marx 
filled it with economic, historical and class content. Marx made the termination 
of alienation the goal of the practical revolutionary struggle. This problem is 
associated also with the State and law. 
By way of summing up the statement may be made that Marx traced 
the struggles of political life back to the interests and conflicts of the particular 
classes of society and that at this point the complete formulation of the 
Marxist theory of classes, class warfare, the State and law has its origin. 
Engels, too, analyzed the problems of State and law in his early works. 
Of these the following deserve mention as bearing on State and law: "Letters 
from Wuppertal", "The internal crises", "The Point of View of the Political 
Parties", "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent", "Outlines of a critique 
of political economy", "The situation of England", "The English constitution". 
"The situation of the working class in England", "The government and opposi-
tion in France". 
Engels recognized tha t the State was in the service of private property, 
that in the background of the struggles of the various political parties there 
was the struggle of the classes of the bourgeois society. He analyzed the doctrine 
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of popular sovereignty, the relation of State and absolutism, the problem of 
popular will in connexion with the relation of the Commons and the people. 
Marx and Engels wrote works in cooperation which must be considered 
their early works and in which they discussed the problems of State and law 
in detail. Of these the following deserve special mention: "The Holy Family, or 
the critique of critical critique against Bruno Bauer and associates", "German. 
ideology. The criticism of latest German philosophy in the persons of its rep-
resentatives, Feuerbach, B. Bauer, and Stirner and the criticism of German 
socialism in the person of their various prophets". In these works, on the 
ground of the philosophic categories of appearance and essence, Marx and 
Engels make it clear that the apparently f ree work of the proletarians is but 
a new type of serfdom, which is formulated by the law in legal relations. They 
demonstrate that the State does not unite the individuals and does not reconcile 
their interests, and that society does not owe its existence to the State. They 
call the position, according to which the State unites and reconciles the interests 
of the individuals, a political superstition. They, point out that the members of 
society are kept together by interest, that their real tie is civil, i.e. economic, 
and not political life. Marx and Engels speak of the revolutionary role of the 
proletariat and of its socialist mission. They emphasize that the aim and 
historical action of the proletariat have been marked out irrevocably. Setting 
out from the thesis that class warfare and class antagonism constitute the real 
basis of the State, they point out that the interest-will of the ruling class stands 
for the dominant will in the State, i.e. the personal rule takes shape as average 
rule. This means that the interests of the individuals of the ruling class change 
over t o common class interest and this gives expression to the common econo-
mic conditions of life of this class irrespective of potential contradictions 
between the personal and common interests of the members of the class, e.g., 
on the whole, observance of the law is in the interest of the ruling class, i.e. 
the law is the expression of the will determined by the common interests of 
the members' of the class. However, individually the members of the ruling 
class t ry to evade the law. Hence it is the essence of the State that, owing to 
the economic structure of society, a definite class is in a ruling position. 
Consequently in the antagonistic class societies the State will serve the interests 
of society as a whole on the surface only, whereas in reality it will display 
activities in the interest of a definite class. The State is the form where the 
individuals of a definite ruling class will bring to fruition their common inte-
rests . (It is even possible that none of the ruling classes will have full .control 
of political power, e.g. in the age of German absolutism.) 
From what has been set forth so far it stands to reason that the problem 
of the State is in the first place not the problem of the form of government, 
but merely a question of the class which governs and holds power. Hence the 
question of the form of government cannot camouflage the class character of 
the State, although there is a difference between monarchy and republic. Marx 
and Engels make it clear that a class striving for power, even if — as in the 
case of the proletariat — its rule presupposes the extinction of the earlier form 
of society as a whole and of domination at all, will have to conquer political 
power first of all. Namely political power may appear in a new form and the 
proletariat will for a period of transition, until the classes have been liquidated, 
even need this form. Therefore the working class has to acquire political power 
even when in the beginning it will act as the representative of society as a 
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whole. In fact at that time its interests will coincide with those of the other 
non-ruling classes. As Marx and Engels express it, every new class will establish 
its régime within a sphere wider than that of the earlier ruling class. On the 
other hand later the antagonism between the now ruling class and the non-
ruling classes will grow in intensity. This means that the class basis of the 
bourgeois State is wider than that of the feudal State, still the contradictions 
of a bourgeois society are greater and keener than those of its predecessor. 
Marx and Engels formulated as early as 1844 that the revolution of the 
.proletariat would overthrow the political power of the bourgeoisie. They raised 
the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e. they believed it was not 
enough to overthrow the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. In fact a new socialist 
state would have to be created. The stress laid on this thesis was at the same 
time the criticism of the anarchistic doctrines. 
On analyzing the evolution of the political and legal opinions of Marx and 
Engels, we find that they divested themselves of all idealistic traits in 1847. 
"The misery of philosophy" of Marx and "The principles of Communism" of 
Engels may be considered the first mature works. 
Marx and Engels developed their political and legal doctrines in their 
purity in a number of works and studies. Without any pretence to completeness 
the following writings may be mentioned: The Communist Manifesto (1847— 
1848), Class struggles in France (1853), Political manoeuvres (1853), The situation 
of factory workers (1857), Introduction to The criticism of political economy 
(1857), The criticism of political economy (1859), The Capital, Vols I, II, III 
(1867—1894), The civil war in France (1871), Critique-of the Gotha programme 
(1875), To the housing question (1872—1873), On the watchword of the abolition 
of the State and the German friends of anarchy (1850), Evolution, of Socialism 
from Utopia to Science (1876—1878), Anti-Duhring (1876—1878), The origins 
of the family, private property and the State (1884), Ludwig Feuerbach and 
the disintegration of the classical German philosophy (1886), Critique of the 
Erfur t programme (1894). Beyond these Marx and Engels dealt in a number of 
papers with the general problems of State and law, the problems of the capitalist 
State and law, and those of the socialist State and law. They discussed questions 
relating to State and law in letters addressed to a number of persons. 
The Marxist doctrine of the origin of the State has been laid down in the 
work of Engels "Origins of the family, private property and the State". In 
connexion wi th ' the origin of the State Engels sets forth that in the beginning 
men lived in clans which were formed of so-called primitive hordes. The clan, 
in point of fact, united the kindred and guaranteed husbandry and livelihood 
in a community. In the period of clanship the productive forces «and conditions, 
of production were on a very low level. Tools of vital importance were made 
in common and the products of work done in common were consumed in com-
mon. Within the clan a variety of agencies managed the internal and external 
affairs of the community. Within it the whole population was armed, i.e. the 
whole armed people defended the common interests of the clan. The leaders 
of the clan were elected by the whole community, these were the first among 
equals, still they enjoyed no fixed privileges. The leaders commanded consi-
derable respect, however, they relied on no violence or force in the government 
of the clan: their power was merely a paternal one. The. affairs of the clan 
were discussed in the assembly of the clan, where also the decisions were made, 
and where any of the members of the clan could freely give expression to his 
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opinion. The assembly could at any time remove the leader of the clan. The 
members were bound to mutual aid, they had to defend their fellows in danger, 
and avenge injuries committed to the prejudice of their fellows. Engels believed 
that this primitive self-government of the clan was an admirable organization, 
however infantile and simple it was. All went one's own way without authori-
ties, gendarmes and police, nobility, kings, lieutenants, prefects, judges, prisons, 
litigation. Any dispute or discord was settled by the community of those 
concerned: i.e. the clan or tribe or between the clans. The organization in 
clans prevented the interests of individuals f rom coming into prominence before 
those of the others, i.e. in the organization of clans an identity of interests was 
a reality. However, by the action of the productive forces, social-economic 
conditions continued to develop. In the organization of clans and their associa-
tions, social. division of labour became established. This division of labour 
brought about the improvement of the productivity of work and the inequality 
of property. It opened the path to the accumulation of wealth. In consequence 
of these developments, the property of the clan broke up and the path was 
opened to the creation of private property. Wealth began to accumulate in the 
form of family property and economic power made the wealthy families masters 
of the clan. At that time property was already praised and honoured as the 
greatest benefit. Only one thing was still missing according to Engels, namely 
that society not only guaranteed the newly acquired property of certain persons 
against the former communistic traditions of the clan system, or sanctioned 
the formerly so little respected private property and declared this sanctioning 
the principal purpose of all human community, but at the same put the seal 
of general social recognition on the rapidly developing new forms of the 
acquisition of property, i.e. of the institution which not only perpetuated the 
splitting up of society into classes, but at the same time recognized the right 
of the propertied classes to exploit the non-propertied classes and to rule over 
them. The institution now became a reality. The State was invented which 
attacked the constitution of clans by creating a detached power, which did not 
coincide with the totality of the armed people. Further it destroyed the system 
of kinship and divided the population by domiciles i.e. by territory. As a matter 
of fact the State owed its existence to the need to curb class antagonism, as 
with the development of private property also the class of proprietors was 
born and with it, as the outcome of the clashes between the propertied and 
non-propertied, the State, as the State of the most powerful and economically 
dominant class. This class then became through the State the ruling class also 
in- the political sense. In the hands of the propertied class, the State became 
the instrument for curbing and exploiting the oppressed class. As Engels wrote this 
was the reason why the most wretched police agent of the civilized State com-
manded greater respect than all agencies of the clan society put together. Yet 
the most powerful prince and greatest Statesman or general of the civilized 
State could envy the smallest of the leaders of clans for the spontaneous and 
self-evident respect with which he was surrounded. Engels also emphasized 
that the creation of the State was the outcome of the intrinsic evolution of the 
social and economic conditions, within which the economic factors were pre-
dominant. Hence the State was not an organism which was forced on society 
from outside, but the product of the intrinsic evolution of society. 
The State changes together with social evolution. This means that in the 
evolution of the State various phases or periods may be distinguished according 
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to the underlying economic and social evolution. Science discusses the problems 
of the State types with due regard to this evolution. Engels wrote that the 
State of Antiquity was in the first place the State of slave-holders, for curbing 
the slaves; the feudal State was the organ of the nobility for controlling the 
serfs and the dependent peasantry; the modern representative State is the in-
strument of capital for the exploitation of wage-work. This is why we distinguish 
slave-holder, feudal and capitalist types of State. Engels also calls attention, to 
the fact that, exceptionally, there are periods when the contending classes 
balance one another to the extent that sovereign power as the seeming mediator 
for a moment acquires a certain degree of independence in respect of both 
parties. Hence the question of the type of State is closely associated with the 
question of the class whose interests are safeguarded or guaranteed by the 
State. If the .State upholds the conditions of life and rule of the exploiters 
against the oppressed class by applying violence, writes Engels in his Anti-
Duhring, then the State may be called one of the exploiter type. In this respect 
the work of Engels on the housing question is of particular interest. In this he 
says that the State is but the combined organized power of the propertied 
classes, the landowners and capitalists against the exploited classes, peasants 
and workers. As regards the question of the types of State, the work of Marx 
"Preface to the criticism of political economy" deserves special attention. In 
this work Marx states that the totality of the conditions of production constitute 
the economic order of society, the true basis on which a legal and political 
superstructure is erected. This means that within the conditions of production 
the property relations have a decisive influence on the political superstructure, 
namely the organization and operation of the State. In the same matter, in a 
letter to F. V. Annekov he sets forth the following ideas: "Presuppose a definite 
stage of development of production, turnover and consumption and you will 
have a definite social system, you will have a definite organization of the family, 
the estates, or classes, i.e. a definite civil society. Presuppose a definite civil 
society and you will' have the corresponding political organization, which is 
only an official expression of the political society." This means that the given 
order of the relations of production defines the political formula of society, 
defines the classes which form society, defines who and by what means acquires 
the goods necessary for livelihood, what function a person performs in the 
historically given social organization of production, the position a person oc-
cupies on the authority scale of society, i.e. whether that of an oppressor or 
oppressed, of a leader or of one led. Consequently the states built up on uniform 
relations of productions and expressing a uniform class content are assigned to 
the same type. Since relations of production have four basic types, on which 
the governmental organizations of a class dictatorship of four types are built 
up, there are four types of State. The type of State will in each case be dif-
ferent owing to the evolution of the productive forces and the relations of 
production. 
The doctrines exposed by Marx and Engels on the types of State are 
associated with their responses to the essence of the State. Accordingly the 
State is but the mechanism serving for the oppression of one class by the other. 
(Introduction to the Civil War in France by Engels.) 
The problem of the form of government occupies a prominent position in 
the oeuvre of Marx and Engels. In connexion with the form of government, 
they analyzed the problems of régime. Engels, in a letter to F. Mehring, pointed 
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out that the form of government sprang up from the form of economy and its 
appropriate management as inevitably as a child f rom the intercourse of a man 
and a woman. Strictly speaking, the problem of the form of government is 
associated with the State as an organism. Namely, the continued social division 
of labour brought about the segregation of the activity directing the administra-
tion, acts and organization of men from economic activity. On analyzing the 
question in Anti-Diihring, Engels came to the conclusion that in addition to 
the overwhelming majori ty toiling in work a layer exempted from direct pro-
ductive work came into being which took care of the common affairs of society, 
viz. management of work, administrative duties, administration of justice. In 
anothèr letter written to K. Schmidt Engels demonstrated that society produces 
certain common functions which are indispensable. Men entrusted with the 
performance of this work form a new branch of the . division of - labour within 
society. By these they got hold of special interests even against their employers, 
they gained independence. In a letter to Cuno, Engels made the statement that 
the sovereign power was but an organization created by the ruling classes, 
landowners and capitalists in order to safeguard their social privileges. Marx 
in particular made subject to a study the problems of the executive power, and 
in his work "The 18th of Bfumaire of Louis Bonaparte" he wrote that the 
executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, 
ramified administrative machinery, an army of about half a million civil 
servants, together with an army of another half a million, was born in the era 
of the absolute monarchy, at the decay of feudalism. 
Engels studied the problem of the best possible form of government and 
came to the conclusion that the best form of government was the one where 
the social controversies were not hushed up, where these were not fettered in 
a violent manner, artificially, i.e. only apparently. The best form of government 
was where these controversies matured to an open fight and so to a solution. 
Marx in his "The Civil War in France" analyzed the problem of the mo-
narchy and the democratic republic. He stated that unlike the monarchy, whose 
name in itself meant the predominance of one bourgeois group over the other, 
the victory of. one party over the other (the glory of one and the humiliation 
of the other party), the republic was the nameless joint stock company of the 
united bourgeois groups, or all allied exploiters of the people. Their class rule 
was in a straightforward and open manner antagonistic to the emancipation of 
the producing masses. The only raison d'être of their direct activities was the 
oppression of the people. This republic was the terrorism of class rule. Engels 
then studied the relations of the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat 
to the republic. He believed that the struggle between the two classes could be 
fought to the end only in a republic. As a matter of fact, the survival of the 
republic was an intensification of the direct, undisguised class struggle between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie, up to a crisis. In this connexion he made the 
statement that the proletariat needed democratic forms for seizing political 
power. The democratic republic was always the last phase of bourgeois domi-
nation, a formation in which the bourgeoisie perished. 
In connexion with the problems of the State, Marx and Engels also analyzed 
the functions of the State. Here Marx brought forward his ideas in the first 
volume of The Capital, in particular as f a r as t h e economic functions of the 
bourgeois State were concerned. In a letter to Schmidt, Engels, analyzing the 
relations of State and economy, wrote that the repercussions of the sovereign 
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power on economic evolution were of a triple, type, viz. the sovereign power 
proceeded in the same direction as economy advanced and then evolution would 
be accelerated; it could proceed in the opposite direction, and then the sovereign 
power would sooner or later become bankrupt in all major nations of our 
days; or the sovereign power could put up barriers to certain trends of econo-
mic evolution, whereas it could prescribe others. In the last resort this case 
could be traced back to either of the two earlier mentioned cases. 
Marx and Engels also dealt with the question of the withering away of the 
State. In this connexion Engels made it clear that the task of vital importance 
of the proletariat was the seizure of sovereign power and the transfer of the 
means of production to public ownership. This meant at thé same time that 
the proletariat would cease to exist and so also the State. However, the State 
would not cease to exist unless class antagonisms and class differences came 
to an end. As Engels stated, the exploiting societies needed a State. In parti-
cular for the forceful curbing of the exploited classes. When there would be 
no more classes to be oppressed, and therefore no more clashes between the 
oppressing and oppressed classes, there would be no need for a State either. 
At that time the management of affairs and the guidance of productive proces-
ses would supersede the rule over persons. The State would not be abolished, 
the State would simply wither away. This statement may be read in the work 
"Evolution of socialism from Utopia to science". As early as 1850. Marx and 
Engels defined the meaning of the abolition of the State. It was a necessary 
consequence of the abolition of the classes. Together with the classes also the 
need ceased for one class to wield power over the other classes. Finally Engels 
in his work "The origins of the family, private property and the State" made 
it clear that the State had not existed f rom times immemorial. There were 
societies which existed without it. The State owed its origin to the disruption 
of society into classes and when the existence of classes became an obstacle to 
production, the classes would disapper, and together with them also the 
State would disappear inevitably. Society which at that time would reorganize 
production on the ground of a free and equal association of the producing 
forces, would put the governmental mechanism, to its proper place, viz. the 
museum of antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze hatchet. 
Marx and Engels made a number of fur ther statements in connexion with 
the State. In his work "The Civil. War in France" Marx, analyzing the Paris 
Commune, again pointed out the need for the destruction of the bourgeois 
political machinery, a thesis which he had already advanced in his work "Class 
struggles in France". In the "Critique of the Gotha Programme" Marx took a 
stand against the doctrines of the State of Lassalle and Liebknecht and set 
against their watchword of a free State the dictatorship of the proletariat. At 
the same time he demonstrated that this dictatorship would be a transition 
f rom the capitalist society to the socialist or communist society, i.e. it was not 
a permanent dictatorship. 
In connexion with law, Marx and Engels laid down a number of funda-
mental theses. Speaking of the essence of law they exposed its class character. 
"Your ideas are in themselves the products of bourgeois production and 
property relations, ' just as your law is but the will of your class raised to -the 
rank of a law, a will whose content is given in the material conditions of life 
of your class", they wrote in the Communist Manifesto. Engels, in his work on 
the housing problem, understood láw as* the system of common rules, and 
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outlined the process of the birth of law. He wrote that at a very primitive 
stage of development of society the need emerged for a consolidation of the 
daily recurring facts of production, the distribution and barter of products in 
a common rule, and also for taking care that each man submitted himself to 
the common terms of production and barter. This rule first became a moral 
custom, and then law. Engels studies the State in close connexion with the 
Law, and puts forward the statement that it is the State that is entrusted with 
the enforcement of the law. He then continues with the problems of the making 
of the law or legislation. Since, parallel to social evolution, legislation has grown 
in volume and complexity, Engels believes that the more complicated legislation 
is the more its forms of expression draw away f rom the manner in which the 
ordinary economic conditions of the life of society are expressed. In connexion 
with legislation, or the making of the law, Engels makes the statement that 
legislation tries to detach itself f rom economy. Consequently many are in the 
belief as if the fur ther evolution of law were in no relation to the economic 
conditions, but had its own specific intrinsic causes or notion of "will" inde-
pendent of the economic conditions. In the course of law-making men are apt 
to forget that the law is the result of the economic conditions of life. Engels 
also points out that the complexity and extension of law-making are responsible 
for the birth of the profession learned in law and, with it, of jurisprudence. 
He emphasizes that in the course of law-making also certain comparative studies 
have to be made, because law-making draws on the legal systems of various 
peoples arid ages. In this connexion he calls attention to the fact that the law 
has to be compared as the reprint of the economic conditions at any time, and 
not as a system whose justification may be found in itself. 
In connexion with the law and law-making, Engels raises the problem of 
justness. He writes that natural law incorporates all that is more or less com-
mon in all legal systems, and if a norm conforms to natural law, this norm 
will be just. Marx in connexion with law-making exposes that the laws of 
succession are not causes but results, legal consequences of the existing econo-
mic organization of society, which relies on the private property of the means 
of production, i.e. the soil, raw materials, machinery, etc. 
Marx in his work "The conditions of factory workers" speaks of the for-
mulation of statutes. He makes the statement that the laws are shameful and 
deceitful, because they are formulated in a way that they frustrate the achieve-
ment of their ostensible end and disarm the men entrusted with their enforce-
ment. He makes it clear that the controversy between the masters of the fac-
tories and the workers is rapidly advancing to the point where veritable social 
wars will break out. 
Engels refers to the fact that for the jurists the evolution of law is the 
tendency to bring human conditions nearer to the ideal of justness. He remarks 
that justness is a category which is the idealized expression of the existing 
economic conditions viewed from their conservative as well as revolutionary 
side. Consequently the idea formed of justness will vary with the given age 
or place. In everyday life the notion of justness may be used without the risk 
of misinterpretation, however, this is not the case in scientific investigations. 
In The Capital Marx solves the problem by laying down that where economic 
transactions make their appearance as the acts of volition of the participants, 
or the manifestation of their common will, or in contracts enforceable against 
one party through the agency of the State the legal forms are mere forms, and 
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consequently cannot define their own contents. They are mere expression of 
this content. The content is just when it conforms to the method of production, 
i.e. it is in harmony with it. It will be unjust, if it contradicts this method. 
Viewed from the aspect of the capitalist method of production, slavery is 
unjust. Similarly, a f raud associated with the quality of the commodity is 
also unjust. 
In connexion with legal relations Marx made it clear that these were 
rooted in the material conditions of life, similarly to the forms of government. 
Consequently, as soon as the means of production would be transferred from 
private ownership to public ownership, the law of succession would die off of 
itself. In Volume I of The Capital, Marx made the statement that legal relations 
were relations of will and that in these relations of will the economic conditions 
out that it was not the title which conferred power on the landlord, but the 
economic conditions recognized in the form of legal titles. 
Marx in his works "Elections" and "Political manoeuvres" analyzes the 
problems of the application of law. He makes the statement that property is 
equal to robbery and points out that in the course of the application of law 
the servile class of bourgeois lawyers are doing an enormous service to the 
transformation of property into private property for the deception of the 
people, and also demonstrates the class character of bourgeois lawyers and the 
bourgeois judiciary. 
Engels deals with, the unity of the legal system of the bourgeois states and 
says that the law does not merely correspond to the economic situation, it is 
not merely an expression of this, but has to be a coherent expression of the 
economic situation also by itself, an expression which does not deceive itself 
with intrinsic contradictions. This cannot be achieved unless the law reflects 
the economic conditions in a less and less t ru thful manner. In this connexion 
he points out that the Code Napoléon was the code which reflected the attitude 
to law of the revolutionary bourgeoisie of the period from 1792 to 1796. 
However, this notion of the law was falsified. The evolution of law manifested 
itself in the fact that attempts were made to eliminate the contradictions of 
the Code and to create a harmonious legal system. The objective ground of the 
endeavour to create a harmonious legal system is the fact that the effects and 
coercive force of continued economic evolution repeatedly break through the 
system and drag it into new contradictions. According to Engels the reflection 
of economic conditions in the form of principles of law takes place without 
becoming conscious to the participant^. "The jurist thinks that he works with 
a priori theses, yet it is a case of economic reflections only." However, it may 
be stated that the bourgeois legal systems are., not free f rom intrinsic contra-
dictions. 
In his "Critique of the Gotha Programme" Marx dealt with the new type 
of law coming into being with the socialist revolution. Here he. enlarged on 
the character of the law that comes into being in the first phase of communist 
society, and attached his comments to the theses of the Gotha Programme 
relating to the distribution of the goods according to a uniform law. He pointed 
out that in the first phase of a communist society, i.e. in socialism, in the 
distribution of the goods in fact the "uniform law" mentioned in the program-
me would dominate. This was associated with the principle of distribution 
prevailing in socialism according to which everybody would work according 
to his abilities and everybody would receive the goods according to his work. 
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He pointed out that equality meant in socialism that here measuring was by 
equal standards, i.e. work. However, it was also t rue that content and form 
had changed, because, owing to the changed circumstances, nobody could give 
anything else but his work, and because, on the other hand, apart f rom goods 
for personal consumption, nothing else could be in private ownership. Marx 
went on declaring that for the distribution of consumers' goods still the same 
"equal law" was valid which brought under regulation the exchange of com-
modities. This equal law was still the same civil law. This equal law was still 
restricted by the bourgeois framework. Hence distribution depended on the 
method of production, i.e. as regards distribution and work, "civil law" re-
mained, still it relied already on the new relations of production. The "civil 
law" in parentheses is already the new type of socialist law, although this new 
law still tied up with certain features of "civil law". 
Marx and Engels also dealt with the relations of State and law, or State 
and morals. In his "Anti-Diihring" Engels made it clear that there were three 
types of morals in a capitalist society, viz. the morals of the feudal aristocracy, 
the morals of the bourgeoisie and the morals of the proletariat. He stated that 
in a society, which moved in class antagonism, morals were always class morals, 
i.e. they always justified the power and interests of the ruling class. In his 
foreword to the 1885 German edition of "Das Elenci der Philosophie" Engels 
emphasized that if the moral consciousness of the masses declared an economic 
fact unjust, like once slavery or serfdom, this was an evidence of the obsolet-
eness of the fact, and of the intervention of other economic facts. Consequently 
the former became unbearable and untenable. This statement is noteworthy 
also in connexion with obsolete legal rules. From the point of view of morals 
and legislation, in particular the statements are of importance which Marx and 
Engels advanced'in connexion with the freedom of will. 
By way of summing up it may be stated that Marx and Engels reached 
the following novel scientific conclusions as regards State and law: they 
pointed out that both State and law are categories of history, i.e. that State 
and law existed not f rom the beginnings, and that with the disappearance of 
classes both would wither away. They demonstrated that the doctrines of 
State and law are in the last analysis defined by the relations of production. 
They pointed out that State and law are the instruments of the power of the ruling 
class, that law expresses the will of the ruling class as the totality of the rules 
of conduct, and that the. State is but the power-enforcement organization in 
the hands of the ruling class. They made it clear that there is an interaction 
between State and law on the one, and the relations of production on the other 
side, i.e. that State and law are superstructures on the economic basis, that 
State and law are defined by the relations of production, i.e. the underlying 
economic basis, but State and law have repercussions on the economic basis. 
They concluded that the types of State and law emerging in the course of 
social evolution always give expression to the political power and will of the 
economically ruling classes, in whatever form they manifest themselves. They 
made it clear that a transition f rom the one type of State and law to the other 
type of State and law is possible only with the aid of a revolution, and that 
'with the revolution always a new class ascends to power, which class creates 
its own political power, i.e. its own State and legal system. They revealed that 
the bourgeois State and bourgeois law are not the final forms of manifestation 
of State and law. As a matter of fact the State and law of the capitalist society 
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would be superseded by the socialist State and law, whose State would be the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and its law would be a socialist law. The State 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist law are merely of a transient 
character between capitalism and communism. Finally they demonstrated that 
with the birth of the communist social and economic system the socialist State 
and law would wither away. It cannot be argued that t h ^ e doctrines meant 
something novel in political and legal thinking, because they reflected the ob-
jective rules of the evolution of State and law. 
[3.] In the closing years of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, 
far-reaching changes took place in the economic life of the capitalist countries. 
In the course of the normal evolution of the social and economic conditions, 
capitalism turned into imperialism. Imperialism is an evolutional stage of 
capitalism, the most striking feature of which it the domination of the monopolies 
In this period, as the result of the growing concentration of. capitalist produc-
tion, the monopolies, cartels and trusts come into being. 
Several thinkers studied the problems of imperialism. In particular I. A. 
Hobson's Imperialism and R. Hilferding's Das Finanzkapital are of importance. 
Lenin, arguing with these works, and based on the analysis of a definite set 
of facts, stated that imperialism had the following five criteria: (a) concentra-
tion of production and capital, which bring about the monopoly organization 
of capitalism; (b) the finance-capital formed of the intertwining of bank capital 
and industrial capital, whose holder is the financial oligarchy; (c) exportation 
of capital which gains the upper hand over commodity exports, as the new 
form of colonial exploitation; (d) the formation of the economic spheres of 
interest by the international monopolies; (e) the end of the process of the 
territorial partition of the world and the beginning of the struggle between 
the various groups of interest for a territorial reshuffling. These processes 
converted imperialism also into the new era of the proletarian revolutions. 
In the preceding period the teachings of Marx and Engels, and hence their 
doctrines of State and law, were spreading and struck root in the working 
classes. Simultaneously, in particular what was called official science, i.e. 
"bureaucratic professors in a bureaucratic spirit" tried to refute and annihilate 
the Marxist doctrines." Naturally not only official science launched attacks 
against Marxism. Marxism was attacked also f rom within the labour move-
ment. In order- to. gain a foothold in the labour movement Marxism had to 
fight against the young Hegelians, Proudhonism, Bakuninism, the positivists. 
As the outcome of this struggle, the influence of these doctrines lost ground 
in the labour movement, and the international organizations of the movement, 
i.e. the periodic international congresses of the labour movement took sides 
with Marxism in all essential points. However, within Marxism, a new trend 
sprang up in opposition to Marxism. Revisionism within Marxism continued 
its struggle against Marxist political and legal theory on the general ground 
of Marxism. Revisionism followed the Neo-Kantians. This school of philosophy 
emerged in Germany in the middle of the 19th century. It emphasized the most 
reactionary idealistic theses of Kant and rejected the materialistic elements 
in his philosophy. 
The most prominent leaders of revisionism, E. Bernstein and K. Schmidt, 
subjected the doctrines of Marx and Engels of the class warfare and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat to a revision. Bernstein explained his point of 
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view in his work Die Probleme des Sozialismus, published between 1896 and 
1898 and at the same time revised Marxism in general and also its philosophic, 
economic, political and legal doctrines (of which the latter two are of interest 
for our purpose). Lenin, criticizing the doctrines of Bernstein in his work 
"What to do", said that Bernstein denied that could be substantiated scientific-
ally, and that, on the ground of a materialistic concept of history, the necessity 
and inevitability ot socialism could be demonstrated. Bernstein denied the fact, 
of growth of misery and proletarization and of the intensification of capitalist 
contradictions. He declared the notion of the "ultimate goal" to be untenable 
and unconditionally rejected the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat. He 
denied the conflict between liberalism and socialism, and the theory of class 
warfare. The doctrines of revisionism were spreading even in Russia, where 
the so-called legitimate Marxists and the "economists" gave their support to 
the doctrines of Bernstein. Bernstein's above-mentioned work was translated 
into Russian, and published in three editions. Zubatov, the chief of the secret 
police of Moscow, thought this book ought to be read by the workers. This was 
not by mere accident, because the Russian propagators of the doctrines exposed 
in this book, e.g. P. B. Struve, S. M. Bugakov, ettc. wanted to deprive the 
working class of its revolutionary theory. 
In Russia, Lenin took a stand against the Bernsteinian correction and re-
vision of the Marxist political and legal doctrines as the "protest of the Russian 
social democrats" in his works "What to do" and "The economic contents and 
critic of Narodism in Mr. Struve's book" (The reflexion of Marxism in bour-
geois literature, 1895). Before Lenin, also Plekhanov criticized the doctrines of 
Bernstein and Schmidt and branded them as reactionary. 
Lenin made it clear that the opinion of Bernstein "the final goal is noth-
ing, the movement is everything" in fact expressed the essence of revisionism. 
He also set forth that f rom this formulation the clear outlines of a revisionist 
policy unfolded themselves, a policy which was an occasionally defined position 
taken to the daily events, accomodation to trivial political changes, the dis-
regard of the vital interests of the proletariat and of the principal traits of the 
whole capitalist order and capitalist evolution, the sacrifice of all vital interests 
for the sake of momentary, real or supposed benefits. Lenin pointed out that 
this policy could put on an infinite number of forms and that any somewhat 
"new" question, any unexpected or unforeseen turn in the trend of events, 
even if it changed the general line of evolution slightly only or for a very 
short time, would at any time inevitably produce the one or the other variant 
of revisionism. Lenin also reminded that revisionism had its class roots and 
therefore it was an international phenomenon. He made it clear that , along 
with the proletariat, there were in all capitalist countries the petty bourgeois, 
the small proprietors, and that capitalism would inevitably thrust back these 
new small-scale producers into the ranks of the proletariat. It was quite natural 
that the ideas of the petite bourgeoisie would manifest themselves in the ranks 
of labour parties with a large membership. Lenin took a stand against the 
theses of revisionism according to which there was no need for a dictatorship 
of the proletariat, the destruction of the bourgeois political apparatus, accord-
ind to which the bourgeois State and bourgeois law were not the means of ex-
ploitation. He bitterly criticized the doctrines according to which the capitalist 
State was the representative of the common interest of society, and that it was 
void of a class character. 
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Lenin developed his ideas of State and law in the following works: State 
and Revolution (1917), On the State (1919), The Proletarian and the Renegade 
Kautsky (1918), Three constitutions or the three forms of the political order 
(1905), Report on the work of the Council of the Commissars of the People to 
the third All-Russian Congress of the soviets of the worker, soldier and peas-
ant delegates (1918), Leftism as the infantile disorder of Communism (1918), 
Once more on the trade unions, the present situation, the errors of Trotsky 
and Bukharin (1921), Reporter's speech on foreign policy in the joint session 
of the Moscow soviet (1918). Reporter's speech in the Tenth Congress 
of the Russian Commiunist (bolshevik) Party on the replacement of the obligat-
ory delivery of the surplus crops by a tax in kind (1921), The Task of the 
New Economic Policy and the committees of political popular education (1921), 
On democracy and dictatorship (1919), The great initiative (1919), etc. 
Lenin, in the first place, expressed his view on the State. In connexion 
with the type and origin of the State he demonstrated that the State was the 
product of the irreconcilable nature of class antagonism and that the State 
came into being when, where and inasmuch as it was impossible to reconcile 
class antagonisms. Consequently the State was not the organ created for the 
reconciliation of classes, for if it had been created for this purpose, i.e. if this 
reconciliation had been effected, then the State would have ceased to exist. 
He fur ther set forth that the State was a power which had its origins in. 
society.. However, it gained the ascendancy over society, and in the course of 
evolution it became more and more alienated from it. Lenin emphasized that 
the State as a power consisted of the special formation of armed men. This he 
explained by the fact that with the birth of the State this public power ceased 
to coincide with the armed population, for if this were the case then armed 
conflicts would develop between the members of the population. According to 
Lenin the army and the police were heeded only because society split up into 
irreconcilably hostile classes. He criticized the doctrines as if the State had been 
born owing to the growing complexity of the life of society and the differen-
tiation of social functions as philistine dreams. If society had not been split up 
into conflicting classes, the spontaneous armed organization of the population 
would exist under much more complicated conditions even today. He made the 
statement that the special formations of armed men gained ascendancy over 
society and became estranged from it. It was by no means accidental that every 
revolution tried to demonstrate in an illustrative form how the ruling class 
endeavoured to set up the special formations of armed men serving the pur-
poses of this class, and how the oppressed class made efforts to set up a similar 
new organization for its own purposes. In this connexion Lenin emphasized 
that the proletariat had to get hold of the governmental machinery in order to 
overthrow capitalism. The doctrines as if the State meant universal inequality 
had to be discarded. He called the doctrine that the State is the tool of univer-
sal popular rule, a fairy tale. Speaking of the origin of the State, Lenin pointed 
out that the State was born at a time when society could not have survived 
without "power", and, for that matter, without a power which seemingly was. 
above society, and to some extent segregated from it. Hence the State as orga-
nized coercion was born of necessity at a definite stage of the evolution of 
society. 
Lenin referred to the relations between the various governments and the 
economically ruling classes, and explained that, as taught by history, a govern-
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ment could not stand outside or above the classes of society. The ties between 
government and classes of society arre illustratively demonstrated by the 
contents of legislation and information relating to the personal data of the 
different politicians. This information confirms the indissoluble unity of econo-
mic and political rule. In this scope Lenin also dealt with the civil servants and 
made it clear that in an exploiting society the civil servants were not the 
servants of society, but its masters. Lenin studied the problem of the type of 
State in conjunction with the relations of dictatorship and democracy and 
advanced the statement that the State was partly dictatorship, partly democracy* 
however, in each case one had to make sure for which class it was a dicta-
torship and for which a democracy. 
He analyzed the socialist type of State in all its details. He pointed out that 
the socialist State was the means of the dictatorship of. the proletariat, whose 
need emerged temporarily. On tying up the functions of the State with the 
problems of class warfare, Lenin categorically declared that the State was 
merely a means of the proletariat in the class warfare. A queer cudgel, rien de 
plus. Hence Lenin took a stand for the need for a socialist State, whose essence 
was the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. He wrote tha t the pro-
letariat needed the sovereign power, the centralized organization of power, the 
power-enforcement organization, also in order to suppress the resistance of the 
exploiters and also to guide the huge masses of the population, the peasantry, 
the petite bourgeoisie and the semiproletariat in the system, of socialist economy. 
In connexion with this thesis Lenin criticized the anarchists and revisionists. 
In connexion, with the form of government Lenin set out from the thesis 
that the State was a machinery or organism, whose forms were extremely 
variegated. In his work "On the State" he explained that the forms of the 
State could be extremely varied. The State is a machinery which serves for 
the suppression of one class by the -other, and whose function is to teach all 
subordinate classes obedience to one class. For the performance of these func-
tions the organization of the State had to be built up in a peculiar manner. 
Lenin, in "Three constitutions, or three forms of governmental order", analyzed 
the structure of the highest level of the political organization in detail and 
made it clear that on the highest level the political order had three forms, viz. 
(a) the absolute monarchy, the form wanted by the police and the civil servants; 
(b) the constitutional monarchy, the form preferred by the most liberal bour-
geois; (c) the democratic republic, preferred by the self-conscious workers. 
In a democratic republic there was no Tsar, no Upper Chamber, there was 
but one chamber elected by general, direct, equal and secret ballot. Further-
more the democratic republic meant the complete subordination of the police 
and the civil service to the people, i.e. they would wield no special power. The 
democratic republic neither granted privileges to the capitalists or the landow-
ners. In a democratic republic the people had to exercise the whole power, i.e. 
in it the people had a united and indivisible power. A democratic republic was 
needed in order that the enlightened people might learn to manage its own 
affairs. It was the most suitable form for the f ree struggle 'of the working 
class for socialism, for a system where there would be neither rich nor poor, 
where the whole soil, all factories would be the people's own. Studying the 
question of the governmental form Lenin pointed out that the forms of govern-
ment were changing in the course of history, however, the essence of the 
various forms was in each case the dictatorship of one class or another. In this 
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respect he pointed out that every State where the private ownership of land 
and means of production existed, where capital was ruling, however democratic 
it was, was a capitalist State, a machinery in the hands of the capitalists, used 
for the oppression of the working class and the poor peasantry. On this under-
standing it could not be disputed that the representative organs were mere 
forms which did not change the essence, i.e. the doctrine as if the various forms 
of representation and the franchise associated with them expressed the will of 
the people as a whole, or the representative organizational forms embodied the 
decisions of the people, was untrue. The representative organizational forms 
and the elections associated with these were, first, mere puppets, secondly, toys. 
He made these statements with reference to a definite country, viz. the United 
States of America. He stated that, as generally known, the United States were 
the most democratic republic of the world, still in this republic the capital and 
not the people ruled, i.e. there the representative forms of organization did not 
express the will of the people and did not enforce the decision of the people. 
"How does the rule of capital prevail?" Lenin asked the question, and answered 
it: "The rule of capital manifests itself brutally, in the form o-f open corrup-
tion, cynically and cruelly; it is exercised by a handful of millionaires." Lenin 
drew the conclusion that no democratic republic could work changes on the 
rule of capital, not even franchise, although, as compared to feudalism, this 
meant progress, i.e. under capitalist conditions the State was not called to 
safeguard the interests of all, but merely served as a means for the oppression 
of others by the few. 
In his "Caricature of Marxism" Lenin stated in connexion with the form 
of government that imperialism, whose economic essence was the replacement 
of free competition by the monopolies, was a turn f rom democracy to political 
reaction. This meant that 'in the era of imperialism the bourgeois State denied 
democracy in both home and foreign politics, e.g. it denied the election of the 
civil servants by the people and also the right of self-determination of peoples. 
However, it could not be argued that the republic was the most democratic 
form of the political superstructure of capitalist society. In this connexion Lenin 
analyzed the contradiction between imperialist and democracy. First, he made 
it clear that each, political form, and thus also the republic, had an economic 
content, i.e. in this respect economy and politics were correlated. Consequently 
the contradiction between imperialism and democracy was the contradiction 
between an economic and political thesis, or, more precisely, the contradiction 
between the economic order of imperialism and political democracy in general. 
Therefore the election of the various representative organs by the people, or 
the right of combination and assembly contradicted imperialism. Imperialism 
then drew the conclusion that its economic system had to be reconciled with 
democracy or the republic, and this in a peculiar manner. This reconciliation 
took place in a way that, officially, the differences of the pecuniary circum-
stances were ignored, i.e. rich and poor were raised to the same level. Recon-
ciliation manifested itself in a republic in a form that wealth wielded power 
indirectly and not directly, partly in the form of a direct "corruption" of the 
civil service,, partly in the form of an alliance between government and stock 
exchange. Thus the reconciliation of imperialism and republic, or democracy, 
had these two economic means which guaranteed the enforcement of the power 
of capital. 
I l l 
in his work "The proletarian revolution and the renegade Kautsky" Lenin 
analyzed the problem of dictatorship, and explained that dictatorship was a 
state where one class exercised revolutionary coercion over the other. The 
distinction recommended by Kautsky, viz. that a line should be drawn between 
the given state or situation and the form of government was mere nonsense, 
because everybody knew that in a bourgeois system the forms of government 
were bourgeois dictatorship. Therefore the fact that any form of the structure 
of the governmental organization served merely for the suppression of one class 
by the other, could not be argued. However, Lenin emphasized that the form 
of oppression was not indifferent for the proletariat, for it could make easier, 
or hamper class warfare. 
Lenin analyzed the problems of the form of government also amidst so-
cialist conditions of society and economy. His great merit was that under the 
historical conditions of Russia, and by taking into account the experiences of 
the revolution of 1905 and the revolution of February 1917, he discovered the 
new form of government of the dictatorship of the working class, viz. the 
republic of the Soviets. In 1905 Lenin wrote that the soviets should be consi-
dered the germs of the provisory revolutionary government, the independent 
revolutionary creation of the working class. This remained his belief also when 
in the February revolution the soviets began to organize. In April 1917 Lenin 
formulated the watchword "No parliamentary republic". A return f rom the 
soviets of the workers delegates to a parliamentary republic would be a step 
backwards. What was needed was the republic of the soviets of the delegates 
of workers, fa rm workers and peasants from below all over the country. Lenin 
enriched the thesis of Engels on the governmental form of a dictatorship of 
the proletariat as laid down in the "Critique of the Erfurt Programme", and 
by this he showed the path to the Russian working classes and the toiling 
peasants in their struggle against the 'bourgeois-landowner system. 
In connexion with the problems of the form of government, Lenin analyzed 
the leading role of the party of the working class in the socialist State. He 
fur ther studied the internal structure of the socialist State, in particular the 
problem of federation in its bearing on the problem of nationalities. 
As regards the functions of the State, Lenin in general analyzed the func-
tion of the State and in this connexion the function of the capitalist and 
socialist State. In association with the classoppressing functions of the State, 
he pointed out that the goal of the State was the creation of an "order" which 
would mitigate the clashes between the classes merely in order to legalize and 
perpetuate oppression, i.e. the State deprived the oppressed classes of certain 
means of the struggle for overthrowing the oppressors. He emphasized that the 
function of the State to maintain a certain order in society and to dampen the 
clashes between the classes did not mean the reconciliation of the oppressing 
and oppressed classes. The ruling class could not be reconciled with its anta-
gonist, the oppressed class. Fundamentally the content of the socialist State 
meant that it was the means of the dictatorship of the proletariat and this 
defined its relations to society as a whole, and also the functions of the State. 
The socialist State as the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat was an 
active factor and governmental activity exactly advanced the objective evolu-
tion of the conditions of society. Consequently the socialist State performed not 
only clas^roppressing functions, but also economic-, organizational and cultural-
educative functions. 
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In connection with the dual function of the State, viz. first, that the 
.socialist State performs class-oppressing functions, and, secondly, that the 
socialist Staté sets as a target the omnidirectional transformation and develop-
ment of society, i.e. displays activities to conform to the needs of a communist 
society, and therefore performs economic-organizational and educative function, 
Lenin made the statement that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a stub-
born struggle, a bloody and bloodless, a violent and peaceful, a military and 
economic, a pedagogic and administrative fight against the forces and traditions 
of the old society. Lenin also analyzed the external functions of the State, or 
rather the socialist State, and laid particular stress on a study of the foreign 
policy of the socialist State. Lenin's doctrines on the foreign policy of the 
socialist State were laid down in the Decree of Peace and in the resolution on 
the international situation passed by the Eighth All-Russian Conference of the 
Communist Par ty and the Seventh Congress of the Soviets. 
In connexion with the external and internal functions of the State, Lenin 
analyzed the notion of politics. In this analysis Lenin enlarged on the relations 
between politics and class interests, and pointed at the relative independence 
of politics and the peculiarities of revolutionary politics. In a letter to Inessa 
Armand he wrote that politics were the relations of nations, classes, etc. and 
prior to this, in notes compiled for the nver-written article "Materials for the 
question of the function of the State" (1916) he wrote that politics were a 
participation in the af fa i rs of the State, the definition of the forms, functions 
and contents of governmental activity. In several works Lenin analyzed the 
problems of politics, e.g. he stated that politics were concentrated economy, or 
the concentrated expression of economy, and pointed out that politics had 
unconditional priority over economy. Anybody thinking differently was obli-
vious of the alphabet of Marxism. He evolved ideas of significance also in his 
work "Once again of the trade unions, the actual situation and the errors of 
Trotsky and Bukharin" when he stated that if the problem was not tackled 
politically, then the class in question would not be able to retain power, and 
consequently, would not be able to perform its task of production (1921). In 
his speech in the Ail-Russian Conference of the committees of political enligh-
tenment organized with the provincial and district divisions of popular educa-
tion (1920) Lenin explained that politics were a struggle of the classes, politics 
were the attitude of the proletariat fighting for liberation, against the bour-
geoisie of the world. This meant that politics had two sides, viz. the inner side 
of the political struggle was the destruction of the legacy of the bourgeois 
régime, or the crushing of the counterrevolutionary attempts of the bourgeoisie, 
and building, i.e. following an economic policy which was for practical purposes 
directed to the building of socialism. In this connexion Lenin stated that politics 
and economy had in the eyes of the bourgeoisie drifted away from each other. 
As a matter of fact the trend of thought of the bourgeoisie was: go on working 
and in the market you would get everything, while economic policy is the 
business of your masters. Lenin made very instructive statements of the roots 
of foreign and home policy. He made it clear that both foreign and home 
policy were associated with the economic interests of the ruling class, i.e. both 
were defined by economic interests. In political activities this fact should go 
astray in the maze and labyrinth of the intrigues of diplomacy. Nor could we 
discover in the background of statements and promises the interests of one 
class or another. Without the knowledge of the class association of interests 
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we become victims of deception and self-deception. This was explained also by 
the fact that every institution relied on the forces of one class or the other. In 
his work "Relations with the bourgeois parties" Lenin explained tha t he who 
rejected the theory of class werfare arid failed to explore (a) the class whose 
interests defined the policy of the various parties and (b) what dominant in-
terest defined them, was not a t rue Marxist. In his writing: "On the occasion 
of an article of the paper of the Bund" he emphasized that politics had their 
objectice logic, and that this objective logic was independent of the preliminary 
setting of targets by persons and the targets of the parties. He also made i t 
clear that there could be certain technical agreements between the parties re-
presenting different class interests, still these would not bring about political 
blocks, so that special attention had to be . paid to these agreements. In fact 
behind the veil of "technical" agreements the idea of a political block might 
stubbornly push through. In connexion with politics Lenin declared that politics 
required elasticity, skilful transition, therefore the complete subordination of 
the policy-enforcing state machinery to politics must be guaranteed. It should 
be remembered that the f irmer the machinery was as an aid, the better and 
appropriate it was for manoeuvring. If a machinery became rigid, it would 
merely hamper the enforcement of a definite policy. Lenin analyzed the 
peculiarities of a revolutionary policy. He emphasized the following: (a) A poli-
tical standpoint means that in the name of the organization the given situation 
must be appraised, a fighting slogan suiting the situation must be sounded, and 
the activity of the masses must be guaranteed; And evaluation must be carried 
out by the vanguard, (b) Only exactly confirmed, i.e. irrefutable facts could 
be accepted as the premise of a policy. Only facts should be accepted as the 
basis which permit an accurate and objective study; (c) Policy is the best 'if it 
is straightforward and open. A principal policy is always the most practicable 
policy. Questions of principle should always be settled beforehand, because 
questions of detail arise, the principles are always needed; it would be un-
principledness to rule without; them; (d) Thére are errors in politics, the f rank 
admission of a political error always yield profits when it is an error in which 
whole parties participate and when these parties have a strong influence on 
the masses; (e) Politics are closely associated with the positive moral properties 
of the individual. In particular one must be sincere, vigilant, consistent, etc. in 
politics. Sincerity in politics means the harmony between words and deeds. 
This is of utmost importance because in politics one has to do with millions 
of people and not with individuals, and what must be sincere in the first 
place is politics rather than the individual. There is also treason in politics. 
Treason can occur for several reasons. It might occur from weakness, ye t ' also 
intentionally, i.e. from, calculation. This distinction between the causes-of 
treason appears f rom the side of individuals, but in politics there is no differ-
ence between the two, for politics decide the lot of millions of men, and it is 
immaterial for the lot of millions whether people are betrayed because of 
weakness or calculation; (f) In politics, personal influence is of enormous 
significance, and so is the addressing of meetings. Lenin made the statement 
that without these two factors there is no political activity, moreover even 
. writing loses of its political vigour. Consequently politics is a science and an 
art at the same time. As an art politics consist in a proper assessment of the 
• circumstances in and the moment at, which we are acting; (g) In his work 
. "The new economic policy and the functions of the committees for the political 
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education of the people" written in 1921 Lenin explained that politics have two 
conditions at least, first, that there should be no illiteracy, as this would 
frustrate a comprehension of the actual policy, and instead false rumors, 
gossip, fairy tales and a variety of prejudices would be spreading, and, sec-
ondly, it should not degenerate into corruption, for corruption was apt to thrust 
measures expressing, the correct policy to the background, and condemn them 
to failure. From this point of view it cannot be argued that the precondition 
of a comprehension of policy is the raising of the cultural standards of the 
masses. 
Lenin also analyzed the problem of the withering away of the State. 
It was particularly. in his work "State and Revolution" that he exposed his 
ideas of this theory. He pointed out that the economic basis of the complete 
withering away of the State is the rise of communism to a stage of evolution 
where the antagonism between intellectual and physical work disappears, and 
consequently one of the principal sources of the present inequality of society 
also disappears, a sourse which cannot be eliminated merely by the transfer 
of the means of production to social ownership or the expropriation of the 
capitalists. Thus Lenin saw the economic basis of the complete withering away 
of the State in the disappearance of the antagonism between intellectual and 
physical work. He stated that the State could wither away completely when 
society had translated into reality the rule "all according to their abilities, all 
according to their needs", i.e. when men would get used to the. observance of 
the fundamental rules of coexistence and when their work would be f rui t fu l 
to an extent that they would do work according to their abilities of their own 
accord. From what has been set forth it is evident that Lenin linked up the 
disappearance of the antagonism between intellectual and physical, work and 
the translation of the principle "all according to their abilities, all according 
to their needs" into reality with the technical development of communism to 
the highest possible degree, this being the precondition of a pre valance of the 
principles referred to above. Lenin made in clear that it is the enforcement of 
these two principles that could persuade men to observe the fundamental rules 
of coexistence, or f rom another aspect, the enforcement of these principles is 
the condition of the needlessness of a state machinery, which at the time of 
transition to communism is still needed although the State of the period of 
transition is no longer a State in the proper sense of the term. In this work 
Lenin also pointed out that from a bourgeois point of view it was easy to call 
this social order a Utopia, and mocking the socialists for their promise that in 
the new society anybody would have a claim to truffles, motor cars, pianos, 
etc. of .any quantity without their work being submitted to any control. This 
was ignorance, because the new social order did not presume the actual 
productivity of work nor the petty bourgeois of these days, who for mere fun 
would be capable of damaging social property and put forward unreasonable 
demands. Lenin also emphasized that the term "withering away" suggested a 
gradedness and spontaneity of the process. In addition Lenin intergrated the 
withering away of the State with the withering away of democracy. In fact 
communism would be capable of guaranteeing a t rue democracy and by that 
time the problem would be no longer interesting. Finally he made it clear that 
only communism would bring about conditions in which the State would 
become wholly superfluous, for there would be "nobody to be oppressed", there 
would be nobody to be oppressed in the interest of a class in the sense of an 
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organized campaign against a definite section of the population. Lenin said that 
we are no Utopians, we do not deny the contingency, moreover inevitability, 
of the comission of offences by certain persons and also that such offences 
must be prosecuted. Still, in the first place, for this purpose no separate 
mechanism was needed, or a separate power-enforcing system, this would be 
done by the armed people (here it should be remarked that Lenin considered 
the soviets of the worker and soldier delegates to be the organization of the 
armed masses) in as simple and easy a manner as actually any group of civil-
ized persons would separate a crowd of ruffians, or prevent women f rom being 
raped. Secondly, everybody knew that offences consisting in the infringement 
of the rules of social coexistence had their cause in the exploitation, misery 
and penury of the masses. With the elimination of these principal causes also 
the offences would begin to "wither away". Nobody knew how rapidly and 
gradually this would take place, still everybody .knew that the causes would 
eventually wither away. Together with the withering away of these causes 
also the State would wither away. 
In his works Lenin exposed a number of fundamental theses not only 
such as related to the State, but also those concerning the law. 
In connexion with the essence of law, Lenin set forth that the law was 
the expression of the will of the ruling class, and pointed out that no law 
whatever could restrict the ruling classes in the expression of their will. In his 
writing "Controversial standpoint" he emphasized that the will, if it was that 
of the State, must find expression in the form of a statute promulgated by the 
sovereign power, or else the word "will" is but a vibration of the air produced 
by mere sound. In his work "Slate and Revolution" he made the momentous 
remark that any law meant the application of a uniform standard to various 
men, who in reality were unequal. In connexion with the exploiting type of 
law he stated in his writing "A noteworthy affair" that it is the landowners 
who make the statutes, and it is they who in practice applied or rescinded them. 
Hence the landowner class made and repealed the law. Consequently the 
landowners were also zealous backers of the law, yet of the law of landowners, 
of their class. Consequently it was ridiculous to speak of law in these circum-
stances. Further he made it-clear that capitalist law paired formal equality with 
social and economic equality and did not recognize the inequalities openly, 
although it even failed to carry through the formal i.e. legal equality in any 
consistent manner. Studying the problems of the bourgeois type of law in "The 
proletarian revolution and the renegade Kautsky" Lenin criticized Kautsky, 
becauce he, Kautsky, failed to notice that the reactionary bourgeois jurists 
worked out statutory provisions going into the minutest detail to "squezze" 
the working man. 
On analyzing the socialist type of law, Lenin by referring to the "Critique 
of the Gotha Programme" of Marx, made it clear that in socialism there was 
need not only for the State but also for the law and that in socialism bourgeois 
law would cease to exist partially only and not altogether. Namely bourgeois 
law brought under regulation the distribution of goods and also of work, and 
in the course of this process it allotted an equal quantity of goods to unequal 
persons for work of an actually unequal amount. This was, Lenin pointed out 
in the "State and Revolution", a hangover of the earlier type of law in the 
new type of law. Lenin then drew the conclusion that in socialism we do not 
yet surpass the narrow horizon of bourgeois law. In his "Letter to the American 
.116 
workers" he emphasized that politically the law carried into effect t rue equal-
ity, as in fact it guaranteed the freedom of combination and assembly for the 
partisans of socialism, i.e. the equality of the workers and peasants, however, it 
suppressed the enemies of socialism. 
Lenin also analyzed the questions of lawmaking or legislation in all its 
details. He expressed his opinion that in a socialist society legislation was quick 
enough. No other powers knew such a high-speed legislation as that of Soviet-
Russia. Time would show whether the near fu ture would not compel these 
powers to follow a little in the wake of Soviet-Russia. 
On analyzing the class content of legislation he also stated that e.g. the 
constitution, i.e. the fundamental statute of the State also expressed the power 
relations as they actually existed in class warfare and that in certain circumst-
ances the constitution, too, openly recognized inequality. In connexion with 
the emancipation of women, Lenin made it clear that statutes by themselves 
were as a matter of course insufficient, and that Soviet-Russia would by no 
means be satisfied merely with the promulgation of decrees. But as concerns 
legislation Soviet-Russia did all she had to do in order to guarantee for women 
a legal position equal to that of men, and Soviet-Russia could pride herself 
for this. It was evident that statutes by themselves were not sufficient, still 
they meant a considerable force, first, for reasons of propaganda, and, secondly, 
for their actual enforcement. In this connexion Lenin referred to the fact that 
the Soviet statutes were landmarks on the path of the evolution of a new 
form of living, that they provided facilities for the unfolding of "the decisive 
factor of the new society", i.e. of the living creative force of the masses, which 
in turn would make up and translate into reality the process indicated by the 
statutes. Lenin exposed this idea in his "Answer to the questions of the leftist 
socialrevolutionaries". In the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist 
(bolshevik) Par ty Lenin, in connexion with legislation, stated that there were 
men who said that there was. no need for compiling this enormous number of 
decrees, and reproach the Soviet government for its undertaking to compile 
decrees before it knew how these could be carried into effect. Strictly speaking 
these persons did not notice how they had sunk to the level of the white guard-
ists. We should be idiots if we believed that rural life as a whole would change 
because of the promulgation of a few hundred decrees. Still we should become 
the traitors of socialism if we waived to mark out the path to socialism in 
decrees. The decrees which could not be carried through at the t ime and in 
their entirety, had a considerable function for the purpose of propaganda. If 
earlier universal truths were used for propaganda, now it was work which 
was propagated. The decrees of the Soviet power were as many appeals to the 
masses for practical work. The decrees were instructions which called the 
masses to practical work. This was of importance. Let there be much useless 
things in these decrees, which would never be carried through in life; but 
there was still enough for practical activity, and it was the function of the 
decrees to teach the hundreds and thousands and millions of men who listened 
to the word of the. Soviet power, to take practical action. Lenin clearly indic-
ated the propagandis ts nature of law, however, this did not mean the blurring 
of the coercive nature of the law. Lenin drew the conclusion that law existed 
only in the State and only the State could lend a compulsory force to the law. 
Therefore customs could not acquire legal significance unless they are sanc-
tioned by one of the agencies of the State. Namely one can speak of law only 
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at a definite stage of historical evolution, f rom the moment when classes and 
the State came into being. In fact, without a law-enforcing organization law 
was nothing. 
Lenin also analyzed the problems of the application of the law. On study-
ing the application of law he set forth noteworthy theses in connexion with 
the interpretation of legal provisions. In his work "The proletarian revolution 
and the renegade Kautsky" in connexion with the bourgeois application of the 
law, he set forth that the lawyers and civil servants knew to interpret the law 
in such a way as to prevent the worker and the peasants f rom breaking 
through the barbed-wire defences of the law. This is but arbitrariness. Fur ther-
more in his "Account rendered on the work of the Council of the People's 
Commissars" he wrote that the bourgeois administration of justice was in real-
ity the blind, crafty, cunning tool of the unrelenting oppression of the ex-
ploited. The 'bourgeois administration of justice always protected the interests 
of the moneybag, or, in other words, in the capitalist society the judiciary was 
the mechanism of oppression and exploitation. Of the socialist administration 
of justice he said that its organization demanded the destruction of the institu-
tions of the earlier bourgeois administration of justice and that the judges had 
to carry into effect the will of the proletariat. In his writing "The draft 
programme of the Russian Communist (bolshevik) Party", published in 1919, 
he declared that if there was no statute, the judge, must be guided by the 
socialist consciousness of law. It the law hampered the evolution of the revolu-
tion, one must not flinck from its sanctity, but must quash it. The . earlier 
statutes must be liquidated, however, this was merely a clearing of the soil, 
but no construction work. He declared that after, the proletariat had taken all 
power into its hands the judges must be elected f rom among the workers and 
only by the workers. This had in fact been carried through in the whole 
organization of the judiciary. In connexion with the judiciary he emphasized 
that there was the enormous task to educate the masses to discipline of labour. 
Such courts had to be organized within as wide a scope as possible, by ex-
tending their activities to the whole productive life of the country. Provided 
that only the broadest masses of the toiling, and exploited population took 
part in them, such courts would in democratic forms, in conformity with the 
principles of the Soviet power, achieve that discipline and self-control did not 
remain mere desires. Only these courts could achieve that there should be 
revolutionary power in the country, which in words was recognized by all who 
spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat, yet instead often some sort of an 
amorphous mass appeared in the guise of dictatorship. : 
Lenin too analyzed the problems of legality in all their bearings. In the 
first "place he dealt with'socialist legality. In 1919 he declared that the most 
rigorous revolutionary order must be maintained, the statutes and decrees of 
the Soviet power must be observed strictly and the enforcement of these 
statutes, and: decrees should be made the duty of everybody. He stated that 
legality was not that of Kaluga, or Kazan, but that it must be uniform through-
out Russia, moreover in the entire Soviet Republic. In his appeal "To the 
Population" he insisted, on the strict observation of legality. "Create as rigorous 
a. revolutionary order as possible, unrelentingly suppress the drunkards, hooli-
gans,' the: counter-revolutionary cadets; thé- Kornilovists and the anarchistic 
tendencies-of-persons similar to. these:"- In his "Letter tó the workers and peas-
ants on the occasion of the victory over Kóltschak" he made it clear that thé 
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slightest unlawfulness, the smallest infringement of the Soviet order was a 
gap of which the enemies of- the worker would imákéi immediate use, and in 
particular the partisans of the former systems hiding in the various agencies 
of the sovereign power. Lenin emphasized that with the; aid of-the law the war 
hád to be carried on against bureaucratism and protracting tactics, and also 
against corruption. To this end the statutes must be enforced-which guaranteed 
the participation of the workers in public administration and the raising of the 
educational level of the workers. At the same time Lenin demanded that 
corruption, i.e. bribing and lobbying, should be punished with imprisonment 
of ten years at least and with forced labour of another ten years. 
In his work "The two worlds" (1910) Lenin stated that although the 
struggle of the proletariat could be carried out on the soil of bourgeois legality, 
still the final goal of class warfare must be discovered "behind the tinsel of 
constitutional legality". As a matter of fact, in order to keep its power the 
bourgeoisie cannot but disregard its own legality. The period of the exploita-
tion of legality created by the bourgeoisie would be superseded by the period 
of fiercest revolutionary battles, and essentially these battles would amount 
to the destruction of bourgeois legality and bourgeois order as a whole, and as 
for their form they would inevitably begin with the bourgeoisie's catching at 
every straw to rid itself of its own-made, yet unbearable legality. Hence for 
keeping its power the bourgeoisie would be forced to disregard its own legality. 
The revolutionary party must avail itself of bourgeois legality, for that matter 
it has no reason whatever to ignore the advantage: implied in the fact that the 
enemy was now entangled in its own legality, that the enemy was forced to 
"fire" first, and disregard, its own laws. Naturally, as Lenin made it clear in 
his "Conditions of admission to the Communist International", the proletariat 
could not trust bourgeois legality, as the bourgeoisie could decree a state of 
siege and introduce emergency statutes. Therefore the proletariat must organ-
ize an underground machinery and combine lawful and unlawful operations. 
This was the only way in which the party could act in the interests of thé 
proletariat and perform its duties towards the revolution. 
Lenin also analyzed the problems of legal relations and the legal system. 
As regards legal relations he drew a line between the two categories of social 
conditions and threw light on their peculiarities. He emphasized that the 
material social relations were those which came to life without penetrating 
into the consciousness of men. Men, while they bartered their products, entered 
intoi production relations without being conscious of the social relations implied 
here: Lenin pointed out that ideological-social relations were such as had passed 
the consciousness of men before their formation. . . 
-i ;.: In connexion" with the division - of < the legal system Lenin in a letter 
addressed to" Kursky explained that there-were no private affairs, in the sphere 
of economy everything was of public, and not of private law. This was his 
fundamental • statement as regards the division of the socialist legal system. 
n In his oeuvre, : Lenin enriched thé Marxist doctrines on State, politics and 
law: The expansion of the Marxist doctrines manifested itself in the first place 
in the light he-threw on the mutual relations of democracy and dictatorship, 
ön ttheir contrast and.uriity, and demonstrátéd the relations and the differences 
between- the 'essence .and the form of the State: In association1 with the 
problems of the-type of Staté he pointed Out that, exactly on' the groùnds of 
the- experience of the Russian, revolution of 1'905, in the course of the transition 
of the capitalist state to a state of the socialist type of democratic dictatorship 
of the working class and the peasantry might come into being. The conclusions 
of Lenin in this matter were of significance also for the popular democracies. 
Lenin discovered the Soviet form of the socialist State and developed his the-r 
ory on the soviets, by emphasizing that the soviets were a new form of the 
dictatorship of the working class which, in their operation relied on a number 
of social organizations and associations of the workers and consequently they 
too manifested themselves as mass organizations. Lenin, while working out 
the Soviet form of the State, set out from the thesis that the socialist State 
needed a form of government which would draw the broadest masses of the 
workers into governmental work. He demonstrated the new peculiarities of 
socialist democracy in the face of bourgeois democracy, and analyzed the con-
ditions of the prevalence of socialist democracy. He developed the socialist 
theory of the machinery of the State, exactly by setting out f rom the state-
ments of Marx on the Paris Commune. He emphasized tha t in. the course of 
the socialist revolution the earlier machinery of the State must be annihilated 
and that a new, socialist type of machinery must be created. As regards the 
State he enriched the theory of Marx and Engels on the withering away of 
State and law, and in particular defined, the economic conditions of this 
withering away. He cleared the function and significance of socialist law in 
the regulation of the distribution of products and labour, in particular in its 
association with the problems of law and equality. He worked out the socialist 
theory of legality, and emphasized that socialist legality was indispensable1 in 
the whole process of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this connexion he 
explored the methods of activities of the socialist State and the management 
of government, and laid special stress on the particular importance of control 
by the masses in the life of the socialist State. • • 
In the fundamentals of State and. law, Lenin enriched the teachings of 
Marx and Engels on the proletarian revolution, and the dictatorship of. the 
proletariat, and worked out a number of theoretical problems relating to the 
realized socialist State and law. : r 
Today the principal trend of the evolution of society may be described ais 
the revolutionary transition f rom capitalism to socialism. This provides the 
content of the present period. The . socialist world system of which various 
phases may be observed, emerged after the World War II. The birth of the 
socialist world system may be dated back to 1949. The first phase lasted till 
1956. The second phase extends f rom 1956 to 1961. The third phase began '"h 
1961 and still lasts. In this period new experiences have accumulated in society, 
whose theoretical generalization has been accomplished in the party platform 
accepted by the XX n d and X X I P d Congress of the Communist. Par ty of the 
Soviet Union. . . 
The XX n d and XXIIn d party congress was the forum where, in association 
with the principal problems of policy, i.e. the problem of political power, the 
relations of the working class to the bourgeois state were made subject of an 
analysis. In the programme it was made clear that in the bourgeois countries 
the creation of the socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat remained 
the fundamental task of the proletariat, its fundamental, strategic goal. It was 
pointed out that the working class of the western countries and its leading 
force, .the communist parties, did not hope to overthrow the capitalist state 
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in the revolutionary situation created by a third world war, nor did they 
reckon with achieveing their goal at the expense of a destructive economic 
crisis. Actually the conditions for the peaceful creation of the socialist state 
in a parliamentary form had improved, although the armed revolutionary path 
to socialism was not abandoned. The party programme and other documents 
made it clear that the socialist state could not mean a "personal dictatorship", 
it could not mean a system of the abuse of power, nor that af ter the establish-
ment of the socialist state those taking sides with the communists for the 
creation of a socialist state would fall victim to what was called "salami 
tactics". Since a socialist state could be created also by peaceful means, 
possibly even in a parliamentary way, the communist parties operating in the. 
bourgeois world have worked out their platforms accordingly. The Italian 
Communist Par ty has laid down the lines on which it intends to carry on its 
struggle for "structural reforms". The party insists on the extension of the 
controlling functions of the bourgeois legislature and 'believes that the power 
of the great capitalists can be crushed even before the establishment of the 
dictartorship of the proletariat. In fact, with the expansion of democracy and 
with the struggle for state intervention according to a national plan, much can 
be achieved in property relations. The Italian Communist Party fur ther gives 
considerable, attention to the proper enforcement of a policy of alliances and 
its consolidation. The French. Communist Party has also laid down the principal 
trends of the struggle for "true democracy". They insist on the restoration of 
popular sovereignty and in this connexion the extension of the. controlling 
functions of - the bourgeois legislature. They also lay stress on the proper en-
forcement of a policy of alliances with the other parties. In either case the 
goal is to place the management of governmental affairs under popular control. 
And this control would bring about the. transition f rom a capitalist state to a 
socialist state. In order to achieve their targets the communist parties have 
to carry on an ideological struggle with revisionism and in particular with 
social democratic ideology. Proclaiming so-called "democratic socialism" social 
democracy believes that socialism can be achieved also without the creation of 
the socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and without the transfer 
of the means of production to public ownership. It cannot be argued that this 
ideological concept of social democracy revaluates the notion of socialism, 
waives the dictatorship of the proletariat and the abolition of the private 
ownership of the means of production. Social democracy is convinced that 
by managing a parliamentary majority the just operation of society can be 
achived. However, this is a mere illusion, as the bourgeoisie and the financial 
oligarchy give up power of their own accord on rare historical occasions only. 
The birth of a socialist state has fundamental regularities and these regular-
ities cannot be ignored. These regularities are the socialist revolution, the 
guidance of the working people by the Marxist party, which gives expression 
to the leading function of the working class, fu r ther the crushing of the bour-
geois political machinery and the revolutionary creative role of the masses in 
shaping the new state. In this process the dictatorship of the proletariat can 
be brought about in many forms and the dictatorship itself may have a variety 
of features. 
In the XXIIn d Congress of the Communist. Party of the Soviet Union, the 
relations of the working class to bourgeois law have also been analyzed. 
Namely it is the policy of the various communist parties to continue their 
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struggle for "structural reforms", i.e. so-called "true or genuine" democracy 
on the ground of present bourgeois constitutions, i.e. the working class makes 
use of bourgeois law, but it does not identify itself with the underlying 
capitalist interests and will. The various documents oppose the doctrines 
according to which bourgeois law, its enforcement and observance, i.e. bour-
geois legality, fully serve the interests of the working class. Naturally the 
existence of bourgeois legality is more for the benefit of the working class 
than e.g. fascism, where legality was trampled upon. The documents explain 
that the problems of the class content of bourgeois legality cannot be replaced 
by the question whether or not the existence of legality or its absence is more 
favourable for the working class. Undoubtedly, in certain periods, the working 
class joins in the fight for bourgeois legality and its enforcement. However, 
the working class cannot accept bourgeois law as its own, and cannot accept 
bourgeois legality either as its own. In fact the contents of both bourgeois 
law and legality have a class character, i.e. the two are not "class-indifferent" 
norms, although the class character will not be obvious in each provision. 
Hence neither bourgeois law, nor its resultant legality has two parts, the one 
being of public interest, the other being associated with class warfare. Fund-
amentally, capitalist law, too, has a duality of functions; first, it has class 
oppressing functions; and, secondly, functions finding an expression in the 
maintenance of order. The duality of functions manifests itself in the dialectic 
unity of content and form, and the class function cannot be segregated f rom 
the function expressed in the maintenance of order. Viewed f rom another 
angle, this means that the safeguard of bourgeois law and bourgeois legality 
by the working class has its limitations. It is true that the labour movement 
may exploit, and even exploits, bourgeois legality for the creation of the 
socialist state, and the introduction of the dictatorship of the proleariat, still 
behind the "tinsel of constitutional legality" there is lurking class warfare. 
This means that the turning to good account of bourgeois legality can never 
misled the working class as to the class character of bourgeois legality, because 
in the order of bourgeois legality the share of the working class is a "serious, 
deepreaching, vital state of war". What follows is that for the working class 
the advantages afforded by bourgeois law and bourgeois legality have a relat-
ive value only, because no trace will remain of bourgeois legality as soon as 
the existence of bourgeois private property is in jeopardy. Hence socialism 
has no place within the framework of bourgeois legality. Namely the bour-
geoisie will, as soon as its .reason for existence is called into doubt, give up 
its own iegality. Hence the denial of bourgeois legality on principle and the 
dialectics of its contingent use are but the dialectic of the proclamation and 
-rejection of bourgeois legality. Hence the working class cannot adopt bour-
geois rlaw. As soon as it will come to power it will have to create a new legal 
system, in . whose creation the broad'masses will have to take part. I f , - for a 
period of transition, statutes dating back to bourgeois times will be salvaged, 
these, will have to be interpreted so as to suit the interests of the working 
class or the whole toiling people. 
The XXIIn d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union aid-
vanced a number of important theoretical statements in connexion' with the 
socialist state. It expressed the doctrine tha t the dictatorship of the working 
class would at a definite stage of evolution of the" socialist state forfeit /its 
justification, i.e. for the purposes of internal evolution, the dictatorship of 
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the proletariat would cease to be a necessity in the Soviet Union. The Congress 
emphasized that the dictatorship of the proletariat guaranteed the complete 
and final victory of socialism in the Soviet Union, and through its agency 
the Soviet Union had been transformed into the universal state of the people, 
an organism representing the interests and will of the people as a whole. With 
the realization of the first phase of communism, i.e. socialism, the socialist 
state entered a new phase of its evolution and so proletarian democracy 
changed over to an allnational socialist democracy. However, the working 
class, as the most progressive, best organized force of Soviet society would 
continue to exercise its leading role. This position taken by the XXIIn d 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: was of fundamental 
importance for several reasons. It was of importance for the very reason 
that the proletariat had not in mind to perpetuate its power, i.e. that 
the socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat was merely the state 
of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Hence the working 
class was the only class in history which did not intend to perpetuate its 
power. As' a matter of fact if . the conditions which had called to life the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would cease to exists, and when also the 
problems which could be tackled only with the aid of a dictatorship would 
be solved, then with the leadership of the working class the State would 
become the universal popular organization of a socialist society. It was made 
clear that the woiking class of the Soviet Union converted its dictatorship 
into a universal popular state, i.e. for the first time in history a state was 
born which was not the dictatorship of a single class, but the means of society 
and the people as a whole, and not of the dictatorship of the one or the other 
class. It was also pointed out that there was no partition wall between the 
state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the universal state of the people, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat itself bore the traits of the universal social-
ist democracy, traits which would become determining in the subsequent 
phase. Its metamorphosis into a universal popular State did not weaken the 
power of the State in the least; on the contrary, this power was even re-
inforced, as its underlying social basis, this principal source of the strength 
of the S t a t e / h a d been widened. It was also made clear that although class 
antagonism had disappeared, the State remained. This is connected with the 
fact that there were still tasks which could be tackled only with the aid of the 
State. Consequently the State would continue to live even after socialism had 
been built up. These tasks were associated with the creation of the material 
and technical foundations of communism, the change-over of socialist condi-
tions to communist conditions, the control of consumption, the safeguarding 
of the rights, freedom of the citizens, the defence of the socialist legal order 
and socialist property, the education of the broad masses to conscious discipline 
and to a communist attitude to work, the defence and security of the country, 
and the cooperation of socialist countries with the capitalist ¿world. Con-
sequently the State would go on living even after the victory of socialism. 
The withering away of the all-national socialist State would take a long time, 
extend over a whole historical period and come to an end only when society 
would be completely mature for selfadministration. Naturally in the process 
of the withering away of the State the elements of political leadership and 
social self-administration would be intertwined for a definite period, and in 
the process the internal functions of the-Sta te would change and gradually 
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drop their political character. The State would therefore wither away, and 
become superfluous only if in the Soviet Union the advanced communist 
society would be established, and in the international arena socialism gained 
the upper hand and consolidated. 
The XXII n d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made 
theoretical statements also in association with socialist law. It emphasized 
the need for the continued consolidation of the socialist legal order, the postul-
ate of the improvement of the legal norms, and that the various laws, resolu-
tions, decrees and instructions had to be enforced completely. It insisted on 
the strict observance of socialist legality on the understanding that any 
breach of it, and any infringement of the law must be prosecuted. 
A review of the political and legal opinions of Marx, Engels and Lenin 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that all the three investigated the most 
vital problems of State and law. In their analysis of the fundamental problems 
of State and law they had rcourse to a number of political and legal cate-
gories. With the aid of these categories they analyzed the content, essence, 
forms, structure of State and law, and also the problems of the socialist State 
and law. 
The Great October Socialist Revolution has created the first socialist 
State, and law of the world. The socialist system of society at the same time 
has given a shape to the theory of State and law as a uniform political science^ 
which deals with the principal phenomena of politics and policy, i.e. with 
State and law. Several phases may be distinguished in the evolution of the 
independent Marxist theory of State and law, and one may say that this 
autonomous branch of science, viz. political science, in particular a f te r the 
XXII n d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has entered 
a phase of remarkable development. Actually, the theory of State and law 
tries to suppress the dogmatic political tendencies in the theory of State and 
law flourishing in the "fifties, and their remnants, and for a study of the 
problems of State and law on a general level endeavours to apply a complex 
method. It is hoped that by this method the theory of State and law will 
effectively promote the research of the principal phenomena of politics, and 
of the socialist State and law, in particular in their relations to the govern-
mental agencies, in order to develop public activity and improve the effect-
iveness of the legal norms. The theory of State and law as an autonomous 
branch of science dealing with the origins of State and law, their essence, 
significance, regularities, evolution makes use of the laws and categories of 
dialectic and historical materialism, relies on scientific socialism and the re-
sults of research in sociology, the psychology of society, the historical sciences 
and the branches of jurisprudence. At present the theory of State and law 
teaches that the principal regularities of State and law have to be grasped 
within the theory of State and law from various aspects. The theory of State 
and law, studying the principal regularities of State and law, at the same 
time emphasized the close relationship existing between State, law and politics. 
The theory of State and law deals with political phenomena. 
Namely the State is a political institution. It was not by mere accident 
that Lenin emphasized the unbreakable ties between politics and State, when 
he made it clear that politics were, strictly speaking, participation in the 
affairs of the State, the guidance of the State, the definition of the form and 
functions of the State, and of the content of its activities. Viewing the State 
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from another aspect, the classics of Marxism emphasized that any general 
statement transmitted by the State would receive a political character. The 
specific, or political side of the various classes of society, various nations and 
other social and economic communities is exactly implied in the fact that these 
relations demand a State. More precisely the. economically ruling class becomes 
a politically ruling class with the aid of the State, or, in other words, domina-
tion with the aid of the sovereign power amounts to domination in the poli-
tical sense. Consequently the State and its activty are the principal aspects 
of political life, i.e. not a specific aspect or routine element of it. The political 
life of society is in its entirety associated with the sovereign power and the 
relations to the content of governmental functions. Consequently politics are 
inseparably tied up with the specific governmental side of the life of society. 
Or, f rom another aspect: without an analysis of the State or without a respect 
for the forms of the State and the peculiarities of politically organized 
activities, one cannot find one's way. 
Law, too, is a political institution. In this case, too, it was not by mere 
accident that Lenin again stressed the unbreakable ties between politics and 
law, when he exposed that law, or the statutes, were political standards or 
policy, i.e. legislation was a political act. The specific aspects, or the political 
side of the relations between the various classes of society, or the different 
nations and other social and economic communities, are also implied in the 
fact that all these demand some law. Consequently politics have a legal side 
as well as a specifically legal side. i.e. the economically ruling class ensures 
its political domination not only with the aid of the sovereign power, but also 
with the aid of the law. Political life of society is on the whole associated 
with relations defined by the law. Consequently there are unbreakable ties 
between politics and the specifically legal side of the life of society. Con-
sequently without the analysis of law no one can take one's bearings in the 
political life of society, i.e. the forms of the law, the peculiarities of its func-
tion will have to be respected in each case. , , 
From, what has been set forth above it stands to reason that politics are 
closely associated with State and law; however, it is also true that State arid 
law are not merely tied up with one another, but mutually permeate each 
other; neither operates by itself without the other. This means that the State 
is. a legal phenomenon and that law, too, is a phenomenon of the State, or 
political phenomenon. This was emphasized also by the classics of Marxism 
by teaching the simultaneous origin of State and law. Namely law is the 
manifestation and safeguard of the economic interests of the ruling class. The 
safeguard of these interests is not simply one of the functions of the State, 
but one of the most important basic means "of political activity. Hence the 
State depends on law in about the same degree as law depends on the State. 
Therefore it is impossible to study the State segregated from, legal regulation. 
These discussions do not want to say as if the theory of State and law 
had lost its independence as a branch of "science, or had coalesced with poli-
tics. The peculiarities of State and law have to be surveyed also in their re-
lations to other political phenomena. The relations of State and law to poli-
tics cannot be interpreted in a simplified form, because as the weapons of the 
politics of classes both possess a certain degree of independence, and this 
independence lends a certain peculiarity to State and law in the wide sphere 
of political life. State and law are subject to politics. Both are weapons and 
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forms of politics. Naturally this cannot mean as if in the process of transla-
tion of politics into reality e.g. the laws of the socialist State could be set 
aside. It is essential therefore that there should exist a strict harmony between 
politics and law. Hence thè law cannot be ignored : it can be changed or re-
pealed only in the order established by statute. On this consideration the poli-
tical principles have to find and expression in the legal forms, in conformity 
with the constitution. Consequently recourse to the legal forms is of funda-
mental significance in the elaboration of a scientifically established policy. 
Hence it cannot be argued that the theory of State and law established 
in an autonomous form is a vital portion of Marxist—Leninist political science; 
it is political science by itself in the above meaning, and therefore the attempts 
to shape a so-called autonomous socialist political science provoke serious 
doubts, because this would suggest as if other social sciences were non-poli-
tical. However, this is merely paradoxical. In this respect it has to 'be em-
phasized that no aspect of social life exists in a manner isolated f rom politics, 
i.e. from politics where the fundamental and most vital interest of the various 
social and economic groups constituting society are reflected. On this under-
standing it cannot be disputed that the interests finding an expression in 
politics are equally reflected in the subject-matters of the various disciplines 
of the political sciences, so in the disciplines of philosophy, political economy, 
in sociology as a group of disciplines, in history, and in political and legal 
sciences, and within the latter in the theory of State, and law. Furthermore 
it cannot be doubted that this statement applies also to other branches of 
the socialist political and legal sciences, although in a most striking manner 
to constitutional law. In fact thèse interests manifest themselves in all branches 
of the political and legal sciences, as the infringement of any legal provision 
exposed or studied within their scope is associated with the violation o f ' a 
scientifically established policy. 
Hence the theory of State and law occupies a prominent position in; the 
system of political sciences. In fact politics are present in the whole system of 
categories analyzed by the theory of State and law. Thus politics manifests 
themselves at the study of the mechanism of the State and its form, the sovere-
ignty of the State, the functions of the State, or even at the study of e.g. the 
categories of legislation, the application of law and legality. Consequently 
actually there, is a demand for the intensification of the role of the theory 
of State.and law in the analysis of political phenomena. All this is associated 
with the fact that State and law have momentous functions in the life of 
society. This calls for an improvement and enrichment of the system of poli-
tical and legal categories within the theory of State and law in order. that 
these categories might give a more complete, profounder and many-sided ex-
pression to the concrete forms, distinctive features and specific traits of the 
political. and legal phenomena and processes of the present age. At the same 
time it is a fundamental function of the theory of State and law to appraise 
and criticize the political and legal categories living in bourgeois political sci-
ence and political sociology. From this point of view the theory of State and 
law is of particular importance in a socialist society for the understanding 
and solution of the political problems. Without the political and legal caté-
gories analyzed within the theory of State and law, a correct political analysis 
of the processes of a socialist society would become impossible. Naturally an 
understanding by itself would not suffice: the ideas manifesting themselves 
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in these categories have to be applied consistently. The theory of State and 
law is a discipline whose objective is to raise and at the same time solve any 
new problem of the political life of a socialist society. The theses of theory 
•depend on objective relations, and their translation into reality depends on 
the degree of their elaboration. , i 
Oni the ground of what has been set forth here, the theory of State and 
•law may appreciably contribute to a study of politics and promote the evolu-
tion of Marxist political doctrine. 
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